

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.


Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI

University Microfilms International
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600





TEMPLE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE BOARD

Title of Dissertation.

"U.S. Political Communication and Liberia: An Afrocentric Analysis"

Author Edward Lama Wonkeryor

Read and Approved by

Abu Abarry
Ella Jones
* Fleckbaugh
Molefi Kete Asante

Date submitted to Graduate Board . 1/7/95

Accepted by the Graduate Board of Temple University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy**

Date 1/15/95

(Dean of Graduate School)

**THE EFFECTS OF UNITED STATES' POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
AND THE LIBERIAN EXPERIENCE (1960-1990):
AN AFROCENTRIC ANALYSIS**

**A Dissertation
Submitted to
the Temple University Graduate Board**

**in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

**by
Edward Lama Wonkeryor
January, 1995**

UMI Number: 9527548

Copyright 1995 by
WONKERYOR, EDWARD LAMA
All rights reserved.

UMI Microform 9527548
Copyright 1995, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.

This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

©
Edward Lama Wonkeryor
1995
All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT

THE EFFECTS OF UNITED STATES' POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND THE LIBERIAN EXPERIENCE (1960-1990): AN AFROCENTRIC ANALYSIS

by Edward Lama Wonkeryor

Doctor of Philosophy

Temple University, 1995

Major Advisor: Dr. Abu Shardow Abarry

This study analyzes, from an Afrocentric perspective, the effects of United States political communication and information on Liberia from 1960-1990, and explicates the extent to which they affected the realization of American interests in Liberia. It delineates how the U.S. political communication impacted upon Liberians and Liberian policymakers for the past three decades (1960-1990) during the Cold War.

A basic argument of the study is that the effects of U.S. political communication and information systems were tantamount to the imposition of American social, economic, political, cultural and military ethos on Liberians to achieve American interests. A theoretical framework involving political communication and information which consisted of the variables--entertainment, culture, corporate, diplomatic and military communications--were developed to guide

the assessment of this thesis. An exploratory case study method providing both qualitative and quantitative data (library research, interviews and questionnaires) was used for this study. The findings indicate that (a) the U.S. political communication and information played an integral role in the stability of Liberia during the Cold War period even though from a domineering position; (b) That Liberian policymakers relied on the "special" relationship which existed between Liberia and the United States during the Cold War, and conservatively promoted American economic, military, and political interests in Liberia and in the West African sub-region. Thus, Liberian policymakers also benefitted while marginal development was realized. On the basis of this domination, the U.S. realized its interests in Liberia. (c) That the transmission of Western programs which originated from the U.S. and Great Britain on Liberian communication networks (i.e., radio, television, magazines, newspapers, among others) from 1960-1990 slightly influenced the lifestyles of Liberians and their contemporary social, political and economic activities in the Liberian society.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation was completed with the assistance of many persons. The author is wholeheartedly grateful to Dr. Abu Shardow Abarry for his leadership and patience in directing this dissertation and having being over the years, his academic advisor, mentor and friend. He is also grateful for the criticisms, suggestions, support and encouragement from other members of his dissertation committee: Dr. Ella Forbes and Dr. Molefi Kete Asante of the African American Studies Department, Temple University, and Dr. George Klay Kieh, director of the Center for International Studies and associate professor of Political Science at Morehouse College, Georgia.

The author's special thanks go to Dr. Molefi Kete Asante whose Afrocentric theoretical concepts and insights allowed him to analyze the study from an African cosmology. Without the discipline of Africalogy, his work could not have been accomplished.

The author is very thankful to Dr. Sonja Peterson-Lewis who, armed with brilliant research skills, critiqued the questionnaires for this study. Dr. Ayele Bekerie's excellent editorial skills and critical suggestions guided the author during the research and writing process, and for this, he is eternally grateful.

Much credit goes to Dr. Jack R. Greene, director of the Center for Public Policy, Temple University who enthusiastically and sensitively encouraged the author to pursue this research in order to bring political communication and public policy orientations to the study of Africalogy. In this endeavor, Dr. Greene made available

to the author pertinent economic, social and political documents on Africa, as well as documentary sources that proved valuable to the data gathering.

Dr. Joseph Saye Guannu, former Liberian ambassador to the United States and Canada, judiciously advised the author on the historical, cultural and diplomatic relationships which existed between the Liberian and American policymakers between 1960-1990. For his contributions, the author is overwhelmed. The author's profound gratitude goes to Nancy Ryan, M.D., whose generous financial assistance made it possible for the author to complete the writing of this dissertation.

Much special thanks go to all those who answered questionnaires and obliged to be interviewed for this study both in Monrovia, Liberia, and in Washington, D.C. It is a great pleasure for the author to acknowledge his indebtedness for the friendly assistance, wise advice and prayers of his family and friends in Liberia and in the United States.

The author is totally responsible for the contents of this dissertation.

Edward Lama Wonkeryor
Philadelphia, PA.

DEDICATION

**To my wife, C. Kou Zigbuo, my children
and my family--past, present and future.**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
ABSTRACT	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vi
DEDICATION	viii
LIST OF TABLES	xii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
Overview	1
The Review of Literature	3
The Research Design	8
The Statement of the Problem	9
Objectives	10
A Conceptual Framework	10
An Afrocentric Framework	12
Data Collection	14
Hypotheses	16
The Specific Projected Treatment of Each Sub-Problem	17
Reliability and Validity	18
The Contents of the Dissertation	20
The Importance of the Study	22
Limitations	25
The Definition of Terms	26
2. LIBERIA: A BACKGROUND	29
Economy	36
Liberia and the United States Friendship	39
Origin of Liberia and Growth of Government	40
Rescued Africans	41
The United States of America Government	50
	51

3. UNITED STATES-AFRICAN COMMUNICATION POLICY	54
4. THE DISSEMINATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION (1960-1990)	70
African Political Systems	77
Economic Trends	88
5. THE UTILIZATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION	97
President John F. Kennedy's African Policy	101
Thorny Problems in African-American Relations	103
Factors in Liberia-U.S. Relations	104
Deterrence and the Campaign of Anti-Communism	108
6. THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION	117
The Postwar Era	123
The Cold War Period	123
The VOA Charter	124
The Charter as Law	125
Years of Growth	125
International Communications Agency (I.C.A.)	126
The Department of State	130
Liberia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs	132
The Ministry of Information	
Communications Media	133
A Case Study	134
Summary of Questionnaire and Tables	135
Entertainment	135
Findings	137
Culture	138
Findings	139
Corporate Communication	139
Findings	141
Diplomatic Communication	141
Findings	143

	Military Communication	143
	Findings	144
	Summary of the U.S. and Liberia Policymakers Based on the Limited Number of Samples	145
	Summary of Findings	156
7. SUMMARY AND FINDINGS		158
	Summary	158
	Some Extrapolations of the Theoretical Framework	161
	General Overview	163
	Recommendations for Further Studies	165
	Conclusion	166
8. REFERENCES		171
9. APPENDICES		
	A POLITICAL MAP OF LIBERIA	178
	B DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR LIBERIAN ETHNIC AND LANGUAGE GROUPS	179
	C A SAMPLE OF LETTERS TO THE U.S. AND LIBERIAN POLICYMAKERS	180
	D A LETTER FROM THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE	182
	E QUESTIONNAIRE COMPLETED BY AMERICAN AND LIBERIAN POLICYMAKERS	183

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	PAGE
1. Ethnic Affiliation of Population, 1962, 1974	33
2. Status of Liberian Immigrants	44
3. Sub-Saharan Africa's External Debt as a Share of Total Developing Country Debt at the End of 1986	92
4. United States Bank Claims on and Exposure to Sub-Saharan Africa: March 31, 1987	93
5. U.S. Economic and Military Assistance to Liberia, 1945-1985 (\$ millions)	115
6. Responses of U.S. Policymakers on Entertainment in Liberia	145
7. Responses of Liberian Policymakers on Entertainment	146
8. Comparative Responses of Liberia and the U.S. Policymakers on Entertainment	147
9. Responses of Liberian Policymakers on Culture	148
10. Responses of American Policymakers on Culture	148
11. Comparative Responses of the U.S. and Liberia Policymakers on Culture	149
12. Responses of Liberia Policymakers on Corporate Communication in Liberia	149
13. Responses of U.S. Policymakers on Corporate Communication in Liberia	150
14. Comparative Responses of U.S.-Liberia Policymakers on Corporate Communication in Liberia	150
15. Liberia Policymakers Responses on Diplomatic Communication	151

16. U. S. Policymakers' Responses on Diplomatic Communication	151
17. Comparative Responses of U.S.-Liberia Policymakers on Diplomatic Communication	152
18. Liberia Policymakers' Responses on Military Communication	152
19. Responses of U.S. Policymakers on Military Communication	153
20. U.S.-Liberia Policymakers' Responses on Military Communication	153
21. Comparison of Liberia and the U.S. Policymakers by Race, Age	154
22. Illustration of Liberia and U.S. Policymakers by Gender, Nationality	155
23. Levels of Education of Liberia and the U.S. Policymakers	155

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Overview

In Liberia, the United States' policymakers use the mass media to propagate and influence public policy, with the primary aim of maximizing American economic, social, cultural, political and security interests. Liberian President Samuel Kanyon Doe (1986) underscored this when he reiterated that "the specific interests of the U.S. in Liberia are trade, economic, military, diplomatic, historical ties, mutual cooperation and the social and cultural interaction among the people of our respective countries" (p. 2).

Whitaker (1978) contended also that "U.S. interests intersect with African issues at three main points: in the quest for economic access to Africa's resources and investment opportunities; in North-South Politics in the United Nations and other forums for multilateral negotiations; and in the internationalization of African conflicts" (p. 6). Mann and Lauter (1993) commented with a prophetic assault on consolidating and promoting American interests world-wide:

For most of the last half-century, Americans who advocated engagement abroad have done so on the grounds of military security. America should be involved overseas, presidents from Harry S. Truman to Bush argued, to counter the power of communist regimes and to defend nations friendly to American interests. (p. 2)

Liberian policymakers reorient their domestic policy to be in consonance with prevailing American interests in the country since they are usually influenced by the

powerful United States' communications system. Like other imperial nations, the United States possesses, recognizes and appreciates the significance of political communication and information systems. These communications media help to marginalize Liberian policymakers who are misinformed by its propagandistic aims, thus making them ineffectual and susceptible to massive American cultural influences, as well as political, military and economic exploitations. In the premises, indigenous Liberian values, norms and symbols are overlooked in the formulation of public policy. Legum (1965) argued that Edward Wilmot Blyden, a Pan-African patriot, educator and leading guardian of the African Personality, in his inaugural address as President of Liberia College (1881), said among other things:

All our traditions are connected with a foreign race. We have no poetry or philosophy but that of our taskmasters. The songs that live in our ears and are often on our lips are the songs which we heard sung by those who shouted while we groaned and lamented... Now, if we are to make an independent nation...we must listen to the songs of our unsophisticated brethren as they sing of their history. (p. 21)

Karnga (1926), a Liberian historian and jurist, in his book, History of Liberia, pointed out the issue plaguing Liberian policymakers:

It is a truism that Liberia will not develop so long as we persistently do little else but blindly copy from Europe or America. The country will develop only on lines natural to Africa. Our Government, our food, our clothing, our education, our thoughts and our church must all be fashioned to suit Negro people living in Negro Africa. (p. ix)

The stated problems are some of the crucial problems which Liberian policymakers have faced and are still excruciatingly addressing from July 26, 1847 when Liberia got her independence up to the contemporary time. Accordingly it

becomes necessary for the Liberian policymakers to understand and appreciate Liberia's cultural, economic and political values in the formulation, hence the implementation of policies for the country. In doing so, Liberian policymakers will avoid the errors of the past thus creating a wholesome functioning society.

The Review of the Literature

Ola Balogun, social critic of the current Western mass media and its lack of concern for African nations, has proposed solutions directly related to the predicted effectiveness of the resolution of the imposition or the effects of the Western mass media in African nations. Considering that both Nigeria and Liberia, states of the West African sub-region, are viewed basically in the same light when it comes to American interest. Thus he found it useful and important to examine the functions of communications media vis-a-vis the Western mass media within the Nigerian society. It is against this background that African countries, less powerful and influential, should adopt a cautious posture vis-a-vis the more powerful and influential Western states which, crave to attain, adopt and use the mass media to pursue their particular interests. Otherwise, as Balogun stated in his 1975 study:

far from contributing to the development of our societies, the indiscriminate introduction of modern means of communication as a vehicle for the propagation of Western cultural influences may lead us to increased political and intellectual dependence on the West, with disastrous consequences for our societies. (p.151)

The undergirding thesis of Balogun's study is that "There is instead a complex pattern of unresolved conflict between indigenous African cultural molds and the

penetration of Western cultural influences in relation to the political, economic and social evolution of the new African nations" (p. 152). Balogun (1975) maintained that:

There is undoubtedly a dialectical relationship between the penetration of Western culture in Africa and the political relationship between the Western world and Africa. Since Western colonial domination of African people had as a corollary a sustained (and continuing attempt) to negate and destroy African cultural molds, it follows that the achievement of true political independence in Africa must be accompanied by a return to the values of African civilization. (pp. 152-153)

Balogun discussed the functions of television, radio, foreign news agencies and cinema within Nigerian society. He noted sadly that television in Nigeria, for example, has existed for many years, but no attempt has been made by the authorities to adopt its contents and production techniques to the needs of Nigerian society. He accentuated that television in Nigeria functions more as a relay station for foreign-produced programs than as an outgrowth of the society. One may even go as far as to point out that in essence, Nigerian television stations serve mostly as trojan horses for the introduction of cultural and political values from the Western world. Films are also imported from abroad. As for newspapers, foreign news agencies hold a quasi-monopoly of news transmission to African newspapers, while some African radio stations continue to monitor and retransmit news broadcasts from foreign radio stations (Balogun, 1975).

Writing with deep insight, Herbert I Schiller, a communications scholar at the University of California, San Diego, addressed well the issue of the transmission of

American political economy of communication and information in emerging nations, legitimizing American economic, social, political and military interests.

Schiller established that a dependence on technology and economic strength has been the mainstay of American world power in the 20th century and technology has been important in the application of that power against weaker nations. On account of this, little attention is paid to the mechanics and context of the United States' economic and military operations against less developed nations. Thus, the claim of neutrality of technology and the impartiality of the world market (and the law of comparative advantage) were and remain essential doctrines of American global power. Yet, the forces that are moving communication and culture to the center of the information economy, and making them primary agents of production are pushing ahead relentlessly, propelled by competition and crisis (Schiller, 1984).

Schiller (1984) stated as his thesis the notion that

The highest political leadership in the market economies of the West is thus collaborating with the forceful information and software companies, in recasting the informational system, eliminating its public and social features, and extending its commercial and profit-making character. These efforts and the consequences they will have on the general social life of the nation are, or should be, the vibrant subject matter for a powerful and exciting political economy of culture. (p. 81)

He concluded that the interests of many poor countries clash with the United States, relying on the U.S. Office of Technology 1981 Report that said, "There has been a gradual shift toward recognizing the legitimacy of nontechnical factors such as political and cultural interests and values in ITU (International Telecommunications Union) deliberations and in other international forums" (p. 92). Cultural and economic affairs

have been important factors in the relationship existing between the industrialized nations and the less developed countries, considering that the latter have demanded a new international informational order. This is so because these countries have recognized their own cultural significance, therefore, they insist on national cultural sovereignty. It is also the view that, international debates and negotiations over space, laws of the sea, radio frequency spectrum allocation and information have reflected an increasing understanding by a good part of the world, that economic and technological questions are, at the same time, informational and cultural issues (Schiller, 1984). In view of Schiller's argument, culture is targeted as a foundation on which the U.S. locates its political communication and information, aimed at a specific African nation. Schiller's views are European-oriented, as he would see the effects of U.S. political communication in Liberia from that perspective. Asante (1983) has elaborated that:

Communication is a Western field of inquiry, much like other analytical forms, seeking to analyze audiences, examine data, and theorize about how humans are persuaded, in order to aid the persuaders, not the audience. In this respect, communication as a science becomes another thrust into the belly of non-Westerners. (p. 5)

The infusion in Liberia of political communication and information systems by the United States' policymakers is not contradistinctive to the whims of imperialism--"the highest stage of neocolonialism"--and has similar economic, military, political, cultural and psychological effects upon Liberians as did colonialism on Africans elsewhere on the continent. The effects of imperialism on Liberians are appalling. In his book, Decolonising the Mind, Wa Thiong'o (1986) decried the impact of colonialism: "Colonialism imposed its control of the social production of wealth

through military conquest and subsequent political dictatorship. But its most important area of domination was the mental universe of the colonised, the control, through mental culture, of how people perceived themselves and their relationship to the world" (p. 16).

Wa Thiong'o submits that economic and political control will be accomplished through mental control by stating that "To control a people's culture is to control their tools of self-definition in relationship to others" (Wa Thiong'o, 1986, p. 16).

Similarly, indeed, Chinweizu, Jemi and Madubuike (1983) proffered this discourse:

That contemporary African culture is under foreign domination. Therefore, on the one hand, our culture has to destroy all encrustations of colonial mentality, and on the other hand, has to map out new foundations for an African modernity. (p. 239)

In words reminiscent of leading African anti-colonialists, Chinweizu et al. (1983) advanced a forceful *prima facie* perspective against foreign domination of African culture, illuminating essential factors that should be considered by Africans prior to the employment of a drastic course for the eradication of the latter, and the sustenance of our culture. They pointed out that "...This cultural task demands a deliberate and calculated process of syncretism: one which, above all, emphasizes valuable continuities without precolonial culture, welcomes vitalizing contributions from other cultures, and exercises inventive genius in making a healthy and distinguished synthesis from them all" (p. 239).

As suggested by Chinweizu et al., if decolonization is the objective, such synthesis must be within rather than external to the confines of the African tradition. It should expand and renew the tradition through new syntheses and breakthroughs

rather than leave it unchanged and in moribund stasis. To achieve such synthesis, experimentation is crucial. The sort of experimentation called for may be labeled as traditionalist, meaning experimentation for the purpose of modernizing and revitalizing the tradition (Chinweizu et al., 1983). The preceding views expressed by Chinweizu and others could be applied also to Liberia in that, as stated by J. Gus Liebenow, the United States played a crucial role in the foundation of Liberia and therefore feels it her moral obligation to dominate Liberia in all aspects of life: social, cultural, economic, military and political (Liebenow, 1987). In doing so, she influences the formulation of Liberian foreign and domestic policies, making the former subservient to and consistent with the U.S.'s policy in Africa, since Liberia became an independent nation on July 26, 1847.

To wit, the U.S. political communication and information systems influence public policy in Liberia in order to maintain American interests. This process was evident in Liberia from the inception to the demise of the "cold war" between the United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). Asante and Ziegler (1992) believed that "Most nations in Africa are caught up in a communication system whose rationale is strictly dictated by the Western industrialized nations" (p. 114).

The Research Design

This study was conducted as an exploratory case study. The research was guided by the methodology developed by Matthew Miles and Michael Huberman's 1984 study (as cited in Korto, 1991). The aims of this study were to (a) determine the

effects of U.S. political communication and information in Liberia from 1960-1990; and (b) to determine if the transmissions of U.S. political communication in Liberia for three decades impacted on Liberian policymakers to acquiesce to American cultural, political, economic and military imperialism in Liberia.

Korto (1991) stated that "A case study looks at a larger issue by focusing on a selected example case" (p. 71). The case of the effects of U.S. political communication in Liberia, examined in this study, is an example of a larger common problem facing African and other developing nations.

Irrespective of the fact that Liberia and other African countries have raw materials, they still rely on the U.S. and other Western countries for financial and technological assistance to foster their development aims. Liberia is a typical example of an African country with weak institutional arrangements and limited economic capacity which depends on foreign aid. In order to meet its development needs, Liberia depended largely on U.S. economic assistance (Korto, 1991) between 1960-1990. As an outcome, Liberia became a proxy of the U.S. and the U.S. policymakers used Liberia for multipurposes which included defense and strategic installations, investment and diplomatic cooperation in order to promote democracy in Africa.

The Statement of the Problem

The United States political communication and information systems have fundamentally influenced and, to an unprecedented extent continue to effect public policy in Liberia vis-a-vis American economic, social, political and security interests. After a protracted and perplexing negotiation with the African kings, free Africans

who emigrated to West Africa under the banner of the American Colonization Society (ACS) on January 7, 1822 laid the foundation of the Liberian state. They relied also on the U.S. political communication and information systems to effectuate public policy. Geared on the preceding reflection, the U.S. maintains its domination and control of Liberia through the manipulation of the communication and information systems.

Objectives

The objectives of this study are (a) to explore, examine and delineate the structural setting under which the U.S. maintains its domination and control of Liberia through the manipulation of the communication and information systems; and (b) to assess and enumerate the ways and essential means by which Liberian policymakers perceived, received and used the United States political communication and information systems to dominate and influence the foundations of public policy in Liberia, from 1960-1990.

A Conceptual Framework

Due to the limited number of the study population, no existing conceptual framework was identified as relevant to this study. Notwithstanding, an attempt was made by this researcher at developing one applicable to this study. Thus, the utility of the Afrocentric framework. Before expanding on the Afrocentric framework, this author argues that, in developing the framework, leading characteristics of the effects of U.S. political communication and information that were delineated in Chapters four and five were used. The degrees to which the U.S. used political communication and

information to achieve its interests in Africa, as well as how political communication and information emanating from the United States have been received, interpreted and utilized by Liberian policymakers for political, economic, and social reasons are discussed in this conceptual framework.

Mathew Miles and Michael Huberman's 1984 study (as cited in Korto, 1991) explicated that 'A conceptual framework, by definition, "explains graphically or in narrative form, the main dimensions to be studied--the key factors or variables, and the presumed relationships among them" (Korto, 1991, p. 63). This study focused on the key factors of the effects of U.S. political communication to Liberia. The conceptual framework guiding this study identified and specified the key factors studied and their presumed relationships as they affect (Korto, 1991) the effects of U.S. political communication in Liberia from 1960-1990.

The effects of U.S. political communication and information in Liberia "is conceptualized as an interactive process involving cooperation and collaboration between" (Korto, 1991, p. 64) the U.S. policymakers and the Liberian policymakers with the view of achieving American interests in Liberia. As part of this effort, U.S. policymakers disseminated political communication and information through both the Liberian and the U.S. communications media during the period analyzed. Some of the characteristics identified include the following: (a) During the Cold War, the U.S. political economy of communication and information must influenced public policy in Liberia in order to achieve American economic, political and security interests. (b) In Liberia, as a consequence of American cultural, entertainment, corporate, and

military imperialism, Liberian policymakers designed, manipulated and used falsehoods, rumors and lies in the form of political communication and information to accomplish their parochial political and economic interests. (c) Political communication and information designed by U.S. for the Liberian reading, listening and viewing audience was well-designed so as to portray the U.S. positively in terms of economic, entertainment, corporate, diplomatic and military matters.

The above criteria characteristics composed of broad criteria for determining the effects of U.S. political communication in Liberia during the three decades (1960-1990) highlighted by this study. Because of the "special" relationship existing between the U.S. and Liberia since the country was founded, the U.S. invested heavily there during the Cold War. Thus, Liberia became the U.S.'s satellite country.

An Afrocentric Framework

This study is guided by the Afrocentric framework developed by Molefi Kete Asante. Welsh-Asante (1991) has defined Afrocentricity as "pro-African and consistent in its beliefs that technology belongs to the world; Afrocentricity is African genius and African values created, reconstructed, and derived from our history and experiences in our best interests" (p. viii). The Afrocentric framework which enabled the author to analyze this study from an African cosmology include the epistemological, axiological, cosmological and aesthetic principles or concepts of the Afrocentric analysis of literature.

The epistemological principle is the category which enables the writer to examine the African presence in language, dance, music, arts, tales and legends as

sources of knowledge in literature. It allows the writer to establish if an incident emerged due to historical events. The axiological principle seeks to scrutinize the ethical basis underlining the author's commitment to a collective vision in his work. The cosmological principle examines the contributions of Africans in global civilizations and contemporary happenings in the world from an African cosmological perspective. The aesthetic principle is a conceptual understanding of what constitutes beauty (Asante, 1987).

Afrocentricity is a theory that directly opposes racism, sexism, ignorance and monoethnic hegemony in curriculum and is not anti-European. Afrocentricity, then, is a frame of reference wherein phenomena are viewed from the perspective of the African person (Asante, 1987). This theory suggests also an alternative perspective on phenomena where Africa, Africans and people of African descent are seen as "subjects" and not "objects."

The Afrocentric analysis re-establishes the centrality of the Ancient Kemet (Egyptian) civilization and the Nile Valley cultural complex as points of reference for an African perspective in much the same way as Greece and Rome serve as reference points for the European world. Thus, the Afrocentrists expand human history by creating a new path for interpretation, making words like "negro" and "colored" obsolete and anachronistic. Africa is identified with time, place, and perspective. Without the Afrocentric perspective the imposition of European line as universal hinders cultural understanding and demeans humanity (Asante, 1987).

In this study, the author used the epistemological (ways of knowing), axiological (its value), cosmological (worldview) and aesthetic (a conceptual understanding of what constitutes beauty) principles of the Afrocentric analysis of literature, in order to gather an insight in the effects of United States political communication and information on Liberia during the height of the Cold War. Like other areas of social inquiry, Afrocentricity has become significant enough to be appreciated and implemented in literary examination. Under such literary autonomy, the leading Afrocentric theorist, Asante, advanced three metaphorical paradigms to critique literature which constitute "Location, Dislocation, and Relocation" (Asante, 1990, p. 136). Location is defined as the cultural production occupied by the writer or critic at the time of creative production; Dislocation exists when a writer or critic seems to be out of synchrony with his or her historical cultural location; and Relocation occurs when a writer or critic who has been dislocated rediscovers historical and cultural motifs that serve as sign-posts in the intellectual or creative pursuits (Asante, 1990). Seeing it as a germinating, systemic framework of theoretical rod of analyzing phenomenon, Afrocentricity concerns itself with comprehending literary phenomena from an African cosmology.

Data Collection

This author examined, through library research, personal interviews and a questionnaire, the dissemination of U.S. political communication and information to Liberia from 1960-1990. This study solicits two kinds of data collection, following Peter Lorkula Naigow's 1977 approach. Naigow's approach called for library

research and personal interviews when he examined, for his dissertation research, how the Voice of America's (VOA) African Division perceives and programs for its target audience in sub-Saharan Africa. Approximately 70 percent of the data was gathered through library research. The remaining 30 percent was obtained through personnel interviews with USIA and VOA's Division personnel in Washington, D.C. (Naigow, 1977).

In Naigow's study the linguistic fallacy was evident, and engendered the Eurocentric motif of racial stratification in Africa. For example, this author found Naigow's use of the word "sub-saharan" to characterize one geopolitical segment of Africa where dark-skinned Africans are located rather offensive. Since this study is based on an Afrocentric paradigm, this author provides an accurate description of Africa: all areas and peoples of Africa, irrespective of the geographical locations and racial components of its residents, are Africa and Africans.

In this study, approximately 70 percent of the data was gathered through library research. The remaining 30 percent was gathered through personal interviews with personnel of the Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, United States Information Agency (USIA), United States Aid for International Development (USAID), Voice of America's (VOA) African Division in Washington, D.C.; as well as personnel of Liberia's Ministry of Information, Cultural Affairs and Tourism, the Liberian Broadcasting System and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Inter-American Affairs, in Monrovia. 16 American and Liberian policymakers were interviewed, determining the breadth and length to which U.S. political communication influenced

public policy in Liberia, with the aim of maximizing American strategic interests. Of the 16 persons (six on the U.S. side and 10 on the Liberian side) who were interviewed and given questionnaires, all were men (six whites and 10 Africans) and they came from different backgrounds ranging from government, academia, and journalism. This author had intended to interview 10 American policymakers, but was unsuccessful. He interviewed and received completed questionnaire from six American policymakers. The interviews were conducted between the period November 1993 to March 1994 in Washington, D.C. and in Monrovia. A total of 33 questions were asked all the interviewees. An exploratory case study was conducted to determine the impact of United States political communication on Liberia. This exploratory case study was conducted in two cities (Washington, D.C. and Monrovia). Political communication and information are designed, transmitted, received and used by policymakers in these two cities, respectively.

The author examined documents, according to the time span (1960-1990). All data were recorded from the records of the respective government agencies and ministries in Washington, D.C. and in Monrovia under study.

Hypotheses

This author hypothesized that the effects of United States political communication and information systems in Liberia are tantamount to the imposition of American social and cultural ethos on Liberians. In view of this, the Liberian policymakers reorient their domestic policy to be consistent with American interests in the country due to the fact that they are influenced by the powerful United States'

communication propaganda. These communications media help to marginalize Liberian policymakers who are misinformed by its propagandistic designs, thus making them ineffectual and susceptible to massive American cultural imperialism, as well as military and economic exploitations.

The Specific Projected Treatment of Each Sub-Problem

The experimental design used in this study is a two group pre-post tests with two levels of the independent variable (political communication and information). The author began his study with a pretest of transmission of the American political communication and information to Liberia, beginning in the 1960s. Additionally, the author examined and recorded the transmissions of U.S. political communication and information to Liberia in the 1970s, 1980s and up to the present time. This information was compiled and interpreted. Results from examining the records of and interviewing personnel of various agencies in Washington, D.C. and in Monrovia were compiled for interpretation.

The stimulus in the research design occurred covering the period (1960-1990). The stimulus (independent variable) occurred on two levels. For both American and Liberian policymakers, the stimulus was political communication and information. The information acquired through the post-test was compared with the information acquired through the pretest to determine the effects of the stimulus upon the limited number of samples from the two countries. The questionnaires (see Appendix) were weighed by the following instruments:

#QS=Question Number
SA=Strongly Agree

SDA=Strongly Disagree
DA=Disagree

A = Agree
DK = Don't Know
LIB. = Liberia

% = Percent
T = Total Number of Respondents
U.S. = United States of America

The author conducted a case study of Liberia and the U.S. based on political communication and information which constituted the following: entertainment, cultural, corporate, diplomatic and military communications. (see questions and tables for summarization). The tables illustrate the categorical scale averages of responses of the U.S. and Liberian policymakers, based on the limited number of samples from the two countries.

For the reader to easily read across the several percentages regarding the questions in the various tables, particularly tables 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 (comparative responses of U.S. and the Liberian policymakers), the author used the "collapsing" Response Categories (Babbie, 1992, pp. 395-396). In this case, this author combined "Strongly Agree" with "Agree," and "Strongly Disagree" with "Disagree" and recomputed the percentages for the combined categories thus giving the total percentages.

Reliability and Validity

Kirk and Miller's 1986 study (as cited in Asante, 1994) said that Social scientific inquiry requires that the procedure used in gathering data in any investigation be objective. They stated that objectivity is the simultaneous realization of as much reliability and validity as possible (Asante, 1994). Put simply, Kirk and Miller contended (as cited in Asante, 1994) that "Reliability is the degree to which the findings is independent of accidental circumstances of the research, and validity is the

degree to which the finding is interpreted in a correct way" (Asante, 1994, pp. 141-142).

Babbie (1992), who has written at length about scholarly research noted that, "reliability refers to the degree to which a particular procedure enables one to collect the same data in repeated observations of the same phenomenon" (p. 129). On his part, Andren (1981) wrote that:

In order to be certain that the results from a particular measurement (for example, a coding procedure) are true, one must, if not conduct the analysis oneself, replicate the investigation...(p. 45).

Indeed, the need to check for consistency in the investigation is a major concern for Holsti (as cited in Asante, 1994), who argued that: "If research is to satisfy the requirement for objectivity, measures and procedures must be reliable; i.e., repeated measures with the same instrument on a given sample of data should yield similar results" (Asante, 1994, p. 142).

Consequently, the procedures and measuring instruments adopted for the present case study were formulated carefully so as not to raise any doubts or questions about them. Reliability (R) for this study was calculated for all the units of analysis (entertainment, culture, corporate, diplomatic and military) by dividing number of responses with total number of questions and then computing the percentage.

$$R = \frac{\text{number of agreed questions}}{\text{total number of responses (policymakers)}} \times \frac{33}{1}$$

On the U.S. side, $\frac{R=\text{number of agreed questions}}{\text{total number of responses (policymakers)}} \times 33$

On the Liberia side, $\frac{R=\text{number of agreed questions}}{\text{total number of responses (policymakers)}} \times 33$

To analyze the results, this author compared the political communication transmitted by United States to Liberia against how the Liberian policymakers receive the political communication and interpret it to Liberians. The author then examined the political communication's results and determined the political communication effects on the Liberian policymakers in rendering good or bad decisions for the country.

In comparing the results, the author determined if the dissemination of United States' political communication to Liberia significantly succeeded or not succeeded in asserting its effects on Liberian policymakers and Liberians during the period (1960-1990) under study. Tangible reasons were posited for the success or failure. On the basis of a significant success or failure, the author then affirmed that the transmissions of United States political communication to Liberia is equivalent to the imposition of American political, economic, military and cultural ethos on Liberians to achieve American interests.

The Contents of the Dissertation

The contents of this dissertation are organized into seven chapters. Chapter One discusses the background of the study and explicates how it is to be conducted. Chapter Two delineates the brief history of Liberia and the United States with views on certain historical, cultural and ideological forces in the Liberian and American

societies, which contributed to the success of American political communication in Liberia in pursuit of American interests. Chapter Three looks at political communication and information policies of the United States government, regarding Liberia, the West African sub-region and Africa in terms of military, economic and political spheres. Chapter Four operationally and theoretically delineates the study, by examining how the United States uses political communication and information to achieve its interests in Liberia and elsewhere in Africa. Chapter Five focuses on how political communication and information emanating from the United States have been received, interpreted and utilized by Liberian policymakers for political, economic and social reasons. Chapter Six historically asserts how American political communication and information have, from 1960-1990, contributed to at best, minimally developing Liberia, and at worst, largely destroying the foundations of Liberia's economic, cultural and social institutions. This chapter also provides a broader overview of the crucial roles played by AID, VOA, USIA, U.S. Department of State versus Liberia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its communications media, in the containment and awakening the consciousness of Liberians about the United States' strategies in achieving its interests in Liberia. Thus, an exploratory case study of 16 Liberian and American policymakers were conducted which helped to determine the extent to which U.S. political communication and information influences public policy in Liberia with the aim of maximizing American interests. Chapter Seven summarizes the study, and extrapolates the integral role of the United States political communication and information in Liberia in the 21st century. Finally, it establishes

the degree to which the dissemination of U.S. political communication has a significant impact on Liberian policymakers in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.

The Importance of the Study

This study is important because many Liberian and African communications scholars have not addressed in totality the effects of the United States' political communication on Liberians. Rather they have marginally addressed the role of mass media and political communication in African countries from a linear Western perspective.

Liberian cultures and pre-industrial life-styles are threatened by the imposition of United States' political communication and information. Due to its commanding technological, economic, military and political capabilities, United States transmits direct and indirect overwhelming political communication and information to Liberia from an America-centered perspective. This study, which is from an Afrocentric perspective, pinpoints the problems inherent in these forms of political communication and provide cues to American and Liberian policymakers to make coherent political, economic and other developmental decisions for Liberia.

The United States' political communication and information systems have succeeded in destroying the fibers of a coherent African culture, traditions and customs in Liberia while, it maintained vital American interests before the violent eruption of the Liberian civil war in December 1989. On the one hand, American policymakers use the Voice of America (VOA), the United States Information Agency (USIA), the United States Aid for International Development (USAID) and the print

medium to propagate and influence public policy compatible with American interests in Liberia.

Liberian policymakers reorient their domestic policy to be in consonance with prevailing American interests in the country because they are usually influenced by the powerful United States' communications propaganda. These communications media help to marginalize Liberian policymakers who are misinformed by its propagandistic designs, thus making them ineffectual and suspectable to massive American cultural imperialism, as well as political, military and economic exploitations. In this realm, indigenous Liberians are being exploited, while the Americo-Liberians benefit the most among Liberians, as they were and still are the policymakers. Americo-Liberians are freed Africans who were enslaved North America, and who emigrated to Liberia in 1822 after they gained their freedom. Indigenous Liberians are Africans who lived and continue to live in Liberia prior to, during and after the arrival of freed Africans who emigrated from America. Obviously, this study is important and Afrocentric because it is based on the cultural, political, economic and communicational realities of Liberia, an African nation located within the West sub-political region of Africa. The cardinal reason this study is Afrocentric is because Afrocentricity is anti-racism, pro-African, African genius and African values created, reconstructed, and derived from our history and experiences in our best interests. Afrocentricity seeks to establish Africans place in world history by pontificating Africans' contributions to global civilizations.

Afrocentricity highlights Africans as "agents" rather than "subjects" in the studies of human phenomena (Asante, 1990; Welsh-Asante, 1991).

United States' political communication has had serious effects in Liberia. On the positive side, it helped to bring about a fundamental political change in the country, by democratizing Liberian institutions with African motifs, so that the institutions will survive to achieve their objectives. Devastatingly, it helped to foster American cultural and social norms in Liberia, as well as propping up repressive regimes including The Samuel Kanyon Doe's Military Dictatorship (1980-1990); The William R. Tolbert, Jr.'s Presidency (1971-1980); and The William V.S. Tubman's Autocratic Presidency (1944-1971). This author argues that political communication will continue to play significant roles in this process, for without communication there can be no social, economic, political and institutional evolution. Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) agreed that "in public affairs, there would be more reason to expect the leaders to be relatively more influenced by the media in their own decisions" (p. 317).

This study is important because it fits squarely within the public policy arena of Africalogy, as it characterizes the collective roles played by Liberian and American policymakers in establishing policies for Liberia. As members of the Pan-African ethnicity, Liberians cannot deny their historical connection with African Americans who helped to lay the foundation of the Liberian nation. To critique from an Afrocentric perspective the effects of United States' political communication and the Liberian experience is important within the academy. Because, as suggested by Asante (1990), "Afrocentricity reorganizes our frame of reference so that Africans become

the center of analysis and synthesis. As such, it becomes the source of regeneration of our values and beliefs" (p. 39).

Limitations

For the purpose of this study, the following limitations are made: Firstly, this study is limited to the effects of United States political communication and the Liberian experience from 1960-1990. The author choose this period because it was the period in which the "cold war" between the United States and the Soviet Union was saturated, and in Africa, Liberia was and remains one of the preeminent satellite countries for the United States. Liberia's major roles during this period were threefold: (a) Liberia influenced African nations, on behalf of the United States, to disavow Communism and commit their countries to the principles and values of democracy and entrepreneurial nation-building. (b) Liberia produced high grade iron ore, rubber, timber and other resources for the sustenance of the American industrial complex. (c) Liberia cemented and enhanced the close military, economic and cultural ties existing between the two nations. Secondly, Liberia experienced limited industrial growth and development, as well as fundamental social and political changes during the time span indicated. However, the selected time span (1960-1990) is sufficiently well-delineated, thus providing a continuing and terminal point to the effects of the United States' political economy of communication and information in Liberia and, therefore, to this study. In this study, America is the same geopolitical areas of the 50 states that constitute the United States of America, herein often times call the "United States" or the "U.S."

The Definition of Terms

This author digresses at this juncture to define the following words:

U.S. political communication. The U.S. political communication is defined as the author used it in the context of the Liberian and American social, economic and political arrangements. The author defined U.S. political communication on the following criteria: corporate, cultural, entertainment, educational, political, diplomatic and military communications.

Afrocentricity. Afrocentricity is pro-African and consistent in its beliefs that technology belongs to the world; Afrocentricity is African genius and African values created, reconstructed, and derived from our history and experiences in our best interests (Kariamuwelsh-Asante, 1991).

America-centered Perspective. An America-centered Perspective is the trend by which American policymakers, at the time of formulation and implementing policy, examines, critiques and interprets issues from an imperialistic position. The America-centered Perspective simply serves American interests.

Africa-centered Perspective. An Africa-centered Perspective, as stated by its leading proponent, C. Tsehloane Keto (1991) "helps us to re-evaluate words, concepts, and phrases that are usually bandied about without an appreciation of their roots and their association to unequal global power alignments" (p. 58). The Africa-centered Perspective places "Africa" at the center of discussion.

Epistemological. The ways of knowing.

Axiological. Values and truth.

Cosmological. A component of the African cultural factor which pertains to a people's assumption or belief about the origin and the structure of reality within the universe. A worldview.

Aesthetic. The conceptual understanding of what constitutes beauty.

Location. The cultural position occupied by the writer or critic at the time of creative production.

Dislocation. Exists when a writer seems to be out of synchrony with his or her historical, cultural position.

Relocation. Occurs when a writer or critic who has been dislocated rediscovers historical and cultural motifs that serve as sign-posts in intellectual or creative pursuits (Asante, 1991).

Indigenous Liberians. Africans who lived and continue to live in Liberia prior to, during and after the arrival of freed Africans who emigrated from America.

Non-indigenous Liberians. Specifically freed Africans who were enslaved in North America, and who emigrated to Liberia in 1822 after they gained their freedom or were manumitted.

Freed Africans. Freed Africans are also called Americo-Liberians, in Liberia.

Linear Western Perspective. The approach by which a critic or writer interprets events from a rational, unobtrusive Western worldview.

Public Policy. Public Policy is whatever governments choose to do or not to do. Public Policy involves a purposeful course of action (although its effects may not

be anticipated), that is based on law and thus backed up by the police power of government (although many policies may not be enforced), and that government's refusal to act when called upon to do so is also a form of policy (Robertson & Judd, 1989).

VOA. Voice of America

AID. Agency for International Development

USIA. United States Information Agency

GDP. Gross Domestic Product

LAMCO. Liberian-American-Swedish Minerals Company

CHAPTER 2

LIBERIA: A BACKGROUND

This chapter attempts to delineate the brief history of Liberia and the United States with views on certain historical, cultural and ideological forces in the Liberian and American societies, which contributed to the success of American political communication in Liberia in the pursuit of American interests.

Liberia was founded by the American Colonization Society with U.S. aid to spread civilization and religion in Africa, and is based upon the assumption that Africa is culturally backward and spiritually naked (Guannu, 1982). Accordingly, everything that was done here was to promote those interests in Liberia. From 1822 to 1960, there was a pronounced American cultural, political and ideological impact upon the Liberian society. Liberia became a fertile source for the success of American political communication. Hence American interests were fully achieved from 1960-1990.

There are several scintillant arguments which support the above stated views. The following constitute these arguments: (a) In those days, the freed Africans who emigrated from the United States to Liberia were perceived as instruments of civilization and religion in Africa. (b) It was the popular opinion in the West at one time that civilization meant Western civilization, and that religion meant Western Christianity. (c) Since Africans in America have embraced Western civilization and adopted Western Christianity, so the argument ran they were now civilized and possessed religion. (d) Since Africans in Africa were not civilized and possessed no

religion as defined above, therefore they had to be taught religion and civilization because of their sojourn in America. (e) Ideology will refer to government--be it a democratic or republican form of government. Coming from the United States which has operated a republican government, the freed Africans established a republican form of government in Liberia along with the attendant institutions. (f) Coming from the United States and being exposed to the free enterprise system, the freed Africans accepted as wholesically correct the American economic system which is based primarily on freedom and competition (particularly, Liberian capitalism lacked the internal mechanisms to make it dynamic). (g) European American immigrants came in search of religious and political freedom. Otherwise stated, they were escaping from religious and political tyranny in Europe. In their new home the immigrants did everything not to experience the political and religious tyranny. Such was how they declared their war on the British Empire to defend and enjoy their inalienable rights. Such was how at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1789, many delegates called for the "Bill of Rights" to be added to the Constitution. Thus throughout her national experience, the United States did everything to protect or pursue her national interests which, reduced to its essentials, refer to the security of the United States and the well-being of its people.

The freed Africans came to dominate the indigenous people primarily for four reasons. First, the freed Africans or Americo-Liberian minority received moral and financial support from the American Colonization Society and Washington. Second, many freed Africans were financially well-off and had received rudimentary education

in America before emigrating to Liberia. Third, the numerically superior Africans among whom they settled were fragmented into several ethnic groups who differed in norms, values and political arrangements. They did not constitute one single or formidable political force. Fourth, like minorities everywhere and at all times, the Americo-Liberians remained united so as to ensure and perpetuate their domination of the indigenous people. Given the freed Africans affinity to America and the Cold War, United States political communication fell on a fertile soil and succeeded in Liberia (Guannu, 1980).

The Republic of Liberia, whose capital is Monrovia, lies on the West Coast of Africa with Sierra Leone and Guinea to the North, the Ivory Coast to the East and the Atlantic Ocean to the South. The climate is tropical with temperatures ranging from eighteen degrees Centigrade (sixty five degrees Fahrenheit) to forty nine degrees Centigrade (one hundred twenty degrees Fahrenheit). Liberia has an area of 111, 369 square kilometers with a population of 1,503,368 people, according to the 1974 Area and Population Census (Banks, et al., 1974).

From July 26, 1847 to April 12, 1980, when the First Republic was displaced by a military dictatorship, the government of Liberia was democratic with its constitution modeled on that of the United States of America. The bicameral legislature elected by universal adult suffrage comprises a Senate, with eighteen members (two from each of the then nine counties) serving overlapping six-year terms, and a House of Representatives with eighty-four members serving four-year terms. Executive power was held by the president, directly elected for eight years

with a vice-president. The president governed with the assistance of an appointed cabinet. Liberia was administratively divided into nine counties, each administered by a superintendent appointed by the president. The superintendent remains in office as long as he does not abuse the integrity of his office or contravene the policies enunciated by the president (Wonkeryor, 1980). Following the coup of 1980, the military regime of the People's Redemption Council restructured Liberia into 13 counties and six statutory districts. The counties and statutory districts were governed by military rulers and had the title of "superintendent" which was used by policymakers in the First Republic.

English is the official language, but the sixteen major ethnic groups or indigenous Liberians speak their own languages. Amos Sawyer characterized that, the indigenous Liberians comprise the following ethnic groups. the Vai, Mende, Mandingo (Malinke), Gbande, Kpelle, Loma, Mah (Mano), Dan (Gio), the Gola, the Kissi, the Dei, Belle, Bassa, Kru, Krahn and Grebo (Sawyer, 1992). Liberia is officially a Christian state, however some Liberians hold traditional beliefs. Between 10 and 20 percent is Muslim; the remainder of the population follows various religions (Banks et al., 1974). See Table 1 on the next page which shows population differences in 1962 and 1974, according to ethnic identity.

Table 1. Ethnic Affiliation of Population, 1962, 1974

Ethnic group	Size 1962	Percent	Size 1974	Percent
Kpelle	211,081	20	298,532	20
Bassa	165,856	16	214,143	14
Gio	83,208	8	130,360	9
Kru	80,813	8	121,414	8
Grebo	77,007	8	119,985	8
Mano	72,122	7	110,770	7
Loma	53,891	5	88,351	6
Krahn	52,552	5	71,177	5
Gola	47,295	5	67,819	4
Kissi	34,914	4	51,318	3
Mandingo	29,750	3	58,414	4
Vai	28,898	3	49,504	3
Gbandi	28,599	3	38,548	3
Belle	5,465	.5	7,309	5
Dei	5,396	.5	6,365	5
Mende	4,974	.5	8,678	5
Miscellaneous	2,299	.5	3,141	.2
Total tribal	984,120	97	1,445,828	7
No tribal affiliation	23,478	2	42,834	2.9
Alien African	8,875	1	14,706	1.0
Total population	1,016,473	100	1,503,368	99.6

Adapted from J. Gus Liebenow, Liberia: The Quest for Democracy (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), p.35.

Major changes have occurred continuously within the indigenous groups from the time they met and associated with the freed Africans who emigrated from the United States, nevertheless indigenous solidarity still exists among these groups. Liebenow (1987) argued explicitly:

Only a few of the ethnic groups, such as the Bassa, the Belle, and the Dei, are found almost entirely within Liberia. The majority of the sixteen straddle the borders between Liberia and the neighboring states of Sierra Leone, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast. In some cases, such as the Mende, the major portion of the group resides across the border. (pp.33-35)

While the intra-indigenous relationship is not as strong as it used to be because of "contact" between the indigenous and the freed Africans, many Liberians if not all, still identify more strongly with their indigenous communities than they do with the modern Liberian state in contemporary times. There are, however, considerable ranges in the degree of response to Americo-Liberian cultural norms. The Dei and the Bassa, who were located behind Monrovia and Buchanan, early became involved in the settler economy during the colonial period as artisans, clerks, and domestic servants. The Vai, on the other hand, who also had early contact with the settlers in Cape Mount, proudly resisted submission to the taxing authority of the Liberian government until 1917. Individual Vai leaders, nevertheless, formed an aristocratic coalition with the Americo-Liberian leaders. By the beginning of the present century members of the Massaquoi, Fahnbulleh, and other Vai families (who skillfully moved from "pagan" to Muslim to Christian affiliations as the occasion demanded) were serving in the administration, the army officer cadre, and even in the consular service. Similarly, despite sporadic resistance offered by various sections of the group, mission-educated Grebo appeared as teachers, ministers, and even authors early in the 1900s (Liebenow, 1987).

An ambivalent case was that of the Kru, who continued their resistance into the 1930s, yet were the most cash-minded group along the coast--far more than those groups, such as Kpelle, Mano, Gio, Krahn, Loma, inter alia who were subsistence farmers. Indeed, more than a century before the freed Africans arrived, the Kru (a term which covered a number of related groups) were trading with European vessels

and serving as interpreters, middlemen, and coastal pilots. For many decades now the Kru have regularly served as crewmen and stevedores for European and African freighters plying the West Coast of Africa. The Gola and Mandingo, too, have had an ambivalent relationship with the freed Africans. Their long history of contact was constantly disturbed by the commercial rivalry between the settlers and these two groups, who had dominated the trade in slaves and legitimate items in northwestern Liberia. The unusual strength of the Poro secret society among the Gola and the Islamic faith of the Mandingoes, moreover served as barriers to rapid assimilation of these two ethnic groups. And the existence of centralized state systems of authority among both groups was undoubtedly a factor in their being able to resist political domination by the freed Africans for as long as they did (Liebenow, 1987)

In the interior of Liberia, freed Africans' contact has been limited largely to the present century. Indeed, the Mano, Gio, Lorma, and Krahn have really only had their traditional patterns of life substantially threatened during the years since the Second World War, as missionaries, new economic enterprises, and a network of roads and railroads have penetrated inland. The rich artistic traditions of the Gio and the Mano in the fields of wood sculpture, weaving, dancing, and music have been giving way steadily to the enameled pots, ready-made shirts, and "high life" musical records brought north by the Lebanese traders. The Lorma and Krahn, too, have been exposed to the Americo-Liberian political system through their involvement in the army. Perhaps the least acculturated group in the country was the largest--the Kpelle. Even among this ethnic group, however, the pace of life was rapidly changing in this

century as recruiters for the rubber plantations sought new labor markets and as iron-mining concessions were located within their midst and on the margins of their homeland (Liebenow, 1987).

Economy

The Liberian economy is based primarily on diamond, iron ore, rubber and timber. Iron ore has superseded rubber in importance and now accounts for about two-thirds of Liberian exports, although the industry employs only a small percentage of the labor force. Industrial development also includes such diverse smaller enterprises (established with foreign assistance) as cement, plastic explosives, beverage and petroleum production. Most of the population is involved in the agricultural sector. The principal cash crops, in addition to rubber, are coffee and cocoa. Timber resources are only beginning to be exploited but have great potential (Banks et al., 1974, pp. 273-274).

Liberian political scientist D. Elwood Dunn and economist S Byron Tarr commented scintillantly about the structure of the present Liberian economy which evolved immediately after World War II and was solidified in the 1960s. Dunn and Tarr (1988) indicated that the Liberian economy "has a very narrow and skewed production base with major production activities controlled by foreign capital and directed toward the export market" (pp. 133-134). They maintained that the agriculture sector, with four components, is the largest source of income. In order of contribution to output these are the foreign-owned rubber and oil palm plantations,

primarily foreign-owned logging concessions; Liberian-owned rubber and oil palm-plantations, and traditional smallholders (Dunn and Tarr, 1988).

Liberia is basically an agricultural economy with over 75% of the population engaged in traditional or subsistence agriculture. In the subsistence sector, primary economic activity is growing staple crops for home consumption. Since the 1960s, however, staple crops such as rice and cassava have been augmented by coffee, cocoa, and oil palm. Beginning in the 1970s, commercial vegetables were cultivated primarily by Chinese. The lack of infrastructures, such as extension services, credit, training facilities, market outlets, and roads, keeps production generally at very low levels (Dunn and Tarr, 1988, p. 134).

Commercial agriculture is dominated by foreign-owned rubber plantations such as Firestone, Uniroyal, Guthrie, and logging companies. Foreign-owned concessions traditionally contribute 80% of total Liberian rubber export, a total which is below 3% of world trade in rubber. Moreover, the major rubber concessions enhance Liberian rubber production by serving as marketing outlets, sources of credit, inputs, and services, including contractual management of Liberian farms. Liberian farms are usually owned by urban elites and suffer from lack of management. The average yield, less than 600 pounds of rubber per acre per year on the more than 9,000 Liberian farms, compares unfavorably with over 1,200 pounds per acre per year on foreign-owned plantations (p. 134).

The mining industry is the most important economic activity in the country. The Liberia Mining Company, which closed in 1977 after twenty six years of

operation, was the first of four, high capital intensity, low domestic employment foreign-owned concerns. LAMCO is the largest company to operate in Liberia; its operations were scheduled to cease in 1989, and during this period the civil broke out. These mining companies exploit iron ore. Iron ore makes the largest contribution to GDP. For example, iron ore production in 1984 accounted for approximately 16% of monetary GDP after falling from its peak in 1975 (pp. 134-135)

Besides mining and agriculture, modern sector activities are few with limited individual significance. The manufacturing sector, for example, today contributes less than 10% of GDP; in the 1970s, oil refining was the most important single manufacturing sector activity, contributing nearly 50% of the sector's value added. Since the cessation of oil refining activities in 1982, the sector's contribution to GDP declined to its present level (Dunn & Tarr, 1988, pp. 134-135).

Rubber is the second largest contributor accounting for nearly 8% of monetary GDP in 1983. While Firestone among the large producers contributed about 37% of total 1980 Liberian rubber export, down from 54% in 1970, participation in this sector by nationals is extensive. Third in sectoral contribution to GDP is forestry, it grew dramatically in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Its contribution to GDP today is about 3%. The sector's future prospects are not bright, as the forest was harvested indiscriminately without the necessary safeguards, including reforestation (Dunn and Tarr, 1988, p. 135). Dunn and Tarr (1988) stated, *inter alia*:

The book value of total fixed gross investment by foreign-owned concessions is estimated at \$550 million in iron ore, \$100 million in rubber, and \$50 million in timber. The sector's share in GDP in the 1970s was estimated at 37%; the export-oriented sector of

which the concessions are the mainstay contributed about 36% of GDP in 1983. The modern sector contributes about 84% of the gross domestic product; the concession sector directly and indirectly accounts for nearly two-thirds of this contribution. (pp.135-136)

Wonkeryor stated that, despite the considerable growth rate, favorable foreign trade balance and budgetary surplus achieved in the 1970s, the gap between the small urban and large rural sectors has not been closed. The government of Liberia set up an industrial free zone at Monrovia to develop the small manufacturing sector of the economy. The government's first development plan, covering the period 1976-80, aimed at increasing incomes and production in the rural sector and providing better extension services and market facilities for the small farmer achieved no tangible result (Wonkeryor, 1980, p. 4).

Liberia and the United States Friendship

Liberia's traditional friendship with the United States is reflected both in the facilities accorded American economic enterprise and in the existence of a bilateral defense agreement that calls for consultation in the event of aggression and provides for economic and limited military assistance. World War II ended Liberia's long-standing isolation. Since that time, Liberia has been a staunch supporter of the United Nations as well as an active participant in African affairs (Banks et al., 1974, p. 274)

The traditional friendship existing between Liberia and the United States has two sides. One side centers around the historic friendship which calls for "a relationship in which the U.S. is perceived as the "mother country" somewhat on the order of Ivorian-French relations. On the other hand, the expected relationship between a

major power and a near mini-state obtains" (Dunn and Tarr, 1988, pp. 169-170).

Dunn and Tarr reflected that while successive Liberian policymakers, American missionary organizations operating in Liberia, the interests of African Americans, and those of U.S. businesses have all sought, for their own reasons, to capitalize on the "mother country" angle of the relationship, this has often been relegated to a perceived U.S. national interest (p. 170).

Origin of Liberia and Growth of Government

In his 1982 book, Joseph Saye Guannu, noted Liberian historian and diplomat, traced the origin of the Liberian state and the growth of the government. Guannu (1982) argued that the political foundation of the Liberian state was laid on December 15, 1821 with the signing of the Dukor Contract between the American Colonization Society, represented by Agent Eli Ayres and Captain Robert F. Stockton, and the African Kings Njola, Peter, George, Jimmy, Long Peter and Governor (p. 13). Holloway (1981) wrote in his study similarly that after long and tedious negotiations at gunpoint which culminated in the signing of the Dukor Contract between the American Colonization Society and the African kings, Cape Mesurado was handed over to the control of the American Colonization Society in return for.

Six muskets, one box of beads, two hogs heads, tobacco, one cask gunpowder, six bars of iron, ten iron pots, one dozen knives, hats, three coats, three pairs of shoes, one box of pipes, one keg of nails, twenty looking-glasses, three pieces hankerchief, three pieces calico, three canes, four umbrellas, one box of soap, one barrel of rum; And to be paid, the following: three casks of tobacco, one box of pipes, three barrels of rum, twelve pieces of cloth, six bars of iron, one box of beads, fifty knives, twenty looking-glasses, ten iron pots of different sizes, twelve guns, three

barrels of biscuits, twelve decanters, twelve glass tumblers, and fifty shoes. (p. xvi)

Holloway noted that in all, these goods represented then about three hundred dollars worth of Merchandise (Holloway, 1981). Through the Dukor contract, a piece of land was purchased for free Africans from America. Price (1980) said that "this land has since expanded through additional purchases; treatise of friendship, protection and commerce; voluntary annexations and conquests" (p. 2724)

Holloway contended that on August 18, 1822, the brig Strong arrived at Cape Mesurado, with thirty-five settlers and the Reverend Jehudi Ashmun and his wife Ashmun was later appointed resident Agent (Governor of the Colony). Ten of the settlers were recaptured Africans sent under the custody of the American Colonization Society by the Federal Government (Holloway, 1981). Recaptured Africans made also a major contribution to the foundation of the Liberian state. As such, it is expedient to briefly trace the origin of the recaptured Africans and how they became part of the "pioneer" class of Liberia with all the rights and privileges the free Africans had

Rescued Africans

As Holloway found in his 1981 study, "The legislation concerning the returned Africans began long before the formation of the American Colonization Society For example, by March, 1807 the importation of slaves into North America was no longer legal" (pp. xvi-xvii). Also, Duignan and Gann reflected in their (1984) study that "Closely linked to the antislavery campaign were the movements to abolish the slave

trade and to provide for the welfare of free blacks and slaves rescued from the slavers" (p. 81). Duignan and Gann (1984) noted:

On March 25, 1807, a law was passed in which the slave trade was forbidden to British subjects. A few days later the U.S Congress also enacted a law forbidding the slave trade as of January 1, 1808. The end of the legal slave trade for British and American citizens marked a revolution in the relations of Africa with the rest of the world. (pp. 80-81)

The American Colonization Society Annual Report, Vol. 1-10, (1818-1827) asserted that the law for abrogating the importation of slaves to North America stated:

After the above period it should not be lawful to import into the United States, or territories thereof, from any foreign country, any negro, mulatto, or person of colour, with intent to hold, sell, or dispose of such person as a slave, or be held to service, or labour. (p. 12)

Given that the importation was illegal, the question was what to do with Africans recaptured in the event of prohibiting the slave trade. To address this issue, Holloway (1981) stated that Congress passed legislation allowing the President to

make such regulations and arrangements as he may deem expedient for safe keeping, support and removal beyond the limits of the United States, of all such negroes, mullatoes, or persons of colour, as may be so delivered and brought within their jurisdiction; and to appoint an agent in Africa to receive such negroes (p. xvii).

Holloway submitted that the United States government appropriated one hundred thousand dollars to enforce this act (Holloway, 1981). This act, on March 3, 1819, was enforced by another Congressional Act which authorized "the President to send beyond the limits of the United States, all captured negroes and to appoint agents, residing on the coast of Africa, to receive them" (American Colonization

Society Annual Report, Vol. 1-10, 1818-1827, p. 12). Between March 1819 and November 1821, on the West Coast of Africa, nearly six hundred Africans were recaptured from eleven American slavers. According to W.E.B. DuBois, in his study, The Suppression of the African Slave Trade, the recaptured Africans made a significant contribution and "was the real foundation of Liberia" (Holloway, 1981, p xvii).

Curtin (1969) advanced that at the time the trans-Atlantic slave trade was being prohibited, many slaves who were recaptured by the British and the United States Navy came from the Delta ports. Between 1810 and 1865 the British Navy alone intercepted one thousand, two hundred eighty seven ships on the high seas bound for North America. Of this total probably no fewer than one hundred and fifty slave ships were taken to Monrovia. The American Navy captured only one hundred three slave ships between 1837 and 1865, with a total of about ten thousand slaves, only six thousand of whom reached Monrovia alive (Curtin, 1969).

Despite the efforts of the American Colonization Society to attract willing immigrants, volunteer immigration was not very effective. In fact, this scheme affected only a small number of free Negroes and mulattoes, a quarter of a million in all by 1867. The following figures show that fewer than twenty thousand persons settled in Liberia, six thousand of whom had never seen America (Huberich, 1947, pp. 41-42). See Table 2 for the status of Liberian immigrants, between 1822 to 1867

Table 2. Status of Liberian Immigrants, 1822-1867

Born free	4,451
Purchased their freedom	344
Emancipated, to go to Liberia	5,957
Emancipated, for other reasons	753
Arrived from Barbados, 1865	346
Unknown	68
Settled in Maryland County, 1831-1862, origins not indicated	1,227
Recaptives, Africans taken from slave ships by the United States Navy, 1820-1843	287
by the United States Navy, 1843-1860	5,457

Immigrants from 1865 to 1904

<u>Origins in the United States</u>	<u>4,093</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>22,983</u>

Source: Charles Henry Huberich, Legislative History of Liberia (New York: Central Book Company, Inc., 1947) pp. 41-42; J. Gus Liebenow, Liberia: The Quest for Democracy (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 19.

For the recaptured Africans, adjustment was long and hard.

Because of their different languages and customs, their first major problem was to acculturate and communicate among themselves. First they developed the use of a patois similar to the Krio language of Sierra Leone. According to Frederick Starr, as more and more Africans landed they eventually learned English, acquired education and became Christians. They found employment as apprentices, and as domestic servants for the Americo-Liberians. However, initial assimilation was hard because

the African Americans regarded the recaptured Africans as "heathens" and "savages", as they did the local Africans. After about fifty years of residence, the recaptured Africans finally became entitled to all the rights and privileges enjoyed by the American blacks. Assimilation took place only because the American Colonization Society recognized a contradiction between the Afro-Americans treatment in America and the Americo-Liberians' treatment of local and recaptured Africans in Liberia. Thus the American Colonization Society refused to recognize any legal distinction between the immigrants from America and the recaptured Africans (Holloway, 1981) Jones (1962) demonstrated that "the chief barrier to unification and integration in Liberia with the liberated Africans for more than a half century was the American-Negroes version of racial conflict" (p. 91). In part this racial and cultural conflict set the tone for the nature of Americo-Liberian relations with the indigenous populations from the foundation of the Liberian state up to the present time (Holloway, 1981). To put it more concisely, Americo-Liberians disregarded their African connection and perceived themselves as Americans. Freed Africans who emigrated to Liberia were born in the United States and therefore lacked the historical knowledge of the past and cultural ethos of Africa. They considered themselves as "Americans" first, and "Africans," second. So given the background that the Americo-Liberians and the indigenous people were "black," considering their racial stratification, Americo-Liberians causally stressed the fundamental differences in the African culture and the American culture which divided them from the "tribal savages" (Holloway, 1981, p 1).

The African Repository and Colonial Journal (1825) affirmed thus:

Dr. Ayres was now appointed agent for the Society, and in company with lieutenant Stockton, of the United States schooner Alligator, proceeded with great resolution to effect the object of this institution. After much perplexity and delay, the perseverance and ability of these two gentlemen were successful, and the natives ceded to the society a tract eligible, and for the present sufficiently extensive; including cape Montserrado, which offered a site better adapted, perhaps, to the purposes of a colony, than any other station on the windward coast of Africa. To this territory, since called Liberia, the colonists were immediately removed, and Dr. Ayres, after superintending the earliest improvement of the settlement, returned to this country to make a statement of its wants, and obtain the requisite supply (p. 4)

The author wants to cast a light on what prompted the formation of the ACS and the location of home in Africa for free Africans. The African Repository and Colonial Journal (1825) stated that, during the administration of Thomas Jefferson, governor of Virginia, the Legislature of Virginia debated and passed a resolution, authorizing the governor

to correspond with the President of the United States, for the purpose of obtaining a territory on the coast of Africa, or some other place not within the State, or territorial governments of the United States, to serve as an asylum for such persons of colour as are now free, and may desire the same, and for those who may hereafter be emancipated in this Commonwealth. (p. 1)

In 1816, the Reverend Robert Finley, a Presbyterian clergyman residing at Basking-Ridge, New Jersey disclosed to his friends and the public the humanistic efforts he was making on behalf of free Africans in the United States, which he had meditated for some time, and which he prosecuted with characteristic zeal and perseverance, until mainly through his untiring efforts, the American Colonization

Society was formed at Washington, in December 1816 (The African Repository and Colonial Journal, 1825). There were reasons which motivated Reverend Finley to fight for the colonization of free Africans. Among the reasons were : (1) He dwelt on the deplorable social condition of free Africans and on the burden of their presence in American society, appealing to the noble cause to be served by their repatriation (2) He called for the formation of a benevolent association that would assist the government of the United States in establishing a colony in Africa. Just as the colonies of Greece and Rome brought "strength and lustre" to their metropolis, an American colony overseas would "extend the empire of liberty and Christian blessings to surrounding nations" (Sawyer, 1992, pp. 28, 30)

Sawyer (1992) established that, in the same vein others including Henry Clay, saw colonization as a nobler cause, stating that:

Can there be a nobler cause than that which, while it proposes to rid our country of a useless and pernicious, if not a dangerous portion of its population, contemplates the spreading of the arts of civilized life, and the possible redemption from ignorance and barbarism of a benighted portion of the globe? Clay and his colleagues seemed oblivious to the inconsistency in engaging "useless and pernicious" group of people as instruments for spreading "the arts of civilized life" (p. 30)

Further, others were apprehensive about the idea of colonization, and called for the securing and maintenance of slavery. Sawyer (1992) explained that they argued that,

it is a notorious fact that the existence of this mixed and intermediate population of free negroes is viewed by every slaveholder as one of the greatest sources of the insecurity and unprofitableness of slave property; that they serve to excite in their

fellows bring a feeling of discontent, of repining at their situation, and they act as channels of communications not only between different slaves, but between slaves of different districts; that they are the depositories of stolen goods (Sawyer, 1992, pp 87, 88)

An African historian, Price (1980), noted:

The African Republic of Liberia was established as a nation in the 1840s, more than a century before the overwhelming majority of African nations except Ethiopia which obtained her independence in 11 B.C., gained her independence, in the period following the Second World War. However, even more significant than the early founding was the ability of this nation to maintain her freedom when every other nation on the continent at one time or another became the possession of a powerful European state. (p 1)

Founded under the auspices of the American Colonization Society (ACS) as a home for the "excess" free Africans during the days of American slavery, the colony swiftly progressed to a self-governing status and finally emerged as an independent republic in 1847. Although diplomatic recognition was promptly granted by several major nations, it was not until in the midst of the American Civil War that such a step was followed by the United States. That American action in 1862, and the support that followed, proved to be vital factors in Liberia's future. The next fifty years would roughly correspond to the major surge in the imperialistic drive in Africa and without this assistance, even though limited in scope, it is doubtful that the Republic could have survived (Price, 1980).

The United States declared her support for the African Republic by stating that a "peculiar relationship" existed between the two lands; this had the effect of establishing an informal protectorate over the tiny Republic. The British, French and Germans generally respected the arrangement in that they did not challenge Liberia's

major population centers, but they felt free to question her extensive territorial claims. The extremities of the Republic were populated by indigenous Liberians who often did not recognize or accept the Liberian authority. Thus the foreign powers began to encroach upon these hinterland regions, often with the aid of the indigenous Liberians (Price, 1980). Price stated that as these pressures mounted, the Liberians sought to strengthen their own. For such, they looked across the Atlantic to the disenfranchised freedmen living in America. Many enslaved Africans were more than willing to leave the land of their bondage in spite of disturbing counter claims concerning the healthiness of the climate and the level of advancement of the nation. How then did the Liberians survive? Their leaders were skillful enough to maintain that weak relationship with America and made it appear to be stronger than it actually was. As a result, the European powers respected the arrangement and generally looked elsewhere for territory to annex. Thus the Liberians were able to use the might and power of her reluctant protector to maintain their own independence (p. 2724)

Instituting an informal protectorate over Liberia by the U.S. is synonymous with the old type colonialism, irrespective of its aims. Given the U.S. role in Liberia, particularly during the ten-year (1980-1990) bloody rule of military dictator Samuel Kanyon Doe which culminated in the U.S. training and equipping of the Liberian Army including a half billion dollars in USAID, caused Liberians to perceive the U.S. as a hostile ally or partner.

The United States of America

For her part, historically, the United States of America was discovered by Christopher Columbus in 1492. An Italian explorer, Amerigo Vespucci, was the first to declare it a new continent. The New World was named America in his honor, and it is now called North and South America. North America is referred to as the United States of America (Immigration and Naturalization Service's Federal Citizenship Text, 1987). When the colonists from Spain, France, Holland, England, and other countries came to settle in North America, there were Native Americans, or Indians, living in many geopolitical parts of the country in groups called tribes. The Native Americans who were armed with bows and arrows were belligerent toward the colonists because they felt that the settlers were taking their land and giving incurable diseases to them. As such, they waged unsuccessful terroristic attacks against the first permanent English colony in America at Jamestown, Virginia, in 1607. That colony was almost obliterated. Well armed with guns, the settlers defeated the Native Americans and coerced them westward. The colonists who emigrated to the United States settled for varying, subjective reasons including trade, freedom of religion, political freedom, and economic reasons. The 13 colonies they founded along the eastern sea board formed the foundation of the United States of America (Immigration and Naturalization Service's Federal Citizenship Text, 1987).

The bedrock of the United States government was instituted by the first group of people (Pilgrims) who emigrated to the United States in 1620 in the Mayflower and landed at Plymouth, Massachusetts. Before their descent from the Mayflower, the

Pilgrims consented on the sort of government they wanted, and drew up a pertinent document called the Mayflower Compact which, among other things, advocated the following principles: (a) the people would vote about the government and laws, and, (b) the people would accept whatever the majority chose (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service's Federal Citizenship Text, 1987). These two cardinal principles were significant and instrumental in the writing of the United States' Constitution.

Another group, the Puritans, who sought religious tolerance and freedom, migrated from England to America and landed at the Massachusetts Bay area in 1630. As industrious immigrants, they developed the important colonial industries of fur trading, fishing and shipbuilding. The Massachusetts Bay colony prospered, attracting Puritans as well as others. The Puritans gained their religious freedom, but they refused to let other groups have religious tolerance within their colony (Immigration and Naturalization Service's Federal Citizenship Text, 1987).

Government

The government of the United States is democratic, and possesses three distinct branches. Each branch has a unique responsibility, while at the same time it strives to square the processes of governance, serving as a check and balance among the other branches of government. Each branch is responsive to their own constituencies, prohibiting popular majorities from trampling on the rights of smaller political factions. Characteristically, the Executive executes the law; the Judicial interprets the law; and the Legislature makes the law. Robertson and Judd (1989) contended that

"With only the House of Representatives elected by the people directly - and even then, with each legislator representing a small geographic constituency - republican government provided a powerful check on the sudden passions and impulses of the mass electorate" (p. 3). This unique system of government is the antecedent of the democratic institutions established by the Founding Fathers as were prevalent in the colonies. In this regard, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service's Federal Citizenship Text (1987) reflected that:

Democratic institutions did well in the New world. The charter given to the colony of Virginia gave its colonists all the rights the English had. These important rights were given to the other colonists in the English colonies as well. Many of the specific rights are found in the U.S. Constitution. Another important right granted by the King to some of the colonies was the right to have representative assemblies. (p. 10)

Perennially, one of the first representative assemblies was established in Virginia in 1619 and was called the Virginia House of Burgesses. The colonists elected representatives who met to make the laws for the colony. This is called representative democracy. In other words, the people do not vote directly on the laws but elect representatives to vote for them. Many of the other colonists followed Virginia's example as they believed in direct democracy. At town meetings, all the voters from the town met to vote on the laws for their town. This kind of government is possible only in a small area because the voters need to meet frequently. At the town meetings, the people also elected their representatives to the colonial assemblies. From the beginning, government in the United States has combined direct and representative democracy. In contemporary times, it is mostly representative, but

some direct democracy still exists and permeates the American society (Immigration and Naturalization Service's Federal Citizenship Text, 1987). It is believed that Americans learned this system of government--democracy--from the Native Americans.

CHAPTER 3

UNITED STATES-AFRICAN COMMUNICATION POLICY

The Cold War forced the U.S. policymakers to focus their energies on building military, economic and political relationships with Liberian policymakers and other policymakers in West Africa and elsewhere on the continent to maintain American strategic interests, while intentionally thwarting, if not frustrating, Russian military, economic and ideological influence. To accent this policy objective U.S. policymakers generally, discounting internal debates over policy directions, crafted a policy of closer cooperation and sustainable security toward Africa. The premier notion was that African countries were valuable to the security of the U.S. because they offered economic and military opportunities.

The notion specified supra was notoriously evident between 1960-1990. Elevating this trend, Kenneth L. Adelman presented some interesting observations about trade, mineral access and other premises which encouraged American policymakers during the Cold War to regard Africa with a compartmentalized holism. The United States' policymakers were concerned about the stability of Africa, and considered Adelman's point, because the continent's stability was necessary "for the economic, political and security well-being of the West, especially in terms of available minerals" (Adelman, 1980, p. 145). Inclusively, Stephen Wright wrote that the United States and the former Soviet Union have "shown much interest in Africa

for Africa's sake, however, superpower policy in the post-independence era was conditioned by the reflex responses to the global Cold War" (Wright, 1992, p. 30).

In the same manner, Roy Allison and Phil Williams' study (cited in Wright, 1992) expounded that "competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Third World is inevitable and endemic. It is rooted in their broader adversarial relationship, is sustained by indigenous developments in...Africa...and is intensified by both fear and ambition" (Wright, 1992, p. 30).

He argued that the encroachment in Africa for strategic reasons during the Cold War by the United States or Russia was challenged by the actions of the other. In this process, little concern was demonstrated either by the Russians or Americans for the prevailing internal phenomena of their African allies whether connected to human rights, economic development, or political pluralism. For example, the Russians' "support for brutal leaders such as Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia can be countered with U.S. support for corrupt leaders like Mobutu Sesko of Zaire" (Wright, 1992, p. 30), and Dictator Samuel Kanyon Doe of Liberia who misruled the country by contravening all norms of African socio-political etiquette, cultural pluralism and the norms of democratic governance. Robinson (1992) commented that "In pursuit of its 'geo-strategic' interests, the U.S. supported autocrats, fostered and helped to militarize African conflicts, and shielded its eyes from rampant corruption and repression" (p. 43).

During the height of the Cold War, the U.S. controlled the processes of political communication and information systems in Liberia and in other African

countries with the view of asserting its influence. Sydney W. Head addressed the issue of the universal dynamics of information, stating how Western interests were the root cause in intervening and controlling the sources and processes of mass communication. While Head's argument is general in content, its deliberations are applicable to the activities of the U.S. in Liberia, considering the utilization of political communication and information. He argued further that:

Western interests expanded their dominance over the sources and channels of mass communication worldwide; but the sheer quantity of emerging nations imbued them with the electoral muscle and the will to begin asserting some control over the information flowing so freely across their national frontiers. Since most Third World nations have underdeveloped economies unable to support mass marketing or to generate private capital, the presence of Western news, popular culture, and high technology is seen by them as being inappropriate to their people's needs, hostile to their best national interests, and threatening to the survival of their authentic cultures (Head, 1985, p. 181).

It is ironic, in the political order of things, to advance that Western countries hold the view that African countries' communication policy is curvilinear (indirect, "not appropriate" to Eurocentric worldview) because African policymakers use political communication and information to contain disharmony, accelerate national development, place a premium on "national cohesion and identity in societies often marked by ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity" (Head, 1985, p. 185). Western countries' policymakers, on the other hand, have a linear (direct, "appropriate" to Eurocentric cosmology) view of communication: that political communication and information should be tailored for a particular audience to effect given political or commercial aims.

In this endeavor Western countries simultaneously propagate their politics, culture and ideology in Africa to build an unprecedented influence for the purpose of realizing their imperialistic aims. In her thought-provoking book, Yurugu: An African-centered Critique of European Cultural Thought and Behavior, Marimba Ani (1994) wrote that, "The image of the West with which the world has been bombarded is one that has served the purposes of European political and cultural/ideological domination. European cultural imperialism has done a formidable job" (p. 570). She went on to argue that

Since Plato the intellectual energies of Europeans have been devoted to convincing themselves and others of their superiority. As a result, the European tradition is a bastion of propaganda, and those who do not share European commitments have been forced to occupy themselves with denying the validity of this portrait; i.e., with refuting its inherent arguments and with offering a different view of the meaning of European development. (Ani, 1994, p. 570)

Since the U.S. culture is a microcosm of the European culture, the designing and implementation of its African communications policy during the Cold War was generated from the Eurocentric cultural position: an aggregation of propaganda to achieve its geo-strategic interests. Drawing from existing communications and information resources on Africa, there seems arguably to be two schools of thought which are drawn from the U.S. African communications policy, with emphasis on Liberia and the sub-West African region. One school of thought seems to hold the view that, from the beginning of the Cold War to its demise, the U.S. initiated and pursued closer, rigorous political communication and information policies between African policymakers and U.S. policymakers for strategic reasons. Another school of

thought holds the view that due to "the demise of the Cold War, combined with the corresponding realignment of Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union" (Wright, 1992, p. 25), U.S. was left with no "fundamental cornerstone that motivated U.S. policy toward Africa since the end of World War II" (Robinson, 1992, p. 39).

In light of this, it is generally conceived that the U.S. shaped a definitive communications policy toward Africa from a domineering position. Domineering in a sense that the U.S. advocated political communication and information through its communications media agencies to Liberia and elsewhere in Africa to advance American security, cultural and political philosophy. The communications media have immense power to influence and manipulate people (see Walter Lippmann, 1922; Harold Lasswell, 1927), because "communication stimulates and disseminates values and supports institutions that are favorable to achievement, mobility, innovation, and consumption--all part of the Western concept of 'modernization'" (Servaes, 1991, p. 55). For instance, Lippmann stated, among other things, that the communications media, with their persuasive and influential powers, define our world.

Robinson (1992) said that the U.S. government is "fashioning a New World Order founded on respect for human rights, the establishment of a democratic peace based on political and economic freedom, and the peaceful resolution of disputes" (p. 39).

The undergirding question is thus posed: To what extent is Africa featured in this "New World Order" which the U.S. policymakers are fashioning, considering the bleak conception that the U.S. "disinterest in Africa begins at the top and permeates

much of the U.S. foreign policy establishment" (Robinson, 1992, p. 42)? To answer this question, Randall Robinson stated bluntly that, "The general sentiment in official circles is that Africa has never been, and never will be, a priority in U.S. foreign policy" (p. 42).

Perhaps the disinterest of the U.S. in Africa is caused by two reasons: (1) the demise of the Cold War, and (2) racism. For example, Robinson reiterated that since the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy toward Africa has produced some disturbing results. He noted that these results are disturbing given the low level of support that the continent received even during the Cold War period when the United States had geo-strategic interests. Thus, the examples of previous and current inattention to Africa attests to what he calls "a double-standard in U.S. foreign policy" (Robinson, 1992, p. 42).

Another telling example of U.S. inattention to Africa was demonstrated by U.S. policymakers when it came to offering development assistance to the continent. Recently, the Congressional Black Caucus raised sub-Saharan Africa's foreign aid levels from \$600 million to \$800 million. Most influential members of Congress considered the goal of \$1 billion in development assistance for sub-Saharan Africa unattainable. On the other hand, Congress, acting upon the request of the administration, eagerly provided foreign aid to the former Soviet Union when it successfully voted for the passage of the legislation that would grant that region at least \$600 million (Robinson, 1992).

Other forms of U.S. engagement also appeared endangered. In the 1970s, U.S. military assistance to Africa, for instance, was approximately \$300 million. Many African experts and advocacy groups object to even this reduced level of military aid to sub-Saharan Africa, but however, this dramatic fall in "security assistance" is reflective of escalating U.S. disinterest in the continent. The premier U.S. agency (Agency for International Development-AID) responsible for implementing foreign development assistance is considering the closing of certain American aid missions in Africa, professed in favor of regional approaches to development. In view of previous records, many suspect instead that AID's African resources are simply insufficient to operate programs at the same level as before. Besides, Eastern Europe and the successor states to the former U.S.S.R. are making increasing demands on U.S. assistance programs and personnel from the Peace Corps. In addition, the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture, among other agencies, have already begun to divert resources from Africa in order to operate new programs in other countries. Worse yet, while efforts at long term sustainable development suffer, interest in relief initiatives has also waned (Robinson, 1992).

The U.S. African communications policy which served American imperialism while blocking Soviet influence in Africa during the Cold War should be redesigned since the Cold War has ended to articulate through political communication and information U.S. unconditional support for the building of democracy, as well as maintaining human rights, and promoting trade and investment in Africa. Robinson stated that several key factors have to be considered by U.S. policymakers, in order

to guide U.S. policy toward Africa. First, as stated previously, U.S. policy should be cemented in support of democratic values, human rights and the principles of determination. Second, the U.S. government should redouble its efforts to enhance mutually beneficial trade and investment in Africa. To this end, African Americans' businesses have a unique role to play in this effort. Third, U.S. bilateral and multilateral development assistance to Africa should rise to a level and form equivalent with the continent's needs, and the funding levels of other industrialized countries. Finally, U.S. policies should be pursued within a framework of collective engagement which includes both greater cooperation with U.S. allies and support for intra-African political and economic regional integration (Robinson, 1992). It can be inferred from Robinson's interesting argument that when whites get needy suddenly Africans are expendable.

On the pessimistic side, Cold War policies have had a tremendous toll. Retrospectively, the U.S. formed alliances of expediency in various geopolitical regions of Africa during the Cold War which were destructive to enhancing civil liberties in Africa. Currently, Africans are still attempting to overcome the calamitous consequences of such alliances (Robinson, 1992).

It is abundantly clear that the political communication and information policies of the U.S. regarding Liberia and the West African sub-region in terms of military, economic and political spheres in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and up to date, were acutely determined by the dynamics of the Cold War period. Ironically, Liberia and other countries in West and continental Africa, as noted by Francis M. Deng, "won

or lost the support of the United States depending on where they stood in this ideological polarity. Africa became a battleground for the proxy confrontation and conflict between the superpowers" (Deng, 1992, p. 48). Liberia won the support of the U.S. because of the strategic and economic opportunities it provided.

Consequently, it can be argued that as a theory, free flow of information rises with American imperialism (Asante, 1983).

It is brutally essential to admit that the United States played a marginalized but significant role as far as decolonization and Africa's quest for independence were concerned; decolonization was a struggle against the United States' Western European allies. This created almost an ambivalence in U.S.-African relations. The then Soviet Union took advantage of this ambivalence to win Africa away from the United States, turning many liberation movements toward the Eastern Bloc (Deng, 1992).

The Soviet Union and the countries of the Eastern Bloc were, ill-suited to assist with the post-independence challenges of development and nation-building which tended to pull most independent African countries toward the West. The response of the West and in particular the United States was determined by the ideological parity of the Cold War (Deng, 1992).

Without relinquishing one iota of the specter of diplomacy, the U.S. African communications policy in terms of the military in the West African sub-region from the 1960s to 1990 was couched in the autonomy of U.S. policymakers' orientation of maintaining U.S. interests in West Africa by any means necessary. That translated as ignoring rampant corruption and repression by autocrats and dictators who supported

U.S. interests. It may, of course, be argued that U.S. African communications policy was seated in anti-communist fervor during the Cold War period.

The U.S. African communications policy is not dissimilar to the communications policy enunciated by the U.S. government since the Depression Era which has continued to the present in guiding the functioning of the communications industry in this country vis-a-vis Africa and the world. Writing with holistic imprint, Paglin contended (as cited in Russell W. Neuman et al., 1993) that

the first paragraph of the 1934 Communications Act charges the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) with regulation of "commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide and world-wide wire and radio communication service" (Neuman et al., 1993, p. 84)

Historically, Paglin wrote (as cited in Neuman et al., 1993) that, Titles II and III of the Act reinforce the distinction between common-carriage, wireline telephony, and radio broadcasting, a legacy of the Cullom (Interstate Commerce) Act of 1887, the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, and the Federal Radio Acts of 1912 and 1927. However, by all accounts, the 1934 Act, as reflected in these words, was designed to bring together the existing regulatory machinery from both traditions (from the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Radio Commission) into a new and unified FCC. President Roosevelt's letter in support of this legislation stressed the importance of bringing the two domains of communications together. The President's administration study group, chaired by the Secretary of Commerce, also supported

this approach and expressed concern about a "collection of communications agencies not working in accordance with any national plan" (Neuman et al., 1993, p. 84).

The U.S. African communications policy which encompassed the political communication and information policies of the United States government in terms of military, economic and political affairs regarding Liberia and the West African sub-region is the transcendental exponent of the 1934 Communications Act. The U.S. African communications policy in terms of the military during the Cold War was basically consistent with the overall U.S. policy of integrating the military establishment in the foreign policy arena to accomplish American interests. The U.S. national objectives were the precursor to the U.S. interest. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason's Study, "The Undeclared War 1940-1941" (as cited in Donald F. Bletz, 1972) delineated the U.S. cardinal national objectives as the

preservation of the territorial, economic and ideological integrity of the United States and of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere; prevention of the disruption of the British Empire; prevention of the further extension of Japanese territorial domain; eventual establishment in Europe and Asia of balance of power which will most nearly ensure political stability in those regions and the future security of the United States; and, so far as practicable, the establishment of regimes favorable to economic freedom and individual liberty. (Bletz, 1972, p. 29)

A laconic background, in actuality, showing that there was a politico-military cooperation during World War II which subsequently led to the military involvement in foreign policy formulation is necessary, so as to give a sharper picture of how U.S. African communications policy evolved. Donald F. Bletz indicated that as the world progressed, the military leaders became involved in the making of foreign policy

decisions during World War II. One school of thought explicated that this transition from purely military areas of concern was actually forced on a reluctantly military profession because the responsible civilian policymakers failed to fulfill their rightful obligation. Another school of thought argued that this bland usurpation of civil authority by military leaders was not coercive, but rather was actively sought by the Pentagon. All in all, it is necessary to recognize the fact that the military did become heavily involved in matters that were traditionally outside the sphere of the American professional military officer (Bletz, 1972).

Immediately after the war, it appeared that the military would withdraw to its prewar status. However, as events have proved, the military did not revert to its prewar position in politico-military affairs. The role of the military in general and military professionalism in particular had taken on a new dimension. It soon became apparent that the military profession was a thing to be recognized and accepted in the national policy formulation circles. Both found it necessary to reexamine old values and all concepts. This then was the status of politico-military relationship in the United States as the nation moved into a new form of conflict: the Cold War (Bletz, 1972).

Being historically aware of the significant role the military played and continued to fulfill in universal affairs, the U.S. policymakers, in order to achieve American interests in Liberia and the West African sub-region, designed a focused communications policy for the military regimes of Liberia and elsewhere in West Africa. The motif of the U.S. African communications policy during this Cold War

era included the exclusion of its policymakers from publicly criticizing the dictatorial military regimes and other countries in West Africa for human rights abuses, while they attempted to promote American democracy in these countries so as to achieve American economic, political, and military objectives.

For the purpose of understanding this discourse, it is necessary to define the term "Cold War," as perceived by the U.S. policymakers, from the inception of the Cold War up to the present. James D. Atkinson's 1963 study done at Georgetown University (as cited in Bletz, 1972) defined Cold War as a war that included

forcible, semi-forcible, and non-forcible techniques. It includes propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage, espionage, subversion, the fomentation of strikes, civil disturbances, terrorism, psychopolitical attack (in the form, for example, of threats of nuclear obliteration), diplomatic pressures, guerrilla warfare, and limited, conventional, undeclared war. (Bletz, 1972, p. 41)

A clearer, applicable definition of the Cold War was advanced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States Armed Forces. They defined the Cold War (as cited in Bletz, 1972) as

a state of international tension, wherein political, economic, technological, sociological, psychological, paramilitary, and military measures short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces are employed to achieve national objectives. (Bletz, 1972, p. 42)

At the economic and political levels, Liberia's armed forces' mutual military alliances with the United States Armed Forces and policymakers resulted in the U.S. playing a greater role in the gradual but guided promotion of the free enterprise system in Liberia which was sabotaged by the country's policymakers. Sabotage in a sense that the economic and political development of Liberia was

undertaken by Liberian policymakers whose aims were detrimental to the human resources, infrastructural and industrial development of the country. It is apparent that Liberian policymakers, from the advent of the freed Africans to the period during which Liberia gained its independence and to the inception of the Cold War and the post Cold War era, participated in official corruption and mismanagement of funds. Echoing this indictment against Liberian policymakers, George E. Saigbe Boley contended in his informative book, Liberia: The Rise and Fall of the First Republic, that "The gross official corruption and lavish misapplication of the public funds' referred to by President Roberts in 1872 can be traced to the administration of President Stephen Allen Benson (1856-1864), the second President of the First Republic" (pp. 33-34). Boley noted further that it was during the regime of President Benson that the National Legislature formed a committee known as the Special Committee on Public Accounts. This Committee, empowered to investigate the management of the public funds by the Secretary of the Treasury, implicated President Benson in its report to the Legislature as having used public funds for his own personal benefit (Boley, 1983).

U.S. African communications policy has had a trenchant impact on Liberia and the West African sub-region in terms of political, social and economic matters. In fairness, foreign mass media, possessing a hegemonic policy, had double-impact on Liberia: (a) these news media projected positively their culture through news reports and entertainment programs to the Liberian reading, listening and viewing public; and (b) they projected negatively Liberian culture, programs and news to the outside

world. In his 1985 scholarly work, "The media system of Liberia," Jerome Zack Boikaii III argued that, "a pervasive feeling in Liberia is that local papers are inadequate to communicate government policies effectively, while foreign news agencies often present a biased and distorted view of Liberia to the outside world" (Boikaii III, 1985, p. 38).

He noted further that, to delete such tendencies the Liberian Ministry of Information established a news agency, the Liberian News Agency (LINA) during the latter part of the 1970s to control the dissemination of information, as well as to provide what the Ministry of Information's news bulletin called "news, comment, and feature articles about its own country to the information media abroad, and at the same time to supply the local press with home and world news" (Boikaii III, 1985, p. 38).

Economically, the U.S. communications policy helped to educate Liberian and West African consumers about commodities imported from the U.S. and other European and Asian countries. Socially, the U.S. African communications policy made it easier, sufficient and necessary for entertainment and informational programs produced in the U.S. to be transmitted to Liberia and other countries in West Africa. Politically, the U.S. African communications policy assisted in promoting mutual political dialogue between Liberian and American policymakers; necessity demands such a dialogue. Militarily, the U.S. African communications policy enabled the U.S. policymakers to utilize military leaders in the formulation of foreign policies which integrated the security and mutual concerns of the U.S. in Liberia and the West

African sub-region during the Cold War. The U.S. military attache to the Ministry of Defense in Monrovia, for example, played a decisive role in the formulation and implementation of major strategic concerns between the U.S. and Liberia during the Cold War (i.e., the regime of President Samuel Kanyon Doe, 1980-1990).

Let it be stressed that communication is necessary because it allows the sender and receiver to interact with one another and address matters of relevance. On the one hand, communication between the industrially advanced United States and the less industrially developing Liberia and countries in the West African sub-region during the Cold War era was done at the dominator-subordinate level. This sort of arrangement benefitted the dominator; in this case the United States. Molefi Kete Asante argued that the doctrines of communication expounded in the Western world meant to protect the status of the exploiter, the dominator, or if they were not so intended have become a reality. Free flow of information, to cite an example, empowers the exploiter and keeps the weak nations weak and undeveloped. As a theory, free flow of information rises with American imperial expansion and global hegemony (Asante, 1983).

CHAPTER 4

THE DISSEMINATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION (1960-1990)

The United States utilizes political communication and information systems to achieve its interests in African countries. The primary objective of the U.S. constructing telecommunications, railroads, broadcasting stations and information agencies in many African countries during the period of the Cold War was to further the interests of American imperialism, and these industrial developments produced incidental benefits for those African countries. Liberia is an example. In the country, the U.S. political communication and information systems include the Voice of America (VOA) in Careysburg, Montserrado County, the International Communications Agency (I.C.A), as well as the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, which is the telecommunications center for all U.S. diplomatic and military traffic between Washington and all U.S. Embassies in Africa. The Omega tracking station, one of a system of seven in the world that monitors the exact movements of all ships and planes is located in Paynesward, Monrovia. These agencies have acted, from 1960-1990, as prime purveyors of public and entertainment information, which helped to shape and determine Liberian public policy. Such public policy has been for three decades a stabilizing force in the governance of Liberia. On the other hand, it has also been a debilitating and unreliable force, especially so, during the regime of the military interregnum (1980-1990) in which human rights were grossly violated by

Liberia's military policymakers. The gross human rights violations by the Liberian military policymakers are compendium of what A Fund for Free Expression Report (FFFER) called "'quiet diplomacy,' combining private admonition with unstinting public support. While this approach has induced some positive changes, the returns have generally been meager. What's more, they are diminishing with time" (FFFER, 1986, p. 46).

Elsewhere in Africa from 1960-1990, United States' political communication and information were disseminated as dialogue and propagandistic communication in lieu of American interests. The U. S. interests in African countries, particularly in South Africa, Somalia, Nigeria, Liberia, the Congo, Libya, and Egypt are important because they consisted of giving America access to African raw materials, trade, investment and strategic opportunities. However, American interests in African countries are not as paramount as that of countries in Latin America, Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Knox (1975) commented:

U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis Africa in fact shows in one sense a lack of interest as compared with Europe, Asia, and Latin America. It is this lack of interest that contributes in part to the application of policies regarded by African leaders as inimical to the continent. (pp. 229, 230)

Knox noted that there is, however, a movement toward more extensive investments in certain areas and territories of Africa, with Zaire, South Africa, and specifically, Nigeria being the most significant recipients, although Angola has received far-reaching recognition due to its petroleum resources in Cabinda. With the exception of Nigeria, meanwhile, it is hardly probable that these increased

investments will affect significantly the comparative importance of U.S. trade and investments in Africa as compared with some other geopolitical regions of the world. It seems clear that, U.S. defense and security arrangements regarding Africa appear to be of even less significance than U.S. economic interests in the area; maintenance of sea-lanes in the hands of friendly nations and the availability of port facilities relate far more to economic activities than to defense considerations, and it is difficult to imagine that such facilities would be denied to the United States except perhaps in a war situation. Even in such a situation, however, alternative arrangements would not be difficult to put into operation (Knox, 1975). Put rather doubtlessly, Africa is and will remain important for the United States militarily, not because of the astronomical might of its armed forces or the bases it provides for military operations and source of supply but the danger that racial or Cold War complications might cause the involvement of American forces on the continent as they became involved in Korea and Vietnam (Emerson, 1967).

In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s contrary to African countries' cosmology, the U.S. view of world order was dictated by the principles of international peace, security, cooperation, anticommunism and the exposure of American cultural motifs to African countries. Ofuatey-Kodjoe (1975) noted:

On several occasions, beginning with the intervention of U.S. troops in the Soviet Union immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution, the United States has been eager to press its anticommunistic sentiment far enough to destroy international peace. In the face of the growth of the Soviet power however the United States has accepted the bipolarity of the contemporary international system. As a result, the U.S. conception of world order has led to a policy settling down to a "protracted conflict"

against communism that the United States hopes to win by propagating the American way of combining "individual freedom and mass welfare of a primarily material kind." (p. 218)

Ofuately-Kodjoe argued that one of the objectives of the foreign policy of a country is to safeguard the institutional and cultural integrity of the society. As such, it is the racist nature of American society that accentuates for the racial aspect of conception of the U.S. national interest, which in turn leads to the policy of natural alliance with South Africa and support of Southern Rhodesia and Portugal (Ofuately-Kodjoe, 1975). Conceiving these irreconcilable views, it seems that the U.S. policy in Africa is changeable only if the racist posture of the American society is fundamentally changed. The real and present factor here is that the American system must integrate the power base by providing ample opportunities for African American policymakers together with American policymakers from other ethnic groups to actively and critically engage in debates concerning African economic, social, political and military issues. This way the interests of Africa will be served. Because of institutionalized racism, the United States attaches diminished significance in dealing with "Black" African countries at the diplomatic, political and economic levels. Conversely, when dealing with African states such as South Africa where a minority white government ruled, the relationship was different. The U.S. used no political communication which was inherently an aggregate of propaganda in dealing with such a racist state.

Clough (1992) observed the following in his book, U.S. Policy Toward Africa and the End of the Cold War, remarking about the role of African American

policymakers in helping to determine the United States policy toward African countries:

Mobilizing black America to oppose white racism in southern Africa is much easier than creating an enduring American constituency for black Africa. Black America's large domestic agenda limits its ability to take on the additional burdens of Africa. Moreover, it is not clear that a consensus exists among black leaders on African issues. While there is significant black support for increased aid to Africa, there is no consensus on who should receive that aid and for what purposes. (p. 34)

Clough delineated that it is not clear that the growing tendency of U.S. politicians and many establishment institutions, especially some of the major foundations, to view African issues as exclusively "black" issues serves either African or African-American interests. Defining African issues in these terms reinforces the view that the United States has no national (as opposed to ethnic) interests in Africa. This creates a danger that U.S. policymaking will be reduced to an ad hoc and often merely symbolic effort to satisfy African American constituencies. Other potentially significant constituencies could be discounted in the process, and non-African Americans may be discouraged from becoming involved with Africa. A danger also exists that African Americans will gain greater influence over foreign policy process. Implicitly, the argument that African Americans possess a greater claim on policy toward Africa than other people suggests that they have a lesser claim on policy toward other parts of the world. What is required instead is a strategy that will enhance the concern of African-Americans with the continent without further marginalizing either Africa or African Americans in the U.S. foreign policy process. Such a strategy would stress the significance of deepening ties between African

Americans and Africa as part of a broader strategy of creating society-to-society linkages between the United States and Africa (Clough, 1992).

Murphy (1969) stated, on the one hand, that "Africans had a favorable opinion of the United States because of its historic commitment to democracy and freedom" (p. 174). Africans observed in the years immediately before their independence, that the United States did not support the principle of colonial rule. The enormous wealth of the United States and the generosity with which it helped Europe to recuperate from the ruins of World War II encouraged African states to anticipate that they might also attain moral and financial assistance from the United States. Following independence, relations between the United States and African states became complex. Those countries that had benefitted from American aid, trade, and investment--such as Ethiopia, Liberia, Tunisia, and Zaire--tended to value the relationship and to articulate their solidarity with the United States policy in Africa. However, almost all of the African countries have developed reservations, because they feel that the United States is playing a global power game (Murphy, 1969). While it appears evident that the United States forceful involvement in Africa, utilizing political communication and information systems started with the Congo turbulence of 1960, this process has continued unabated, and is continuing in the 21st century giving the dynamics of international political, economic, military and social orders.

Political communication and information systems in the United States and in African countries permeate political and cultural life. Karl Deutsch suggested that, without political communication and information systems there can be no nation. For

it is through the process of communications that people first developed a sense of community and a shared set of values that legitimize political authority (Deutsch, 1963). Cultural values take precedence in a culture because they give direction to life, and in the African context, they are sacrosanct. The American Assembly (1958) asserted that, "In seeking after the values of his culture, the individual gives meaning to his life" (p. 167).

Given the unique dimensions of advanced telecommunications and information technologies, politicians and corporate executives in the United States use the new technologies to transmit political and entrepreneurial information among themselves, to their constituents, and to their targeted consumers, in order to consolidate their political and corporate control, as well as to manipulate the behavior of those groups to conform to their political and corporate aims. As for Liberia and other African nations, politicians and business leaders have also recognized the importance and power of political communication and information technologies. African policymakers have recognized that information technologies and unmuffled political communication are vital to the social, political, cultural and economic development of the diverse geopolitical regions of the continent.

Linked as they are to all social activity, the new information and communication technologies provide endless opportunities to enhance the cultural enrichment of Africans and Americans. Given their network capabilities, they offer an expanded infrastructure for information sharing and exchange. They can be used, moreover, not only to generate greater amounts of information and new kinds of

cultural forms, but also to make this knowledge more accessible and to provide it in more convenient and subtle ways. In addition, in America, for example, communication and information technologies are decentralized and widely available, they open the way for many new people to become actively involved in creative activities. Finally, given their ability to store and retrieve vast quantities of information, they can serve as a storehouse of cultural resources, making them accessible and available for generations and civilizations to come. Even though they are controlled by policymakers in many African countries, communication and information technologies are important for the cultural, political, economic and social developments, as well as improved security for their citizenry.

African Political Systems

Africa has multiple cultural and political systems, among which are Western, colonial, and traditional. The Western political system is a system whose attributes (social, political, and economic) are Eurocentric. The colonial system is an expansionist system with the nuances of Eurocentricism, yet it is committed to the imposition of European values on Africans, as well as the exploitation of Africa's resources. The traditional system caters to the customs and traditions of African societies, as well as maintaining law and order.

The effects of United States political communication and information systems in Africa have been minimally effective because the U.S. policymakers have gaps in their knowledge and understanding of Africa's political history which emit from the

period of enslavement, and later during the period of colonialism, on the continent.

Kitchen (1988) summed up the interaction of the U.S. with Africa:

We sometimes forget that (in contrast to Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, and Germany) United States interaction with Africa was largely limited before World War II to episodic links with Liberia, Morocco, Ethiopia, and Zanzibar, and to the distortions inherent in the slave trade. It was not until 1958 that the Department of State created a Bureau of African Affairs. (pp. 14-15)

This action was amended in 1974, when the Nixon administration had second thoughts about what constituted "Africa" and shifted four of the key members of the Organization of African Unity since 1963--Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Libya--back in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Kitchen, 1988).

From the end of World War II to the present, it has been the objective of the United States to see the democratization, stability, and security of Africa. America's strategic and economic interests in Africa cannot be attained with unorthodox and non-democratic forms of government. The American Assembly (1958) noted:

Perhaps democracy can emerge from quite different social and historical circumstances than those of European societies, or special conditions found in developing African societies can serve as functional equivalents. Indeed, there is danger of becoming insensitive to such possibilities and of perpetuating an ethnocentric and pejorative attitude characteristic of not a few Western observers of development in the non-Western world. The most we can say at this stage is, there is a strong presumption that the presence in any society of the conditions described above would tend to enhance the possibilities of a democratic order. (p. 29)

In African states, the development of stable and democratic systems rests mainly on (a) the development of political leadership, (b) political integration, (c) the emergence of a national party system, and the growth of an indigenous bureaucracy.

In colonial times, African leadership was held by the most articulate agitators in the nationalist crusade. A facade of national unity was created by popular endorsement of the slogan of self-government, which meant very different things to different groups. Competitive political groups were condemned, if not considered treasonable, because they divided and weakened the nationalist movement; and the higher positions in the bureaucracy were in alien hands. A new type of leadership was required after independence was achieved. Pre-existing colonial cleavages in the society could no longer be concealed under the banners of nationalism; ranks were closed for the painful tasks of national integration to be confronted. If the society were to be democratic, competing political parties were necessary to exist to provide the electorate with periodic choices regarding public policy and personnel; and the development of an indigenous bureaucracy to make self-government a reality was essential (American Assembly, 1958).

Because of its homogenous characteristics, Africa has vast problems and the forms of political systems are many and different. In fact, several political systems are represented, including a medieval monarchy, experimental democracy, and military dictatorship. Unlike the United States, the different political systems in Africa make it difficult for policymakers to implement a coherent national public policy. For example, public policy that is appreciated and successful in one African country may be rejected and totally irrelevant for another. Such political diversity obviously must be fully appreciated for any realistic assessment of the prospects for democracy and stability.

Let us briefly look at the diverse effects of cultural perspectives on the normative and cultural thought patterns that inform institution-building, including patterns of communication. The case of Nigeria, one of the largest, richest, and most powerful states in Africa, from the colonial period to the contemporary time is reviewed, for the purpose of this discourse.

Tony Ike Nnaemeka advanced the view that, thus knowing the sociology of modern African political processes is the same as understanding the forms of integration of varied cultural communication influences that impinge on the structuring of the system. Since communication builds itself into the social framework, the materialistic symbolic contents of a society's communication systems generally reflect the structural morphology of that society at any given time and between periods in history (Nnaemeka, 1990).

The issue of continuity and change over time fall squarely within this framework. To illustrate, Nnaemeka stressed that cultural patterns or their related cosmology are static conditions. However, their structures may exhibit stability between one point in time and another, they also may change in accordance with at least two possible contexts of experience: (1) encounter with different thought systems, prompting a continuous interplay of the various elements including ideas, beliefs, and values that inform each of the systems throughout stages of institutional reforms and development; and (2) the context of the change that emanates from major traumatic events in the history of a people, such as wars and other turbulent social upheavals capable of provoking radical changes in the normative patterns and

conceptions of life shared by members of the society (pp. 308-309). The civil wars in Liberia, Ethiopia, Somalia, and elsewhere in Africa are distinct examples of the context of structural change that emanates from major traumatic events in the history of a people.

Both as a concept and as a socio-political process, nationalism played a crucial role in revamping the location of contemporary African institution-order, as well as political communication patterns. For instance in Nigeria, as elsewhere in Africa, Hodkin and Said's studies (as cited in Nnaemeka, 1990) noted that nationalism was and continues to be an "ideology" of change, however not in a doctrinaire sense. It incorporates within its autonomy many different ideas and values about a just and humane society, with concepts for political action drawn from both the experiences of personalities and developments in Europe, the Americas, and African regional or ethnic backgrounds. However it constitutes as a new creation, a global synthesis of these diverse thoughts and cultural patterns, without bias toward any particular model (Nnaemeka, 1990).

A network of public acculturation that was central to the initial structuring of politics and political communication in Nigeria was the communications media. The peculiar character of Eurocentric hegemony in "black" Africa was sustained by the introduction of modern communications media and other assortments of colonial regime. On the other hand, their institutionalization in Nigeria's political process was guided by a system of values and norms that supported nationalism (Nnaemeka, 1990). Nnaemeka (1990) wrote:

The institutionalization and growth of the mass media (press) in colonial Nigeria as combative and antiestablishment arms of the political process arose, as Ainslie (1967) observed, both from the need felt by the elite for a voice in public affairs and the desire to arouse racial consciousness and the idea of nationalism among the masses, as well as to stimulate in them some form of "vicarious participation" in the affairs of the nation. (p. 312)

Maybe it was due to the strategic and tactical uses of the communications media for the mobilization of nationalist sentiments that thoughts and values from the indigenous cultures were brought more directly to the forefront of political communication structuring of this period. Given the understanding that the colonial regime had imposed a Eurocentric language (English) as the common vehicular language to serve as bond among the diverse ethnic-linguistic groups in Nigeria, political communication initially centered around the indigenous educated elites who were versed in the nuances, idioms, and symbolisms of the language of the ruling colonial power. Meanwhile pressure to enlarge the participatory base of the nationalist movement, and the need to frustrate the repressive colonial laws of sedition and treason, forced the indigenous leaders and revolutionaries to look inward to traditional ideographs, myths, and other symbolic cultural representations to communicate various oppressive and dehumanizing forms of colonialism, including the essential thoughts of nationalism (Nnamemeka, 1990). Fanon (1968) wrote on the role of the nationalist movement that "The rebellion gives proof of its rational basis and expresses its maturity each time that it uses a particular case to advance the people's awareness" (pp. 146-147). He contended further that, in defiance of those inside the nationalist movement who believe that shades of meaning constitute dangers and drive

wedges into the solid block of popular opinion, the leaders are grounded in those principles that have been sifted out in the national struggle, and in the universal struggle of mankind for freedom and security (Fanon, 1968). This process of communication was used to depict in a larger context in the African cosmology, the intense struggles for freedom and political empowerment, which were sought by the indigenous leaders and the so-called revolutionaries.

These culturally-rooted modes of expression were skillfully manipulated in the press, in a manner that not only projected colonialism in its most grotesque forms, but was able to cast the ideas being communicated within an interpretive system of thought familiar mainly to the indigenous population. The nationalist newspapers were able to achieve this thought-transpository feat (conveying a cultural thought pattern through a foreign, linguistic vehicular medium without losing the importance and meaning of that thought system) because most of those who edited and worked on the nationalist press were also leaders of the movement. Where traditional nonmedia settings were used as contexts of communication, like rallies and cultural display (and these were extensively used), the manipulation took various symbolic and expressive forms. For example, different masquerades depicting different cultural referents of meaning were always invited to display at nationalists' organized mass rallies to portray symbolically different aspects of the colonial situation being communicated (Nnaemeka, 1990). Depending on the types of masquerade, and the socio-cultural contexts in which they generally derive their essence and meanings, different masquerades can objectify for their audiences different aspects of both the

empirical and superempirical realms of reality. Apart from their symbolic significance in social communication, masquerades like other forms of traditional cultural displays (dancing, drumming, and wrestling), serve integrative communicative functions, in the sense that they are open-air social activities capable of drawing together large and diverse segments of the population into a communication process (Nnaemeka, 1990). Welsh-Asante and Asante (1981) noted that, "A communicative experience, deriving from our own symbology, will add to the human capacity to speak clearly, directly, and with propriety about the immensity of the crises in intercultural communication that we now share" (p. 395). The former expression by Welsh-Asante and Asante is a function of group dynamics in the African culture, contributing to the communicative, political, social, and economic amalgamation of Africans.

In Africa, political communication and information systems have become commercialized and suited with organized, elevated occurrence of corruption, particularly in the military, dictatorial, civilian, and constitutional governments. Even in colonial Africa, corruption was pervasive. Diop (1991) claimed that:

However, the political systems were far from being perfect. We have shown, in *L'Afrique Noire precoloniale*, that to look for the driving force of African history amounted to finding the social categories that did not resign themselves to their fate, because they were exploited without compensation; these were the truly alienated of society: those who produced for society, but received almost nothing in return. In the particular case of the Cayor, and with minor differences in the case of all the neo-Sudanese societies, they were made up of the peasantry, the Badolo; and of the third category of private slaves, called captives of the Father's hut. (p. 168)

This author argued that the U.S. political communication is Eurocentric and hegemonic because its contents are rational and tailored for a particular political audience, whereas traditional communication in contemporary African countries carries the tone of political messages, but has an axiological root. Political communication and information systems in several African countries are vibrant and necessary when effectuating changes in the political system. Parts of the political system need to be adjusted or these intended changes may not be implemented, they may be cosmetic. It is obvious that changes in the political structure can threaten the power of African leaders, therefore changes need to be made with causality and with sensitivity to the existing power structure. Herbst (1990) stated that "African regimes often rig markets through direct state intervention in order for resources to flow to constituencies important to their tenure in office" (p. 949). Herbst said that, at a more abstract level, government intervention in Africa led to systems where goods were allocated through state coercion, a process which impeded the market from providing information. Structural adjustment requires states to cede much of their coercive powers over the economy, and pay much more attention to the information that real prices provide (Herbst, 1990). The analogy in Herbst's discourse is that the combination of force, information or political communication that African governments use have an impact on the existing system; for as he observed, "if the proportions are substantially altered the structural relations of government will also be altered" (Herbst, 1990, p. 952).

African governments do not use information well to eradicate misinformation which engenders political and economic reforms and national development. The gamble here is explicit. Herbst (1990) recognized that

There is no real vision of the state here. Nor is the absence of such a vision surprising given that it is not in the interests of African leaders to acknowledge that the economic reforms to which they are now nominally committed also entails significant political reforms which might weaken their power structures further. (p. 954)

Many African countries are now democratizing and imbuing their institutions with African motifs, so that the institutions will survive to achieve their objectives. The United States' political communication and information systems including the Voice of America (VOA) and the International Communications Agency (I.C.A) have played and continue to play significant roles in this process, for without communication there can be no social, economic, political and institutional evolution. Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) agreed that "in public affairs, there would be more reason to expect the leaders to be relatively more influenced by the media in their own decisions" (p. 317).

Implicitly, the United States is advanced in communication and information technologies, hence the U.S. cannot abhor the scientific use of these communication and information systems in the pursuit of its interests in African states. Obviously, problems of gigantic proportion will surface. To diminish such problems, African states and the United States would have to equally utilize these communication and information technologies to their advantage to enhance their economic, political,

social and institutional growth. The United States must refrain from distorted political communication in African countries because the imposition of United States political communication and information systems and cultural hegemony are regarded by African policymakers as threats to Africa's free flow of political communication and information and cultural pluralism among its diverse ethnic groups in the various geopolitical regions.

Media imperialism occurs when a dominant culture such as the United States imposes its values, beliefs, assumptions, and language upon a dependent culture like the African countries through the process of political communication via the information systems. Since mediated products reflect the cultures that produce them, the currency of telecommunication message-systems transmit products that reflect the inevitable and uneven power relationship between the senders and the receivers (Head, 1985). In his 1983 study, Hamelink articulated that when a nation's cultural decisions are made by outside forces like foreign media and transnational corporations, then its own cultural sovereignty gives way and becomes molded into an imitation of the alien culture. Hamelink referred to this process as "cultural synchronization", meaning that the receiving culture takes on the shape of, or becomes synchronous with, the outside culture (pp. 3-23).

The commercialization of the political process with the attendant American political, cultural pattern type is evident in Liberia and other African countries where the United States influence is saturated. In Nigeria during the Second Republic, for example, the commercialization of the political process was not limited to mere

adaptation of American Hollywood-type "image packaging." It extended to the way in which traditional modes of perception and perspectives were exploited and capitalized on in political image-making processes. To illustrate, traditional maestros were employed to compose songs that skillfully weave the native myths, lullabies, and background history of a political actor into a story, which was subtly diffused through both the traditional oral and the mass media channels--all in the attempt to find a new cultural base for legitimizing the leadership of the new political actors, most of whom were previously unknown personalities in their respective communities (Nnaemeka, 1990).

Economic Trends

From 1960 to 1990 and onward, the United States considered Africa as an important trading and political partner, notwithstanding individual African state's ideological leanings, because of the crucial raw materials which come from Africa.

Kamarck (1963) enumerated that:

Africa supplies the bulk of our consumption of diamonds (industrial and gem), columbium, cobalt, corundum, pyrethrum, arabic gum, wattle bark and extract, palm and palm kernel oil; at least half of our consumption of cocoa, cloves, vanilla beans, extra long staple cotton, mahogany logs, long fiber asbestos; and around a quarter of our consumption of antimony, chrome, graphite, manganese, tantalum, goat and kid skins, papain, and canary seeds. (p. 157)

Emerson (1967) summed up that "To this list must be added very substantial purchases of coffee, for the most part from East Africa and Angola, of rubber from Liberia and Nigeria, and of gold and uranium, primarily from South Africa" (pp. 31-

32). In West Africa, to add, Nigeria is the major oil producing nation, Liberia is the leading iron ore producing country, and Ghana is the largest gold producing country. Let it be stressed that Africa recognized its economic importance to the United States, and that economic factors usually played a determining role in the political decision-making for the U.S. by African states.

Most American economic objectives regarding trade promotion, investment protection, and reliable production and supply of raw materials can best be served by encouraging and promoting harmonious political relations with African governments. Such efforts will, however, be dominated by American policy toward South Africa. As long as the American position on South Africa is seen as underhandedness by Africans, the emanating suspicions and hostilities may prove detrimental to American business interests. To this end, the impact of any such changes in attitude toward Americans would probably be marginal (Whitaker, 1978). Political communication played a crucial role in fostering amicable political and economic relations between the United States and African governments.

The stark view is that the transition from the apartheid system of government to a future political entity engulfed with a democratic veil in South Africa will have an impact on the U.S. economic interests. If, as it seems increasingly likely that the South African future holds a period of prolonged and violent struggle, the economic repercussions for the United States in particular and its allies in general could be quite destructive. In an environment of increasing violence the economic costs to the United States would begin to escalate. American-owned property would certainly be

vulnerable to attack. A war-ravaged economy in South Africa could scarcely be expected to yield normal profits and trading partners would be disrupted. The strain of war on the South African economy would be detrimental to African imports, assuming that the United States was not selling arms to South Africans. But most dangerous would be the impact on raw materials supply. As the disruptions of these supplies would be both unpredictable and uncontrollable, prices would skyrocket and physical shortages would occur, with adverse economic and political consequences (Whitaker, 1975).

As the most powerful economic and military nation in the world, the United States has the crucial and moral obligations to work with African states, other countries, and institutions to find a concrete solution to the problems plaguing Africa: bloody civil wars, famine, diseases, drought and death, dictatorial regimes, abject poverty and illiteracy. Being a member of the community of nations, Africa's problems must be solved by all member states of the United Nations; otherwise, Africa's problems would affect the United States and other United Nations' member states. Rotberg articulated that, on the economic front, while it will be necessary to distribute food in times of famine, the import of free food undermines the development of proper incentive structures in African agriculture. U.S. Aid officials could devise means to promote productive pricing structures, like the governments of Zimbabwe and Cameroun. The United States should continue to provide help to those African states which are beating a retreat from a dependence upon state-owned enterprises, centralized control of food production, and fully administered wages and

prices. As African countries move (following Nigeria and Ghana) toward more open economies, the United States must find coherent macroeconomic ways to assist those who are helping themselves (Rotberg, 1988). A coherent macroeconomic ways can be explained well through an undistorted and verifiable political communication and information designed by the U.S. policymakers aimed at African countries that are working hard to alleviate their economic misery.

African states, particularly sub-Saharan African states are heavily indebted to the United States that they can hardly improve their crippling economies, and foster developments. Underwood discussed that sub-Saharan African debt is estimated at about \$100 billion. By contrast, Brazil and Mexico owe over \$100 billion each. United States bank exposure (their claims not guaranteed by a third party outside the debtor country) in sub-Saharan is estimated to be less than \$2 billion. Excluding Nigeria and the Ivory Coast, which came under U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker's well-publicized 1985 initiative for highly indebted middle income countries, U.S. bank exposure is calculated at \$600 million. By contrast, United States bank exposure is \$24 billion in Mexico, \$23 billion in Brazil, \$8 billion in Venezuela, \$6 billion in Chile, and \$78 billion in all of Latin America (Underwood, 1989). (see Tables 3 and 4 below which characterized World Bank Debts to developing countries and the U.S. debts to African countries).

**Table 3. Sub-Saharan Africa's External Debt as a Share of
Total Developing Country Debt at the end of 1986
(Figures given are in billions of U.S. dollars)**

	(Percentage Share)	
Sub-Saharan Africa*	102	8.6%
of which:		
IDA-eligible countries	57	4.8%
Other countries	45	3.8%
of which:		
Nigeria	22	1.8%
Ivory Coast	11	0.9%
Latin America*	399	33.5%
of which:		
Brazil	111	9.3%
Mexico	102	8.5%
Other Developing Countries*	691	57.9%
All Developing Countries	1,192	100.0%

*Estimates for countries, such as Angola, that do not report external debt data to the World Bank are included under "Other Developing Countries."

Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1987-88 edition.

**Table 4. United States Bank Claims on and Exposure to
Sub-Saharan Africa: March 31, 1987**

(Figures given are in millions of United States dollars)

Claims	Less Amounts Guaranteed By External Entity	Plus Amts. Externally Guar. by Borrower	Equals U.S. Bank Exposure	
Non-Oil Africa	2,734	806	46	1,974
Less:				
Egypt	546	337	31	240
Morocco	845	99	8	754
Tunisia	134	42	0	92
Plus:				
Nigeria	864	274	28	618
Gabon	41	9	0	32
Equals:				
Sub-Saharan Africa	2,114	611	35	1,538
Ivory Coast	367	7	6	366
Sub-Saharan Africa Less Nigeria and Ivory Coast	883	330	1	554

**Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council
Country Exposure Lending Survey: March 1987, released
August 5, 1987.**

The United States should forgive the official debts of the poorest African nations-states, and allow these nations-states to concentrate their meager resources on economic developments. The reason is not difficult to discern. The U.S. transnational corporations such as Firestone Rubber and Tire Company, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Sun Oil Company, among others exploit irreplaceable mineral resources from African countries such as Liberia, Zaire, Sierra Leone, Guinea, among others without paying adequate compensation to the governments. These African countries have no resources or sufficient funds to embark on agriculture and other forms of development, thus invigorating their economic renewal. As a consequence, these countries have become poverty-stricken, making it difficult for them to repay their debts to American lenders.

The United States and other western nations have economically exploited and continue to rip-off Africa. As Katz has elucidated in his 1988 study, "Soviet leaders, including Gorbachev, have accused America and the West of being the root cause Africa's economic problems. American transnational corporations have taken billion of dollars in profits out of Africa. Africa's burden of debt to America and the West has grown tremendously" (p. 191). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (both of which, Moscow alleged, are controlled by the United States) have imposed its demand on African countries as a requirement for obtaining new loans. Such conditions are endemic to the sustenance of Africans, and are aimed at permitting transnational corporations to exploit Africa without any challenge. Secretary of State George Schultz's call for African governments to reorient their

economies from the socialist to the capitalist model of development have the same objective. However, Moscow accentuated that, the experience of the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, and Liberia have all shown that capitalism has failed to bring about economic prosperity (Katz, 1988). Cesaire (1972) stated in his book, Discourse on Colonialism, another important view of capitalism:

that the decisive actors here are the adventurer and the pirate, the wholesale grocer and the ship owner, the gold digger and the merchant, appetite and force, and behind them, the baleful projected shadow of a form of civilization which, at a certain point in its history, finds itself obliged, for internal reasons, to extend to a world scale the competition of its antagonistic economies. (pp. 10-11)

The United States holds the trump card in Africa's economic future. Bowing to the strength of this argument, Kamarck posited bluntly in his 1958 study:

The real direct economic interest of the United States in Africa is in the future. As a source of supply for raw materials and as a market for United States goods is destined to play a more important part in the American economy in the future. Basic changes, both in the United States and in Africa, will bring this about. (p. 119)

Akinla II (1987) stated that, in light of this trend, "Generally, Africa's contemporary economic attitude is that success in achieving goal of economic development will result as much from proper attention to domestic policy and institutional weaknesses, as from redressing unfavorable conditions in the international economic environment" (p. 26). To a larger degree, African policymakers regard stable international economic environment as a valuable path to development, maintaining their positions and power and alleviating their countries from poverty, ignorance, disease and powerlessness.

The U.S. used political communication and information to achieve its interests in Africa, from the 1960s to the 1990s, by designing policies which were and are still applicable to the life and existence of African nations. Nielsen (1969) grappled with this position:

That continent is a place of great human need, of oppression and injustice, of dramatic struggle by a great branch of mankind for dignity, freedom, and progress. Its problems are specifically related to the values, ideas, and principles upon which American society has been built. (p. 404)

Nielsen stated unequivocally that Africa stands, therefore, not only as a test of American foreign policy but also as a challenge to the nation's vision of itself and of its meaning as the dominant civilization in the world of the late twentieth century and beyond (Nielsen, 1969).

CHAPTER 5

THE UTILIZATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION

The Europeanization of human consciousness masquerades as a universal will. Even in our reach for Afrocentric possibilities in analysis and interpretation we often find ourselves having to unmask experience in order to see more clearly the transformations of our history. (Asante, 1987)

Asante synthesized clearly the theoretical groundings for Afrocentrists to critique the Eurocentrism of universal patterns of civilizations. Amin (1989) argued that in line with this theoretical assessment, "Eurocentricism is a culturalist phenomenon in the sense that it assumes the existence of irreducibly distinct cultural invariants that shape the historical paths of different peoples" (p. vii). He contended further that Eurocentrism is only a distortion, an organized and significant distortion, from which the majority of the dominant social concepts and ideologies suffer. Truly put, Eurocentrism is a concept which, like all paradigms, operates continuously, often in the gray areas of seemingly obvious facts and common sense. Thus, it manifests itself in several ways, as much in the expression of received ideas, popularized by the media, as in the erudite formulations of specialists in different areas of social science (Amin, 1989).

Eurocentrism is an erudite construct because, like the analogous Orientalist construct, it (a) eliminates Ancient Greece from the very milieu in which it unfolded and developed--the Orient--in order to annex Hellenism to Europe arbitrarily; (b)

retains the mark of racism, the fundamental basis on which European cultural unity was constructed; (c) interprets Christianity, also annexed arbitrarily to Europe, as the main factor in the maintenance of European cultural unity, conforming to an unscientific vision of religious phenomena; and (d) concurrently constructs a vision of the Near East and the more distant Orients on the same racist foundation, again employing an immutable vision of religion (Amin, 1989). Noting that the cultural ethos of U.S. policymakers are distinctively marked with Eurocentric cultural motifs, it is therefore conceivable that their modes of political communication and information aimed at Liberia had Eurocentric orientation.

Clothed with the understanding of the above Afrocentric theory and the erudite framework of Eurocentrism, this author appraises cosmologically the periphery to which the extant U.S. political communication and information were transmitted to Liberia from 1960 to 1990, and the angle from which Liberian policymakers received them.

Liberian policymakers used American political communication and information for economic, political and social empowerment. To set this discourse in a proper perspective, a sharper historical review shall be made concerning the United States policy toward many African countries at the dawn of their independence. While acknowledging that many of these newly independent African countries were once colonial enclaves, this discourse will expand upon how Liberia was featured in this process.

With independence fervor sweeping Africa and radical governments emerging, American policymakers decided to use political communication and information systems to keep Liberia, their satellite country, from embracing this sort of radicalism. George Klay Kieh, a brilliant Liberian political scientist, maintained that Liberia became the target of the American propaganda campaign during the 1960s because she was located near the paradox of radicalism. To cement this policy, the United States built an information service in Monrovia to (1) provide Liberians with an insight into the American way of life via weekly film shows and carefully selected "free" books, magazines, and pamphlets; and (2) to offer carefully screened news broadcasts from the major American television networks, especially from the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) and the American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) (Kieh, 1992).

There are two corresponding angles in this historical review. Firstly, the United States policy toward Africa at the time of independence since the end of colonialism can be considered by historians "as representing a sane, well-balanced, and responsible course of action, or," secondly, "downgraded as timid, unimaginative, and ill-attuned to African needs and aspirations" (Emerson, 1967, p. 95). Schlesinger, a noted American historian, advanced another historical angle which argues that, as the United States played only a slight pivotal role in promoting the independence of African colonies, so it has generally lagged behind the more dynamic of African leaders who at least on anti-colonial and racial issues could carry all or the bulk of Africa with them (Emerson, 1967).

When the Europeans' encroachment in Africa faded, and former colonies became sovereign nations, the relationship between the United States and Africa assumed a new direction. The United States was marginally involved in helping these former African colonies achieve their independence, or determine their own destiny. Due to the United States' marginal role in this process, the crusaders of African nationalism and anti-colonialism regarded American policy toward Africa as one full of apprehension, sharpened racial antagonisms and hostility. Armed with such racist policy, the U.S. was cautious not to derail the image of her European allies in Africa. The allies are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)--a European and North American military alliance organized at the end of World War II to avert the expansion of the former Soviet Union into Europe and other parts of the world, Africa being no exception. The United States inaction was hinged on the premise that her European allies' interests in Africa were not diminished.

The U.S. policymakers' disinterest in African affairs was based on racial discrimination, together with the absence of broad and coherent African policy, which was permeable and enforceable within the American government before John F. Kennedy ascended to the presidency in 1960. Such anti-African policy, as African nationalists and policymakers saw it, was the reason they had to look elsewhere for support and security. African nationalists and policymakers sought political, military, economic and cultural relations with the Communist World because they showed solidarity with their campaigns of protests and belligerence toward the colonial powers. Adversely, the U.S. had a pessimistic impression of Africans predicated on

the racist interpretations of Africans by Europeans, as was transparent in its policy toward Africa. Schlesinger (1965) had this to say about the perception of American policymakers of Africa:

Of all the continents this one had stayed longest on the outer fringes of the American consciousness. As late as 1960, our direct interests in Africa, political or economic, military or intellectual were meager. No traditional doctrines guided our African policies. No alliances committed our troops. Our foreign aid programs made only token contributions to African development. Of our \$30 billion of overseas investment, less than 3 per cent was in Africa. (p. 551)

Schlesinger posed the historical argument that Americans' perception of Africa below the Mediterranean rim was vague and dim. No historic ties bound the U.S. to other parts of Africa beside the transatlantic slave trade; and in this regard, Americans had done their best to repress the memory (and, by a sentimental concern for Liberia, to allay the guilt) (Schlesinger, 1965).

President John F. Kennedy's African Policy

A swift turnaround was made in African American relations during the Kennedy administration. With a telescopic insight on problems plaguing Africa, Kennedy architected the new United States' African policy. Schlesinger further noted that when Kennedy assumed the presidency he was more knowledgeable on African issues than any other contemporary American politician. His broad interest in colonial problems was traceable to his childhood tales of Ireland's long struggle for independence and, in the contemporary world, at least to the trip he had taken as an inquisitive young Congressman to Indo-China in 1951. In the mid-fifties he had begun to see in Algeria the same pattern of colonial decay he had already inspected in

Southeast Asia; and he feared that French intransigence would have the same outcome of uniting the nationalists with the communists. In addition, he had just come on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and no doubt wanted to move into foreign affairs in a way that would at once be arresting and useful so as to demonstrate a basic liberalism (Schlesinger, 1965).

Kennedy fought hard for the needs and aspirations of the Africans during his tenure as president, even though other American policymakers seemed disinterested in the affairs of the emerging African nations. Because of the intensification of intra-American policymakers' diminished interest in African matters, Kennedy had a difficult time in providing the kinds of economic aids which could accelerate the development of Africa. Liberia was one of a few exceptions. Emerson (1967) repositied incisively:

Liberia's relatively high place on the American aid program derived primarily from the old-established relationship between the two countries, although it was also stated, perhaps with a greater measure of hope than of firm expectation, that Liberia was beginning to attack its larger development problems. The American assistance program has aimed at helping the country achieve needed institutional changes and carry out basic reforms in public administration and budgetary policies. (p. 40)

To build the United States "good" image in Liberia and elsewhere in Africa, and in order to discourage policymakers of these African countries from tilting toward Communism, President Kennedy demonstrated an attitude of political correctness and diplomatic goodwill. "And in communicating these political attitudes Kennedy used a

weapon more powerful than the most generous aid. That weapon was his own personal contacts with African leaders" (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 557).

Thorny Problems in African-American Relations

Another thorny problem in the African American relations during the period of the Cold War, especially from the 1960s to the 1980s and the post-Cold War era, has been what Emerson (1967) called "the disinterested character of American policy toward Africa which ensures neither that policy will be wise nor that it will fit in with what the Africans see as their interests" (p. 99). Emerson observed that it is evident that the United States has many interests which do not directly concern Africa, and inevitably some of them will run counter to African desires. For the most part, to be sure, Washington can follow policies in relation to Africa which are explicitly framed to deal with African problems and needs, but from time to time conflicts of interest prove unavoidable (Emerson, 1967). Indeed, as hammered by Madhubuti in his 1992 study, "the reality is that the American way is not the way of the world and is often in conflict with the world" (p. 162). Madhubuti underscored the aim of the U.S. in Africa in an understandable context. For it had been and continues to be the genuine texture of the U.S. policy to exploit Africa's human and natural resources for her own sustenance and security interest. In hindsight, the U.S. addresses political, economic and military problems in Africa from a racist and controlling position which results nominally in the underdevelopment of the continent.

Politically, for example, during the Cold War, the U.S. used her influence and discouraged Liberia, the Ivory Coast, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Zaire, South Africa,

Egypt and Somali from breeding Communism. Economically also, for example, the U.S. companies including Firestone, Liberia Mining Company, and LAMCO extracted rubber, iron ore, and diamonds without paying equitable compensation for these resources. Militarily, the U.S. constructed the Air Force, Navy and Rapid Deployment Force bases in Liberia and other African countries between 1945-1990, and at the same time provided these countries with enormous military and economic aid. After the demise of the Cold War, America withdrew her economic and military assistance to these countries. Such action by the United States has resulted in destabilizing many regimes and institutions in Africa that were dependent on the aid. As a consequence, Katz noted that the Eastern countries have accused the U.S. and Western European countries of being the real cause of Africa's economic problems because American transnational corporations have extracted billions of dollars in profits out of Africa, with disregard for the economic and political security of African governments and peoples (Katz, 1988).

Factors in Liberia-U.S. Relations

Cardinal factors existing in the relationship between the United States and Liberia during the First Republic, especially between 1960-1980, and also in the military interregnum (1980-90), were the fulcrum to which political communication transmitted from Washington to Monrovia was used by the Liberian policymakers for economic, social and political reasons. Since the presence of America in Liberia is to protect, promote and enhance American interests, American policymakers find it as a

matter of elevated essence, the maintenance of the U.S. "special relationship" with Liberia.

The United States has used political communication to help determine Liberian public policy including domestic and foreign policies. The motif of the U.S. is to ensure that Liberian foreign and domestic policies are in accordance with, nominal or subservient to "excessive" American interests. Let us examine the crisis of the blueprint for the unity of Africa that led to the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the roles Liberian and American policymakers played in this process. The attendant factors in this characterization are twofold: political communication (diplomatic) and information.

From the time Liberia was established in the 1820s, became independent in 1847, and became Africa's oldest independent nation, Liberia seems to be in Africa without being a part of Africa. During the first 100 years of its independence, relations with continental Africa took the form of relating to the omnipresence of European colonialism and provincialism on the continent. Occasionally Liberia would produce some thinkers such as the pan-African patriot Edward Wilmot Blyden, the pan-African journalist John Payne Jackson, and the philosopher of African regeneration Alexander Crummwell--all of whom were prominent as forerunners in the growth and development of African nationalist thought (Dunn and Tarr, 1988).

During the course of World War II, Liberia and Ethiopia were the only independent African states, but due to extenuating phenomena surrounding this era, Liberia identified with the goals and aspirations of Africa, "for it was only beginning

in the 1940s that her political leadership began to perceive her destiny as linked to Africa's" (Dunn and Tarr, 1988, p. 178). To solidify her linkage with Africa, Liberia supported the causes of African liberation in forums at the United Nations during the earliest stages. Uniquely assembled, Liberia provided also material assistance and freely made available passports and other documents to facilitate the travels of prominent nationalist leaders such as Hastings Banda, Joshua Nkomo, and Herbert Christepo (or their representatives) (Dunn and Tarr, 1988).

When several African countries gained their independence in the 1960s, their policymakers advocated radical nationalism, a policy that was anathema to the Liberian policymakers because of their "pretentious" capitalist nature. A Ghanaian Prime Minister and a Pan-Africanist, Osageyefo Kwame Nkrumah espoused nationalism with the aim of recreating Ghana and the newly independent African nations, if not all but the entire continent, in the path of Socialism.

President Tubman of Liberia, an autocratic leader, a conservative politician and a pro-capitalist guru, saw Ghana's apparent radicalism as inimical to the interest of Liberia. As Liebenow acknowledged in his 1987 study, "Tubman, for his part, found the prospect of Nkrumah as his next-door neighbor a direct challenge to the Liberian political system" (p. 148). Opposing Nkrumah's position that Pan-African unity had to be achieved immediately, politically, and on a continental plane, Tubman gradually evolved a counterversion of Pan-Africanism that stressed gradualism, economic and cultural cooperation as a precursor to political discussion, and regional rather than continental cooperation (Liebenow, 1987).

As a chief Liberian policymaker at the time, Tubman used the occasion to impede the nationalism and the ideological radicalism which emanated from Ghana and other parts of Africa. In doing so Liberia, with Tubman holding the mantle of leadership, staunchly opposed Africa's tilt toward Communism during the heat of the Cold War. At this time, political communication which came from Washington was always in full support of President Tubman's policy. As Dunn and Tarr put it succinctly, "As correspondence between Washington and Monrovia reveals the support of a U.S. in the throes of the Cold War was there to sustain him" (Dunn and Tarr, 1988, p. 179).

Against the background that the U.S. interests in Liberia had to be maintained at all costs, Liberian policymakers from the post World War II era became actively involved in the creation and running of domestic, regional and continental African organizations such as the Liberian Telecommunications Commission, the Liberian Port Authority, the Mano River Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Although Liberia is a member of international organizations such as the Nonaligned Countries Movement, the Lome Convention, and the United Nations, she was hampered between 1960 to 1990, by United States' political communication, in making decisions which could better serve her economic and political ends. Instead Liberian policymakers made decisions, because of "mounting pressure" from Washington via political communication, to satisfy the policymakers in Washington, even if concurring with Washington's position meant subverting Liberia's own national interest.

Deterrence and the Campaign of Anti-Communism

The U.S. political communication and information systems were effectively used as instruments to deter Liberian policymakers from turning the country into a breeding ground for the Communists. In this respect, the U.S. policymakers shunned the interest of Liberia and unapologetically pursued this policy to enhance American interests. Dunn and Tarr (1988) expounded thus:

The attitude of great distrust that marked Liberia's view of Communists in the immediate post-war era was drawn largely from American cold war propaganda and certain African nationalists' resort to Communist ideology in their struggle against colonialism. Liberia swallowed whole the American propaganda, but sought to contain, through diplomacy, such Communist ideological elements as lingered on in independent Africa. (p. 191)

Because of the "special relationship" existing between the United States and Liberia, American policymakers used political communication specifically during the Tubman years to influence Liberian policymakers to make coherent public policy. Liberia's relationship with the Communist World during the cold war period was lukewarm and suspicious.

Cosmologically, Dunn and Tarr wrote with brute force that during the Tubman regime, Liberia dealt with the Communist World with a degree of causality. For example, invitations were frequently extended to and accepted by Communist member states of the United Nations to Tubman's inauguration into office. When the Communist countries including the Soviet Union, would reciprocate by inviting the Liberian leader or Liberian policymakers to visit their countries, diplomatic excuses would be offered. The U.S. often influenced the responses. As in 1956, to illustrate,

when the Liberian ambassador in Washington was bluntly told by an American State Department official that Liberia should decline the Soviet invitation to Tubman because to accept it "would unfavorably reflect on the prestige of the U.S. government, especially so due to its close ties with the Liberian government" (Dunn and Tarr, 1988, p. 191). After the death of President Tubman on July 23, 1971, President William R. Tolbert, Jr. who succeeded his predecessor, forged a new foreign policy with a tilt toward Socialist countries. Discounting his reformist and nationalistic appearance, Tolbert was visibly pro-capitalist, pro-entrepreneurial and sternly anti-Communist or Socialist. But the premise for this radical shift in Liberia's foreign policy toward these Socialist countries was to portray Liberia as an African nation which was and still is committed to African nationalism, solidarity, and reforming philosophy.

Foremost, Tolbert and other prominent Liberian policymakers used this approach to imprint the collective conscience of Liberians on the minds of American policymakers who minimally appreciate the contributions of Liberia to the economic and security sustenance of the United States--referentially so, during the Cold War. Kieh argued profoundly that regardless of Liberian policymakers' shift toward the Russians, Liberia's foreign policy remained unchanged, and the U.S. influence in Liberia nevertheless remained undiminished (Kieh, 1992).

Given the position of the U.S. in Liberia, it becomes clear why U.S. policymakers recognized that American interest in Liberia can better be accomplished by and through the use of persuasive but effective political communication and

information. These messages could be packaged in the form of programs designed by the United States Information Agency (USIA) to attract local interests so that the listening or viewing Liberian audience may not misinterpret, underreport or forget the contents of such messages.

The reason U.S. policymakers were concerned about the contents of programs was that these programs were designed and transmitted from Washington, D.C., a metropolitan city alien to the African geopolitical locality, such as Liberia. The nature of transmitting political communication and information to Liberia was to exert American influence in the country. Barring the mood of the country, programs were designed based on what American communications "experts" deemed as the needs and interests of the Liberian viewing and listening audience. In Liberia it is rather the function of the USIA and the VOA to communicate with the local communicators and the people with the aim of providing correct American-centered information about U.S. policies, actions and intentions regarding Liberia. Such information is propagandistic in content, and it strives to exert American imperialism in a disguised form. For example, "The Editorial," is a program designed by the VOA's Policy Office and cleared prior to broadcast by the USIA Office of Policy Guidance, reflecting "what our government does--and why-- by offering explanations of U.S. foreign policies and insights into the philosophy of the current administration" (VOA Programming Handbook, 1992, p. 13).

As stated in VOA 1992 analysis, "The editorial fulfills the VOA Charter requirement to present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively" (p. 13). For much of VOA's global listeners this information is not available from any other source. Other editorials, while not discussing formal policy matters, delineate basic American principles and treasured values. For example, when a principle rather than an official policy is stated, reference to "the views of the U.S. Government" is deleted from the introduction and closing (VOA Programming Handbook, 1992).

The Office of Policy issues one or two editorials each day. When there are two, services can choose the piece which best suits their audience and program needs. Editorials are four to five minutes long when read in English (VOA Programming Handbook 1992).

Another example is the **Current Affairs program** which is prepared by the VOA's Current Affairs Division and is broadcast in English and is available for adaptation and translation by VOA's language services. This program focuses on the interests of the American people. It helps to interpret and explain events in the news, using the voices of experts or significant comment from American media, covering arts, agriculture and science, education and religion, sports and business, labor and politics (VOA Programming Handbook, 1992).

Other significant VOA's dynamic programming in African Service include **African Panorama, Africa World Tonight, Daybreak Africa, Nightline Africa,** and the **World of Music**. As Vincent found in her 1994 study:

African Panorama was the first language program tailored for audiences in Africa. Today, VOA broadcasts more than 82 hours

per week to Africa in English, French, Portuguese, Hausa, Swahili, Amharic, Somali, and Arabic. Africa World Tonight, which has essentially replaced African Panorama, is a full service news show about Africa and the World and provides up-to-the-minute news, information, sports, Americana, and various other features. Daybreak and Nightline Africa feature major developments in Africa, and The World of Music, as well as Music Time in Africa feature African artists. (p. 29)

These programs entertain, educate and inform audiences in the various African audiences including Liberia. Concerning networking, VOA-produced reports, interviews and entire programs in English are broadcast on government radio stations in more than 20 African countries, as well as the few independent stations on the continent. Timely items are sent via one daily feeds, of 25 minutes in duration, transmitted by satellite to USIA posts each weekday for delivery to radio stations (VOA English to Africa Profile, 1994, p. 4). For example, ELBC/TV in Monrovia, Liberia, uses on average one report a day on national radio and television networks. Africans in general and Liberians in particular listen to programs which emanate from VOA for they are interested in U.S. foreign policy toward Africa and in the functioning of American society.

The Liberian government recognized since the 1960s that a well-informed citizenry make a progressive, vibrant and industrious nation. Liberia, as an industrially less developing nation, requires the sympathy and understanding of its people in order for government social and economic programs to gain the support of the citizenry. As was the case, Liberian policymakers realized also that, to develop Liberia, authentic and forthright communication and information systems were essential in democratic national life and therefore must be disseminated. Thus it is not

unusual that Liberian policymakers allowed the Liberian Broadcasting System (LBS), ELWA (Eternal Love Winning Africa) and Radio LAMCO (ELNR), and the local daily newspapers and magazines to feature educational programs, light features, news summaries, informational bits and pieces and light entertainment music programs to bolster national development and enrich the cultural life of the Liberian people. Some of the programs (i.e. news service and information pieces were produced by the Voice of America) in Washington for the Liberian listening audience.

The U.S. policymakers who fostered American interests in Liberia from 1960-1990 designed programs which were disseminated by the Liberian communications media to avert Communism in Liberia and protect American interests in the country. Specifically, the programs aim was to counter and expose "Soviet propaganda themes and techniques. The Soviet Union has been caught not infrequently utilizing forged documents, rumors, and institutions as well as altered facts and outright lies in its propaganda efforts" (Hansen, 1989, p. 9). Apparently most of the programs were disseminated by the Liberian Broadcasting System's ELBC/ELTV radio and television networks.

During the military interregnum (1980-1990), political communication between Washington and Monrovia took on a new dimension: effective persuasive but political communication with the Liberian military policymakers to dissuade them from fraternizing with the Communists. In return for their adherence to the U.S. anti-Communism policy which was pervasive in Africa, Liberian military policymakers were rewarded with an unconditional increase in economic and military aid.

To sustain American interest and promote the "historically close relationship" between Liberia and the U.S., especially in the era of President Ronald Reagan's renewed Cold War, U.S. aid to Liberia over the past years (1980-85) shattered all previous records. From an annual average of \$8 million during the two decades preceding 1980, total U.S. assistance since 1980 approaches \$500 million (Dunn & Tarr, 1988). Table 5 on page 115 illustrates the level of U.S. economic and military assistance to Liberia over the past years. It shows precisely the steep recent increases, as well as the rise in the grant component.

These recent dramatic increases in U.S. aid to Liberia, according to U.S. officials, were designed to contribute to the government's declared goals of bringing about democracy and economic recovery. By their spirited involvement in what all sides acknowledged as the process toward democracy, the Liberian policymakers and the people expressed their hearty welcome for this American largesse. But the demonstrably rigged elections of October 1985 and their aftermath, as well as the expressions of support for the fraud and deception by the U.S. State Department suggests, with some clarity, the American choice for "friendship" with a dictator over democracy for a people. Business as usual proceeds in the context of what another American called "constructive" involvement, in only a slight deviation from the more familiar American policy of "constructive engagement" (Dunn & Tarr, 1988).

Table 5. U.S. Economic and Military Assistance to Liberia, 1945-1985 (\$ millions)

		1946- 1948	1949- 1952	1953- 1961	1961- 1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
ECONOMIC AID	Total	<u>7.5</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>29.2</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>41.7</u>	<u>16.5</u>	<u>19.1</u>	<u>11.7</u>	<u>10.2</u>	<u>8.2</u>	<u>13.0</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>17.3</u>	<u>17.3</u>
	loans					31.3	7.4	9.3	2.2	1.9	1.3	5.6	9	--	8.1
	grants					10.4	9.1	9.8	9.5	8.3	7.2	7.4	7.1	8.0	9.2
MILITARY AID	Total			2.3	1.5	1	4	1.1	6	8	7	5	7	2.4	
	loans									--	--	--	--	2.0	
	grants									8	7	5	7	4	
TOTAL AID¹		<u>7.5</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>31.5</u>	<u>13.4</u>	<u>41.8</u>	<u>16.9</u>	<u>20.2</u>	<u>12.3</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>8.5</u>	<u>13.5</u>	<u>8.5</u>	<u>8.7</u>	<u>19.7</u>

		1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
ECONOMIC AID	Total	<u>18.6</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>15.7</u>	<u>5.8</u>	<u>21.4</u>	<u>7.2</u>	<u>17.6</u>	<u>23.5</u>	<u>55.2</u>	<u>65.5</u>	<u>62.9</u>	<u>66.0</u>	<u>75.5</u>
	loans	12.9	--	9.0	--	11.8	--	--	10.0	15.0	15.0	16.7	15.0	
	grants	5.7	6.0	6.7	5.8	9.6	7.2	17.6	13.5	40.2	50.5	46.2	51.0	
MILITARY AID	Total	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>12.6</u>	<u>12.7</u>	<u>12.8</u>	<u>16.2</u>
	loans	--	--	1.0	1.7	5	5	1.2	2.5	4.7	7.0	7.0	--	
	grants	2	1	1	1	1	2	3	2	1.6	5.6	5.7	12.8	
TOTAL AID		<u>18.8</u>	<u>6.1</u>	<u>17.6</u>	<u>7.6</u>	<u>22.0</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>19.1</u>	<u>26.2</u>	<u>61.5</u>	<u>78.1</u>	<u>75.6</u>	<u>78.8</u>	<u>91.7</u>

¹ This excludes EXIM Bank loans and Overseas Private Investment Corporation Insurance

Adapted from D. Elwood Dunn & S. Byron Tarr, Liberia: A National Polity in Transition (Metuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, 1988), p. 134-135; U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, Obligations and Loans Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 1984. Series of yearly date, Vol 4, Africa. Office of Planning and Budgeting, Bureau of Program and Policy Coordination, AID, Washington, D.C.

Liberian policymakers used foreign policy as an instrument of social control. For example, between 1960-80, Liberia managed to execute almost complete reversal of its relatively isolationist stance. Without abandoning its ties with the United States--even increasing them in terms of economic, cultural, and military assistance--Liberia forged an independent activist role in international politics. New links with Asia and Europe gave it more maneuverability in resisting demands from the United States. Its new ties with its African neighbors reduced the dangers of ideological threats closer to home. From a position of low repute in the attitudes of African elites elsewhere on the continent, it was permitted to claim the mantle of leadership in pressing African causes. Thus, by pursuing an activist foreign policy, Liberia managed to neutralize the potentially hostile environment in which it had formerly found itself. In a curious way, too, the activist foreign policy provided yet another hedge against revolution by providing an outlet for the pool of young educated Liberians who had their aspirations and professional talents intentionally thwarted insofar as the domestic economic transformation of Liberia was concerned (Liebenow, 1987).

CHAPTER 6

THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION

The underdevelopment of Liberia's economic, cultural and social institutions was widely enhanced because the country's policymakers had judicious access to various forms of communication and information systems which they used insidiously for their own sustenance. Under such conditions, American political communication and information systems played some distinctive roles, and cogitated the personal and political interests of Liberian policymakers.

Political communication expert Lucien Pye articulated that at an abstract level, the political process in its entirety is influenced by individuals having access to means of communications. Interrogations about the ease of access and the existence of limitations to the use of communications media touch upon some of the most latent issues determining the character and the stability of political life in any society (Pye, 1963).

In Liberia from 1960-1990, there were unmitigated relationships which existed "between the structure and organization of communications and the character, tone, and, even to a degree, content of political expression" (Pye, 1963, p. 58). It appeared then that the Liberian policymakers' function both as the purveyors of collective identity and as champion of specific interests were invariably conditioned and limited by the communications media available to them. Geared on this litmus correlation,

Pye observed that no leader or policymaker can escalate the restrictions of the specific communications networks to which he has access, and at the same time, none can escape the consequences of being surrounded by a communication's systems (1963).

Liberian policymakers controlled and monopolized political communication and information which emitted from the United States in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s for their own security. During these years in Liberia, controlling the processes of political communication meant that policymakers had absolute power in determining how control and power were distributed in the nexus of the various Liberian clans, chiefdoms, districts, and counties. Liberian policymakers disseminated political communication and information to the people to accent "new values and new outlooks. Modernization calls for the transformation of popular tastes and fashions, the creation of novel devices and demands, and the welding together of new loyalties" (Pye, 1963, p. 61).

Worse, given that political communication and information were not properly articulated by the Liberian policymakers for three decades (1960-1990), the realization of national development, plus the understanding and appreciation of the traditions and ethos of the Liberian society were complicated. Against this backdrop, Pye (1963) argued that "the consequences can only be a general debasement of standards throughout the society" (p. 62), thus resulting in institutional breakdown as was demonstrated in Liberia in 1980, when the disenfranchisement and desperation of the citizenry led to civil strife, which consequently led to the violent collapse of the First Republic. To support this argument it is necessary to cite the providential words of

Cheikh Anta Diop. He wrote in his prophetic work, The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality, that "...the moving force of history lies in the determination of the oppressed classes to free themselves from their condition. If that condition is intolerable and humanly inadmissible, the rebellious conscience becomes revolutionary" (Diop, 1974, p. 223). In the Liberian case, a lengthy jaunt was that policymakers grappled with only satisfying the "ruling class"; as such, they formulated and disseminated falsehoods, rumors and lies in the form of political communication and information purposely aimed at the Liberian citizenry to satisfy and achieve their provincial political and economic interests.

During the misrule of the military interregnum in Liberia (1980-1990), Liberian propagandists and communication specialists used political communication (propaganda) and information (rhetoric) collectively to mobilize Liberians for national development and reconstruction. However, the "supposedly" national development and reconstruction never materialized because of the inexperience of the military rulers and their pervasive and contentious misuse of political communication and information systems. Due to the recalcitrant attitudes of the disoriented military rulers, Liberia experienced the emergence of ethnic rivalry, as well as social, political, and economic disorder among the diverse ethnic groups. Similar patterns of rule and misuse of political communication and information systems, for example, were evident during the administrations of President William V.S. Tubman (1944-71) and President William R. Tolbert, Jr. (1971-80). Bienen (1985) had this to say, in lieu of the former arguments:

In the Liberia case, class and ethnic cleavages fused; although there were and (and are) strong ethnic splits among so-called indigenous or tribal peoples, the great gap in Liberian society prior to 1980 was between the Americo-Liberians elite and indigenous people. (p. 363)

Liberian policymakers used political communication and information, regardless of its contents, for political socialization, including education and entertainment. Political communication and information directed at the Liberian audience by the Liberian communications media (The New Liberian, a government-owned and operated daily newspaper; ELBC/AM & FM, ELBC/TV, Liberia Rural Communications Network (LRCN); Broadcasting Division of the Ministry of Information); as well as the Voice of America (VOA) offered fresh insights for understanding politics and for interpreting the scope of government in the three decades of the country's political and Cold War history. As for the VOA's role in this connection, Gregory A. Pirio, chief, English to Africa Branch at the VOA, stated in a face-to-face interview¹ that:

There is, however, within VOA and not within the English to Africa Branch of VOA itself, an interest to promote democracy. There are lots of programming generated in VOA and we carry some in English to Africa that deals with democratic life and institutions in the United States. And we broadcast this material as part of our mandate from Congress to represent American society and life and its diversity of opinion. (1994)

Let us examine VOA and its integral role in helping to achieve American interests in Liberia and other African countries during the height of the Cold War.

¹G. A. Pirio (personal communication, February 18, 1994)

VOA is the world's leading international broadcast entity which originates 160 hours of programming each day in more than 46 languages. VOA's broadcast services reach weekly to an estimated listenership of 127 million worldwide. Available on shortwave, and in some areas on medium wave (AM) and FM as well, VOA transmits from Washington, D.C. to 14 relay stations around the world. Satellite technology further expands the VOA listener base and improves the reliability and quality of the station's signal. The growth of VOA from its beginning as a small station at the start of World War Two into a global source of news and information is unique in the history of broadcasting (VOA Programming Handbook, 1992).

Vincent (1994) wrote that as a "Part of the United States Information Agency, the Voice of America (VOA), provides information about the United States and its foreign policies to listeners worldwide" (p. 28). She said that functioning in a greatly changed geopolitical world, VOA "offers new and dynamic programming supportive of Africa's effort to craft a political culture which is accountable, representative, and entrepreneurial" (Vincent, 1994, p. 28).

The first known regularly-scheduled international broadcasts emanated from Radio Netherlands in 1927. In the following decade, external radio services were set up by other countries including Britain, Germany, France, and Japan. These services were often adjuncts of domestic radio stations, created primarily to serve overseas citizens of the originating countries. But in the 1930s, as war loomed in Europe and Asia, that changed. The international broadcast services suddenly had a new mission to inform and influence the peoples and government of other countries. These external

broadcasters multiplied largely in number and transmission power during World War Two (VOA Programming Handbook, 1992).

Historically, VOA started broadcasting on February 24, 1942, with a fifteen-minute broadcast in German. Similar programs in Italian, French, and English soon followed. These initial efforts were set up within the Office of War Information in what was known as the Foreign Information Service. Then, as now, all of VOA's financial support came from the American people through the Congressional appropriations process. Initially, VOA was headquartered in New York City. It differed from other countries' external broadcast services in that it began with no transmission facilities of its own. The first programs were recorded in New York and flown by military aircraft to Britain, where they were retransmitted via relay stations to other parts of Europe. Just as today, VOA's first broadcasters came from many parts of the world. They were led by producer, actor, director and author John Houseman (VOA Programming Handbook, 1992).

VOA developed rapidly during the war years. It had established 27 language sources and constructed 23 transmitters by the time of the Allied summit at Casablanca in 1943. During the remainder of the war years, VOA grew to 41 languages. When World War Two ended much of the world's international broadcasting was reduced or eliminated. A much diminished VOA was transferred from the Office of War Information to the Department of State, though it continued to operate from many buildings in New York City (VOA Programming Handbook, 1992).

The Postwar Era

In late 1945 a State Department-appointed committee of private citizens chaired by Columbia University professor Arthur McMahon decided that the U.S. Government must become politically conscious about the ways in which the American society is portrayed to other countries. Congress reluctantly appropriated funds for VOA to continue operations in 1946 and 1947. The hesitancy to support international broadcasting all but disappeared in 1948. That year, members of Congress were largely influenced by the escalation of the Cold War and the revival of hostile international broadcast organizations in the Soviet Union and Soviet-controlled countries. The enactment of the Smith-Mundt Act gave permanent status to America's international information and cultural exchange program--which included the Voice of America. Subsequently, in June 1948, the Berlin blockade demonstrated anew the need for an American radio voice to the world (VOA Programming Handbook, 1992).

The Cold War Period

For the next two years there was debate in the government about the proper role of America's official international broadcasting arm. The leading question in the debate was the following: Was it to disseminate the news and reflect America--or was it to be used as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, and as a "weapon" against the Soviet Union? Congress saw it increasingly in the latter role. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 new language services were added to VOA and plans were laid for construction of large transmitter complexes on both the east and west coasts of the United States (VOA Programming Handbook, 1992).

In early 1953 Senator Joseph McCarthy chaired several weeks of hearings which investigated the programming and engineering practices at VOA and allegations that there were "subversives on the staff guilty of negligence favoring communism." The inquiry also examined management practices in plans to build a number of new VOA transmitters on the east and west coasts of the United States. While the charges of subversive activity were never proven, widespread dismissals and resignations followed. In the wake of the hearings, Congress reduced VOA's budget, the transmitter construction program was cancelled, and a number of language services were terminated (VOA Programming Handbook, 1992).

In April 1953, President Eisenhower's Committee on Government Reorganization recommended that VOA and other informational activities be separated from the State Department. Congress approved the presidential reorganization plan and, on August 1, 1953, VOA became part of the new, autonomous U.S. Information Agency. Within fifteen months, VOA operations were moved from New York to a new location in Washington, D.C. At the start of the 1990s, old studios and central technical facilities had largely been replaced with new, state-of-the-art equipment (VOA Programming Handbook, 1992).

The VOA Charter

USIA Director George V. Allen approved the VOA Charter in 1960. This Charter postulates the paramount programming mandates which are currently still useful. VOA Programming Handbook (1992) enumerated that the mandates are:

to serve as a consistently reliable source of accurate, objective, and comprehensive news; to present a balanced and comprehensive

projection of significant American thought and institutions; and to present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively along with responsible discussion and opinion on those policies. (p. 2)

The Charter as Law

President Ford signed into law the VOA Charter (Public Law 94-350) on July 12, 1976. Almost similar to the one first advanced by USIA Director Allen in 1960, the Charter won Congressional approval under the sponsorship of Senator Charles Percy (R-Ill), and Representative Bella Abzug (D-NY). By passing the law, Congress at last codified the purposes of the VOA. These concepts, having been given the endorsement of both the legislative and executive branches, have been reaffirmed by every President since 1979 as a framework for VOA programming (VOA Programming Handbook, 1992, p. 2).

Years of Growth

Growth and creativity have taken place at VOA since the Charter was first published. Innovations included the establishment of global English language broadcasts, programming for Africa, the building of a worldwide contingent of VOA correspondents, the first broadcast industry Peabody awards for VOA, and construction of a huge transmitter complex at Greenville, North Carolina. In 1959 VOA began **Special English**, a limited-vocabulary, slow-paced delivery of the language which has helped millions of listeners over the years make the transition from their mother tongue to VOA standard English broadcasts. VOA also refined and expanded its live coverage of events such as the American political conventions, the Olympics and World Cup competitions, and the United States space missions. When

Neil Armstrong set foot on the moon in 1969, the British and Australian Broadcasting Corporations joined VOA in a massive network--and the combined listenership to VOA live broadcast that day was estimated at nearly 800 million (VOA Programming Handbook, 1992, p. 2).

Programs designed and disseminated by VOA to Africa can help facilitate fundamental institutional changes, depending on the phenomenon of a given country; or can be destructive, depending also on the phenomenon of that country. South Africa and Liberia are good examples. In South Africa, VOA continuous broadcasts of up-to-the-minute, comprehensive information support the critical development period for building democratic administration and refining the free market economy. As for Liberia, especially between 1960-1980, and particularly so, during the administrations of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush (1980-1992), VOA's editorials which reflected the views of the U.S. government supported the brutal military regime of Samuel Kanyon Doe for ten consecutive years (1980-1990).

International Communications Agency (I.C.A.)

The International Communications Agency (ICA) formerly the United States Information Agency (USIA) has been in the vanguard of advancing American interests in Liberia and other African countries since it was founded. USIA has successfully presented American culture, traditions, policies, and democratic ideals through pamphlets, newsletters, educational exchange programs, motion pictures and broadcasts in Liberia to promote binational interests. USIA learns also about the culture, political philosophy, and foreign policy formulations, and public opinion of

other countries about the U.S. policy, and in turn enlightens American policymakers about those policies.

Historically, USIA was established in 1953, and became the International Communications Agency (ICA) on April 1, 1978. ICA "merged the informational and cultural exchange activities of USIA and the educational and cultural exchange programs of the U.S. Department of State" (Hansen, 1989, p. xiv). From the beginning the acronym "ICA" was criticized due to possible confusion with the letters "CIA" for the name of the new agency did not clearly signify that the International Communications Agency was a government entity. Use of the acronym "USICA" was only partially successful in this respect (Hansen, 1989).

USICA has also been engaged actively in public diplomacy, which is another form of political communication or propaganda influencing public opinion and achieving American interests, since the 1960s. The term "public diplomacy", which is propaganda or political communication, needs to be properly defined. Public diplomacy was first used as a working vocabulary by Dean Edmund Guillion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. It was created at the establishment of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy (Hansen, 1989). Public Diplomacy, as defined by the Fletcher School Catalog, is "the cause and effect of public attitudes and opinions which influence the formulation and execution of foreign policy" (Hansen, 1989, p. 2). Hansen (1989) stated that after a protracted period of grappling with the term "public diplomacy," the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy elaborately defined it as follows:

Public diplomacy...deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of intercultural communications. (p. 3).

Hansen reiterated that "central to public diplomacy is the transnational flow of information and ideas" (p. 3). The philosophy and approach of USIA was delineated in 1963 by its director, Edward R. Murrow, before a crowded Congressional hearing. Hansen (1989) noted that Edward R. Murrow remarked forcefully about the philosophy and approach of USIA:

American traditions and the American ethic require us to be truthful, but the most important reason is that truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that. (p. 9)

The aim of the U.S. Information Agency is "to submit evidence to peoples of other nations by means of communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace" (Hansen, 1989, p. 25). While it is conceivable that carrying out the above mandate in a hostile country would pose some hardships for the USIA information officers, that was not the case in Liberia due to the so-called "special relationship" existing between both countries. Although the communications media of Liberia are largely controlled by the government, however, administration after administration in the country, from 1960 to 1990, have not hindered, for

example, the dissemination of USIA or VOA's programs, no matter how devastating its contents might be.

It appeared, however, that between 1960-1990, USIA did not express well to the Liberian people the objectives and policies of the United States Government; nor delineated imaginatively the correlation between U.S. policies and the legitimate aspirations of Liberians. USIA did not challenge through its editorials and programs, Liberian policymakers who made "hostile attempts to distort or to frustrate the objectives and policies of the United States" (Hansen, 1989, p. 25). To Liberians, USIA failed to address "those important aspects of life and culture of the people of the United States which facilitate understanding of the policies and objectives of the Government of the United States" (p. 25). When the military regime of Liberia ascended to power in 1980 after the brutal displacement of William R. Tolbert, Jr.'s legacy, policymakers soon engaged in corruption and human rights abuse. USIA officers who had access to the Liberian communications media (newspaper, magazine, radio, television, etc.) did not place in any one of these news media, material critical of the military policymakers because they frustrated the legitimate aspirations of the Liberian people and the establishment of a constitutional democracy in Liberia. USIA's information officers refused to act because the military regime was, during the Cold War period, supportive of U.S. military and economic interests. As such, it matters not to American policymakers if the military dictatorship of Samuel Kanyon Doe denied the people the right path to democracy.

The Department of State

The Department of State is the agency of government which formulates and conducts U.S. foreign relations. As one of the leading contributors to the formulation of foreign policy, it is the single most significant figure in that process. Assigning the job of foreign political advocacy to the institution that plays the central foreign policy role in the U.S. government is inherently logical and increasingly desirable. In light of present conditions and the direction in which diplomacy is moving, the arguments for doing so far outweigh those for maintaining the status quo (Malone, 1988).

The Department of State was and still is responsible for the advocacy of U.S. policies in Liberia to achieve American interests. In this process, the Department of State communicated simply and directly with Liberian policymakers to coordinate their domestic and foreign policies with the U.S. This was evident during the rule of President William V. S. Tubman, between 1960-1971 when the Cold War was still in motion, and when Liberia and the U.S. developed anti-Communist policies. Malone (1988) noted that

While it would not guarantee that factors involving foreign public opinion would be automatically taken into account as policy is developed, it would make this feasible for the first time and, as people became accustomed to the practice, increasingly likely (p. 105).

Typically, the Department of State, among its multifaceted responsibilities, has also the primordial task of explicating and enhancing American interests in Liberia and countries in West Africa. During the Cold War, the U.S. invested in Liberian policymakers who

were not committed to the industrial development of the country as well as the citizenry, simply because those policymakers supported American interests in the country. As the Cold War has ended, the U.S. has examined her relationship with Liberia from not an imperial position, but rather a more pragmatic perspective, in view of the current civil war. William D. Jackson, country desk officer for Liberia at the U.S. State Department, advanced during an interview² that:

There is an historical "special relationship" between Liberia and the U.S. which is broader and deeper than other countries in Africa. Since the Cold War is over now, the U.S. can look at Liberia on its own merits. Through exchange programs, etc., U.S. will promote democratic ideals in Liberia because these changes are on the margins. (1994)

Jackson argued that during the Cold War, the U.S. policymakers coordinated policies with Liberian policymakers and invested heavily in these leaders. With the demise of the Cold War, the U.S. has no investment in the leaders because the U.S. has no countervailing interest in the country. On moral grounds, U.S. assistance to Liberia in the near future when democracy has been truly established would be aimed at developing enterprises and entrepreneurial skills. Assistance will be given to private voluntary organizations to improve their entities. Assistance shall also be given to health care services, while ensuring the virtual disappearance of U.S. military assistance to Liberia.³

²W. Jackson (personal communication, February 18, 1994)

³W. Jackson (personal communication, February 18, 1994)

Liberia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Like the U.S. State Department, the Liberian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is charged with the responsibility of conducting foreign relations and preserving Liberian interests. In this respect, the Foreign Ministry explains the essence of the diverse Liberian institutions and culture to the outside world, while learning also about the importance of other cultures and institutions.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs keeps Liberian policymakers abreast of public opinion and the view of other countries and their policymakers regarding the country. The Foreign Ministry, through its Office of Public Affairs, carves a "good" image for Liberia through news releases, publications and the transmission of policy statements.

The Ministry of Information

The Ministry of Information was the official "mouthpiece" of the Liberian government and played a leading role in all government communication efforts. It also supervised and censored all news and editorials about the Liberian government before they were printed or broadcast. The Ministry of Information had also the power to license broadcast journalists and other communications media in the country, and functionally helped, through the presentation of accurate public opinion and views of other countries and their policymakers about Liberia and her policymakers, to develop foreign policy. It coordinated its activities with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies of government for the purpose of conducting foreign relations. It worked hard in maintaining a credible, positive image at both the national and international levels by dispatching several official press releases daily (written by

professional journalists and information officers who were trained in public opinion and propaganda strategies, as well as in mass media needs) to the press institutions for publications.

Communications Media

The Liberian communications media have played and are continuing to discharge a wholesome functioning role in light of the effects of U.S. political communication in Liberia for the past three decades (1960-1990). The Liberian communications media (print and broadcast) have contributed in several ways to the promulgation of news, information, entertainment programs and government policies to the listening, viewing and reading Liberian public.

Within the framework of the considerable emphasis placed upon the development of an effective communications-oriented Liberian society, Edward Lama Wonkeryor stated that the Liberian communications media concerned themselves specifically with the task "of fostering good will and winning public support and confidence through objectively informing the public about government policies and programs, in the hope of assuring rapid achievement of social development on the national front" (Wonkeryor, 1980, p. 57). The U.S. policymakers used their communications agencies to present their country positively to Liberians, with the U.S. government's political and economic interests as the focal point during the Cold War. American policymakers mandated their communications agencies to draw analogy of similarities in culture, education and entertainment, while rigorously pursuing American interests in Liberia (Wonkeryor, 1980).

In Liberia, policymakers perceived the communications media as agents of harmony and modernization both at the level of individual attitudes and at the level of political and social institutions. The use of the communications media for national integration and for modernization has been reconciled with the much more difficult questions of ascertaining that the ethos implicit in political communication and information disseminated to the citizenry are values commensurate with the cultural motif of Liberia (Wonkeryor, 1980). It is perhaps the perpetual misuse of the communications media under the guise of integration and modernization by the Liberian policymakers that hampered their appreciation of Liberian institutions, and the ultimate accomplishment of national integration and modernization.

A Case Study

As extrapolated in Chapter 1, the author hypothesized that the effects of the United States political communication and information systems are tantamount to the imposition of American social (entertainment), economic (corporate), political (diplomatic), military and cultural ethos on Liberians to achieve American interests. To validate whether this assumption is correct or not, this author interviewed Liberian and American policymakers in Monrovia and in Washington, D.C. to determine the extent to which U.S. political communication and information influences public policy in Liberia with the aim of fostering American interests.

Summary of Questionnaire and Tables

Entertainment

The first variable, entertainment, see (tables 1, 2, and 3) consisted of eleven categorical questions which were addressed to both the Liberian and American policymakers. Here is the first question: The depiction of violence on television on programs imported from the United States is influencing Liberian teenagers to resort to violence. In reviewing tables 1, 2, and 3, it is clear that 90 percent of the Liberian policymakers and 50 percent of the American policymakers "strongly agree," while 10 percent of Liberians and 50 percent of the American policymakers "don't know." The second question read thus: Traditional African values among the Liberians make it difficult to accept the content of many American movies. About 30 percent of the Liberian policymakers "strongly agree" or "agree," 60 percent "strongly disagree", and 10 percent "don't know," while 100 percent of the American policymakers "strongly agree."

Question Three: Liberian listeners and viewers of radio and television programs which emanate from the U.S. are influenced by the advertisement of consumer products. On this question, 17 percent of the U.S. respondents "strongly agree", while 83 percent "don't know." 60 percent of the Liberian respondents "strongly agree", while 30 percent "strongly disagree" or "disagree," and 10 percent "don't know."

Question Four: Liberian programs shown on television do not address well nor reflect the social realities of the country. On this question, 40 percent of the Liberian

respondents "strongly agree", 60 percent "strongly disagree" or "disagree", while 50 percent of the American respondents "strongly agree", and 50 percent "don't know."

Question five: Liberian programs shown on television do not address well nor reflect the political realities of the country. To answer this question, 70 percent of the Liberian respondents "strongly agree", or "agree", 20 percent "strongly disagree" and 10 percent. On the American side, 50 percent "strongly agree", and 50 percent "don't know".

For question six, (Liberian programs shown on television do not address well nor reflect the economic realities of the country), 50 percent of the U.S. respondents "agree", or "strongly agree," 33 percent "don't know" and 17 percent "strongly disagree". For Liberian respondents, 90 percent "strongly agree," while 10 percent "don't know."

As for question seven (Liberian programs transmitted on radio do not address well nor reflect the social realities of the country), 67 percent of the American respondents "strongly agree", 17 percent "strongly disagree", and 17 percent "don't know." On the Liberian side, 80 percent "strongly agree" while 20 percent "don't know."

Question eight (Liberian programs transmitted on radio do not address well nor reflect the political realities of the country), 83 percent of the U.S. respondents "strongly agree," while 17 percent "don't know." For Liberian respondents, 60 percent "strongly agree," or "agree," while 30 percent "strongly disagree," and 10 percent "don't know."

Question nine (Liberian programs transmitted on radio do not address well nor reflect the economic realities of the country), 67 percent of the American respondents "agree", or "strongly agree" and 33 percent "don't know." 60 percent of the Liberian respondents "strongly agree," while 30 percent "disagree" or "strongly disagree," while 10 percent "don't know."

Question ten: Most of the programs shown on Liberian television networks are Western oriented with sexual overtones. On this question, 50 percent of the U.S. respondents "strongly agree," while 33 percent "don't know." As for the Liberian respondents, 60 percent "strongly agree," or "agree", while 20 percent "strongly disagree", and 20 percent "don't know."

As for question eleven (Most of the programs transmitted on Liberian radio network are Western oriented with sexual overtones), 50 percent of the American respondents "strongly agree," while 50 percent "don't know". As for Liberian respondents 10 percent "strongly agree" while 70 percent "strongly disagree" and 20 percent "don't know."

Findings

Predicated upon the above tabulations, it was discovered that entertainment (the transmission of American programs and advertisements on the Liberian communications networks) do not significantly affect the Liberian culture and traditions. However, because most of the programs originated from the U.S. and Great Britain, it is asserted that Western culture slightly affects or influences the

lifestyles of Liberians and the contemporary social, political, and economic activities in the Liberian society.

Culture

In the culture category (see tables 9, 10, and 11), six-and-a-half questions were asked of the respondents who were randomly selected in Washington, D.C. and in Monrovia, Liberia. On the first question (African culture is not sufficiently depicted on the Liberian television network nor on its radio medium), 70 percent of the Liberian respondents "strongly agree," while 30 percent "strongly disagree" or "agree." As for the American respondents, 50 percent "strongly agree" and 50 percent "strongly disagree."

Question two: Liberian policymakers prefer American culture to their own. This question received the following response from the Liberian respondents: 30 percent "strongly agree", 50 percent "disagree" or "strongly disagree" and 20 percent "don't know." For the American respondents, 37 percent "strongly disagree" or "disagree" and 50 percent "don't know."

As for question three (Christianity is regarded as the most acceptable form of religion in Liberia as compared to other African religions and Islam), 80 percent of the Liberian policymakers "strongly agree," 10 percent "disagree," while 10 percent "don't know," marginally. For the American policymakers, 100 percent "strongly agree" or "agree."

Question four: Respect for parents and elders has become nonexistent in Liberia. As for this question, 30 percent of the Liberian policymakers "agree", 50

percent "disagree", and 20 percent "don't know." American respondents answered thus: 67 percent "don't know" while 33 percent "strongly disagree." Question five: To maintain African culture and traditions in Liberia, any planned educational programs must reflect the merits and demerits of African cultural characteristics. This question was addressed by the respondents in the following manner: 100 percent of the Liberian respondents "strongly agree", while 100 percent of the American policymakers also "strongly agree."

Answering question six (Whose role is it to maintain culture and traditions in Liberia? (a) policymakers), or (b) parents. 90 percent of the Liberian respondents "strongly agree" and 10 percent "don't know." With the American respondents, 100 percent "strongly agree." On question (b), 100 percent "strongly agree." On the American side, 100 percent "agree."

Findings

It is discovered that Liberian policymakers prefer American culture to their own. This is based on the fact that most Liberian policymakers are descendants of the freed Africans who emigrated from America, and are Christians. The computation shows clearly that the higher percentage (100%) of the Liberian and American respondents "strongly agree" with the above statement.

Corporate Communication

Like the previous categories, corporate communication has six categorical questions which were addressed to both the Liberian and American policymakers. (See tables 12, 13, and 14). On the first question (Information regarding the

operations of U.S. companies are not made available to the Liberian public), 90 percent of the Liberian policymakers "strongly agree", while 10 percent "disagree" or "strongly disagree". On the U.S. side, 50 percent "strongly agree," while 50 percent "disagree."

Question two: United States companies (i.e. Firestone, LAMCO, United States Trading Company, etc.), extract Liberian resources without offering any incentives to the country. Liberian respondents answered this question as indicated: 30 percent "strongly agree," 60 percent "disagree", while 10 percent "don't know." As for the U.S. policymakers, 50 percent "strongly agree," or "agree", and 50 percent "disagree."

On the third question (Leaders of U.S. corporations operating in Liberia provide accurate information about profit or loss gain from their operations), 10 percent of the Liberian respondents "strongly agree" while 60 percent "strongly disagree," and 30 percent "don't know." On the same question, 100 percent of U.S. respondents "strongly agree."

Question four (The taxes paid by U.S. corporations to Liberia are adequate), of the 10 Liberian respondents, 40 percent "disagree" while 60 percent "don't know." With the six U.S. respondents, 100 percent "disagree."

On question five (There is no two-way communications between Liberian policymakers and American corporate leaders), 20 percent of the Liberian policymakers "strongly agree", while 50 percent "disagree" and 30 percent "don't know." The six American respondents scored thus: 100 percent "strongly agree" or

"agree." Question six: Corporate communication is essential for the building of Liberia's infrastructure. On this question, 90 percent of the Liberian policymakers "strongly agree" while 10 percent "don't know." As for the Americans, 100 percent "strongly agree."

Findings

It was established that there was no two-way communications between Liberian policymakers and American corporate leaders, except where their corporate interests were concerned, or became significantly paramount over the interests of Liberians.

Diplomatic Communication

Concerning diplomatic communication (see tables 15, 16, and 17) between the United States' policymakers and the Liberian policymakers, six categorical questions were posed. Necessary and sufficient answers were given by the respondents.

On question one (Diplomatic communication between American and Liberian policymakers is biased in favor of America), 80 percent of the Liberian policymakers "strongly agree," or "agree," 10 percent "strongly disagree" and 10 percent "don't know." On the American side, 67 percent "strongly disagree" or "disagree" while 33 percent "don't know."

Question two: United States policymakers dictate American policy to Liberian policymakers regardless of that policy's constructive use for Liberia. Answering this question, 80 percent of the Liberian respondents "strongly agree," 10 percent "disagree", while 10 percent "don't know." The U.S. respondents answered thus: 100 percent "strongly disagree."

As for question three (American policymakers communicate with Liberian policymakers only when their interests are at stake in the country), Liberian respondents scored as follows: 50 percent "strongly agree", 30 percent "disagree" and 20 percent "don't know." As for American policymakers, 100 percent "strongly disagree."

Question four: Liberian policymakers communicate with American policymakers only when their interests are at stake in the country or in the U.S. On this question, 40 percent of the Liberian respondents "strongly agree", 40 percent "disagree" and 20 percent "don't know." On the American side, 100 percent "disagree."

On question five (Diplomatic communication between the United States and Liberia has been reduced substantially by the demise of the "cold war" between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union), of the Liberian respondents, 80 percent "strongly agree," while 20 percent "don't know." As for the American policymakers, 100 percent "strongly disagree."

On question six (Since the death of some American missionaries during the violent Liberian civil war, diplomatic communication between American policymakers and heads of the various warring factions in Liberia has broken down), 50 percent of the Liberian respondents "agree," while 50 percent "disagree." On the American side, 100 percent "strongly disagree."

Findings

It can be established that the prevailing assumption of the Liberian policymakers is that the United States policymakers dictate American policy to Liberian policymakers regardless of that policy's constructive use for Liberia. It was discovered also that American policymakers do not take into consideration the cultural motifs of the Liberian society when formulating policy for that country. As such, and in view of the diminishing Liberian economy and political paralysis, it seems hardly probable that democracy can be established there. The U.S. policymakers should concern themselves with, first, analyzing and appreciating the dynamics of Liberia's diverse ethnic linkages and ethos, and second, assisting to build a democracy and the free enterprise system consistent with Liberia's cultural and social characteristics in mind, otherwise problems of unimaginable proportions would impede the building of contemporary democracy in Liberia.

Military Communication

Concerning military communication (see tables 18, 19, and 20) between the United States and Liberia, four prominent questions were asked of both the Liberian and the American policymakers. The questions are categorized.

Question one (U.S. military communications are responsible for the destruction of Liberia's institutions), 20 percent of the Liberian policymakers "strongly agree," 40 percent "strongly disagree" and 40 percent "don't know." For the American policymakers, 100 percent "strongly disagree."

Question two: The installation of U.S. military communication posts (i.e. the Omega Navigational Towers, Diplomatic communications, etc.) help to sustain the Liberian economy. On the Liberian side, 60 percent "strongly agree" or "agree", while 40 percent "strongly disagree." As for the Americans, 100 percent "strongly agree."

Question three (Military communication between the United States and Liberia will help American policymakers to embark on sound policy dealing with mutual security interests), 80 percent of the Liberian policymakers "strongly agree", while 20 percent "don't know." As for the Americans, 33 percent "disagree" while 67 percent "don't know."

Question four: The U.S. uses its operations of military communication posts in Liberia for the purpose of enhancing America's own security interests in Liberia and elsewhere in Africa. On this question, 100 percent of the Liberian policymakers "strongly agree." As for the American policymakers, 100 percent also "strongly agree."

Findings

This analysis found that the United States military communications were not responsible for the destruction of Liberian institutions, rather they were contributory factors in Liberia's economic and security development. The study proved that the operations of military communications in Liberia were purely for American security interests. The study also found that military communications were relevant because

they served another anchor while they prevented Liberian regimes from destabilization from the inception of the Cold War to its demise.

**Summary of the U.S. and Liberia Policymakers
Based on the Limited Number of Samples**

Table 6. Responses of U.S. Policymakers on Entertainment in Liberia.

# QS	SA	%	A	%	DK	%	DA	%	SDA	%	T
1	2	33	1	17	3	50					6
2	3	50	3	50							6
3			1	17	5	83					6
4			3	50	3	50					6
5	1	17	2	33	3	50					6
6			3	50	2	33	1	17			6
7			4	67	1	17	1	17			6
8			5	83	1	17					6
9			4	67	2	33					6
10			3	50	1	17	2	17			6
11			3	50	3	50					6

Table 7. Responses of Liberian Policymakers on Entertainment.

# QS	SA	%	A	%	DK	%	DA	%	SDA	%	T
1	2	20	7	70	1	10					10
2			3	30	1	10	6	60			10
3	2	20	4	40	1	10	3	30			10
4	2	20	2	20			6	60			10
5	4	40	3	30			2	20	1	10	10
6	3	30	6	60			1	10			10
7			2	20	2	20	6	60			10
8	1	10	5	50	1	10	3	30			10
9	1	10	5	50	1	10	3	30			10
10	2	20	4	40	2	20	2	20			10
11			1	10	2	20	6	60	1	10	10

Table 8. Comparative Responses of Liberian and the U.S. Policymakers on Entertainment.

				U.S.				LIB.
#QS	SA/A	SDA/D	DK		SA/A	SDA/D	DK	
1.	50%		50%		90%		10%	
2.	100%				30%	60%	10%	
3.	17%		83%		60%	30%	10%	
4.	50%		50%		40%	60%		
5.	50%		50%		70%	20%	10%	
6.	50%	17%	33%		90%	10%		
7.	67%	17%	17%		80%		20%	
8.	83%		17%		60%		40%	
9.	67%		33%		60%	30%	10%	
10.	50%	17%	33%		60%	20%	20%	
11.	50%		50%		10%	70%	20%	

Table 11. Comparative Responses of the U.S. and Liberia Policymakers on Culture.

				U.S.				LIB.
#QS	SA/A	SDA/D	DK		SA/A	SDA/D	DK	
1.	50%	50%			70%	30%		
2.		37%	63%		30%	50%	20%	
3.	100%				80%	10%	10%	
4.	67%	33%			30%	50%	20%	
5.	100%				100%			
6a.	100%				90%		10%	
6b.	100%				100%			

Table 12. Responses of Liberia Policymakers on Corporate Communication in Liberia.

# QS	SA	%	A	%	DK	%	DA	%	SDA	%	T
1	6	60	3	30			1	10			10
2	2	20	1	10	1	10	6	60			10
3	1	10			3	30	3	30	3	30	10
4					6	60	4	40			10
5	1	10	1	10	3	30	5	50			10
6	6	60	3	30	1						10

Table 13. Responses of U.S. Policymakers on Corporate Communication in Liberia.

# QS	SA	%	A	%	DK	%	DA	%	SDA	%	T
1	2	33	4	67							6
2	1	17	2	33			3	50			6
3	5	83	1	17							6
4							4	67	2	33	6
5	4	67	2	33							6
6	5	83	1	17							6

Table 14. Comparative Responses of U.S.-Liberia Policymakers on Corporate Communication in Liberia.

				U.S.				LIB.
#QS	SA/A	SDA/D	DK		SA/A	SDA/D	DK	
1.	50%	50%			90%		10%	
2.	50%	50%			30%	60%	10%	
3.	100%				10%	60%	30%	
4.		100%				40%	60%	
5.	100%				20%	50%	30%	
6.	100%				90%		10%	

Table 15. Liberia Policymakers' Responses on Diplomatic Communication.

# QS	SA	%	A	%	DK	%	DA	%	SDA	%	T
1	6	60	2	20	1	10	1	10			10
2	4	40	4	40	1	10	1	10			10
3	3	30	2	20	3	30	2	20			10
4	1	10	3	30	2	20	4	40			10
5	6	60	2	20			2	20			10
			2	20	3	30	5	50			10

Table 16. U.S. Policymakers' Responses on Diplomatic Communication in Liberia.

# QS	SA	%	A	%	DK	%	DA	%	SDA	%	T
1					2	33			4	67	6
2									6	100	6
3							5	83	1	17	6
4							6	100			6
5							6	100			6
6							5	83	1	17	6

Table 17. Comparative Responses of U.S. and Liberia Policymakers on Diplomatic Communication.

				U.S.				LIB.
#QS	SA/A	SDA/A	DK		SA/A	SDA/A	DK	
1.		67%	33%		80%	10%	10%	
2.		100%			80%	10%	10%	
3.		100%			50%	30%	20%	
4.		100%			40%	20%	20%	
5.		100%			80%	20%		
6.		100%			50%	50%		

Table 18. Liberia Policymakers' Responses on Military Communication.

#QS	SA	%	A	%	DK	%	DA	%	SDA	%	T
1.	1	10	1	10	4	40	4	40			10
2.	2	20	4	40			4	40			10
3.	4	40	4	40	2	20					10
4.	7	70	3	30							10

Table 19. Responses of U.S. Policymakers on Military Communication to Liberia.

# QS	SA	%	A	%	DK	%	DA	%	SDA	%	T
1									6	100	6
2	6	100									6
3					4	67	2	33			6
4	6	100									

Table 20. U.S.-Liberia Policymakers' Comparative Responses on Military Communication.

				U.S.				LIB.
#QS	SA/A	SDA/D	DK		SA/A	SDA/D	DK	
1.		100%			20%	40%	40%	
2.	100%				60%	40%		
3.		33%	67%		80%	20%		
4.	100%				100%			

Table 21 highlights the differences in age and race of the Liberian and the U.S. policymakers who were interviewed for this case study. Both Liberia and the U.S. have one policymaker each who was under 30 years. From 30 to 50 years, there were six Liberian policymakers and five American policymakers. In the category over 50 years, Liberia has three policymakers while the U.S. has none.

Table 22 shows the gender and nationality of the policymakers. Under 30 years on the Liberian side, there was one male and zero female, and on the American side, there was also one male and no female. In the 30 to 50 years category, there were six males and zero females, and on the American side there were five males and zero females. Within the over 50 years category, there were three policymakers on the Liberian side who were male and no female, and on the American side there were zero male and zero female.

There are interesting combinations as far as levels of education are concerned in Table 23. Regarding secondary education, there were no policymakers with that level of education on both sides. Two Liberian policymakers had college education, while one U.S. policymaker also had the same level of education. Eight Liberian policymakers had graduate or professional education, while five U.S. policymakers had graduate or professional education.

Table 21. Comparison of Liberia and the U.S.'s Policymakers by Race, Age.

		Policymakers		Total
		Race		
		Liberians (blacks)	Americans (white)	
a	under 30 years	1	1	2
g	30 to 50 years	6	5	11
e	over 50 years	3	0	3
	Total	10	6	16

Table 22. Illustration of Liberia and U.S. Policymakers by Gender, Nationality.

		Gender				T
		Male		Female		
		Liberia	U.S.	Liberia	U.S.	
a	under 30 years	1	1	0	0	2
g	30 to 50 years	6	5	0	0	11
e	over 50 years	3	0	0	0	3

Table 23. Levels of Education of Liberia and the U.S. Policymakers

	Nationality	
	Liberians	Americans
Secondary Education	0	0
College	2	1
Graduate or Professional	8	5
TOTAL	10	6

Summary of Findings

As a whole, the respondents said that entertainment (the transmission of American programs and advertisements on the Liberian communications networks (i.e., radio, television, newspapers, magazines, etc.) do not significantly affect the Liberian culture and traditions. However, because most of the programs originated from the U.S. and Great Britain, the respondents asserted that Western culture slightly affects or influences the lifestyles of Liberians and the contemporary social, political, and economic activities in the Liberian society.

The respondents stated that the Liberian policymakers prefer American culture to their own. They noted that the basis for their collective view is that most Liberian policymakers are descendants of the freed Africans who emigrated from America in the 1800s, and are Christians.

The respondents established also that during the Cold War there was no two-way communications between Liberian policymakers and American corporate leaders, except where their corporate interests were concerned or became significantly paramount over the interests of Liberians. But the clarion call of the respondents was that the U.S. policymakers dictated American policy to Liberian policymakers regardless of that policy's constructive use for Liberia. They said also that American policymakers do not take into consideration the cultural motifs of the Liberian society when formulating a policy for that country. They stated that in view of the diminishing Liberian economy and political paralysis, it seems hardly probable that democracy can be established there. They noted that in order for democracy to be

established in Liberia, the U.S. policymakers should concern themselves with, first, analyzing and appreciating the dynamics of Liberia's diverse ethnic linkages and ethos, and second, assisting in building democracy and the free enterprise system consistent with Liberia's cultural and social relationships in mind. They conceded, otherwise, that problems of unimaginable proportions would surface thus impeding the building of contemporary democracy in Liberia.

They noted also that the U.S. military communications were not responsible for the destruction of Liberia's institutions, rather the military communications were contributory factors in Liberia's economic and security development. The respondents stated that while the operations of military communications (i.e. an OMEGA Navigation Station, a telecommunications relay station, etc.) were purely for American security interests, they were relevant because they prevented Liberian regimes, from President William V.S. Tubman's rule to President Samuel Kanyon Doe's dictatorship, from destabilization. It is significant to state, however, that the small sample size of this study limit its generalization.

In the end, this chapter revealed that during the Cold War, with emphasis on the decades (1960-1990), Liberian policymakers manipulated their relationships with the U.S. policymakers to achieve two objectives: (1) their parochial political, economic and social interests, and (2) their wholistic contribution to the U.S. policymakers' perennial efforts to achieve American interests in Liberia.

CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY AND FINDINGS

Summary

This study summarizes the effects of U.S. political communication in Liberia from an Afrocentric perspective. An Afrocentric perspective, in the words of Molefi Kete Asante, "re-establishes the centrality of the ancient Kemetic (Egyptian) civilization and the Nile Valley cultural complex as points of reference for an African perspective in much the same way as Greece and Rome serve as reference points for the European World" (Asante, 1987, p. 9). He pointed out further that "Without the Afrocentric perspective the imposition of the European line as universal hinders cultural understanding and demeans humanity (Asante, 1987, pp. 10-11).

This study investigates the impact of U.S. political communication and information on Liberian policymakers from 1960-1990 and explicates the degree to which they affected the realization of American interests in Liberia. It discusses the historical and ideological foundations and cultural differences between Liberia and the United States, and delineates the process by and through which the study was conducted. It further operationally and theoretically characterizes how the United States used political communication and information to achieve its interests in Africa.

This study focuses on how political communication and information emanating from the United States were received, interpreted and utilized by Liberian policymakers for political, economic and social reasons. It historically asserts how the U.S. political communication contributed to developing the foundations of Liberia's

political, economic and social institutions from 1960-1990. It provides also a broader overview of the crucial roles played by the Voice of America, International Communications Agency; Agency for International Development; U.S. State Department vis-a-vis Liberia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Information, and its communications media, in enlightening Liberians about the strategies used by the U.S. in achieving its interests in Liberia.

Thus, an epistemological examination of the political communication and information policies of the United States government, regarding Liberia and the West African sub-region in terms of military, economic and political arenas were made. Further, this study extrapolates the integral role of the U.S. political communication and information in Liberia in the 21st century. It argues cosmologically the extent to which the U.S. political communication and information impacted upon Liberians and Liberian policymakers for the past three decades (1960-1990) during the height of the Cold War.

In the 1960s when colonialism ended, many colonial nation-states in Africa became independent and their policymakers opted for democratic rule. From the beginning these policymakers practiced democracy; however, this practice soon eroded and they advocated radical nationalism, employed dictatorial rule and created personality cults which resulted in nation-states feuds, tribal demarcations, civil war and anarchy. The rule of the following leaders clearly attested to such malignly: Presidents Sekou Toure of Guinea; Modibo Keta of Mali; Osageyfo Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana; Mohammed Siad Barre of Somali; Gaafar Neimery of Sudan; Colonel

Muammar Qadafi of Libya; Sylvanus Olympio and Gnassingbe Etienne Eyadema of Togo; Sir Milton Margai and Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone; and William V.S. Tubman, William R. Tolbert, Jr., and Samuel Kanyon Doe of Liberia, among others. During their regime, this post-World War II generation of African policymakers used political communication and information to sustain their positions.

As for Liberia, the study revealed that policymakers designed, manipulated and used falsehoods, rumors and lies in the form of political communication and information purposely aimed at Liberians to satisfy and accomplish their parochial, political, and economic interests. However, political communication and information which emanated from the U.S. was rational and unquestionably West-centered.

The exploratory method used in this case study assesses if the effects of the United States' political communication and information systems were tantamount to the imposition of American social (entertainment), economic (corporate), political (diplomatic), military and cultural ethos on Liberians to achieve American interests. Thus this study provides both qualitative and quantitative data (library research, interviews and questionnaires) necessary in analyzing the perimeter to which U.S. policymakers used political communication to achieve American interests in Liberia. It offers, on the other hand, the dimension to which Liberian policymakers received, interpreted and utilized U.S. political communication to maintain power, control the Liberian citizenry, embark on national development and achieve their provincial economic interests.

Some Extrapolations of the Theoretical Framework

Without any doubt the theoretical framework for this study offers some valuable extrapolations for analyzing the effects of United States political communication and information in Liberia from 1960-1990. It is an open secret that during the Cold War Liberian policymakers used insidiously political communication and information to keep the antagonistic Liberians (indigenous) in weak and controllable positions in order to maintain their political, economic and social interests, as well as foster marginal national development. Equally important, the dominator/subservient receiver relationship (U.S./Liberia), as far as political communication was concerned during the height of the Cold War, adequately enhanced how communications media were used to promote and achieve American and Liberian policymakers' interests in Liberia. As noted elsewhere, if the dissemination of U.S. political communication and information in Liberia from 1960-1990 to achieve American interests has a positive or negative effect on Liberian policymakers, then the transmission of U.S. political communication and information to Liberia is equivalent to the imposition of American political, economic, military and cultural ethos on Liberians to achieve American interests. As clearly reflected, the dissemination of U.S. political communication and information to Liberia has a positive impact. On the basis of this significant impact, the U.S. realized its interests in Liberia during the Cold War.

This study reveals pertinent factors which caused Liberian policymakers to allow Liberia to become a proxy or a "satellite" country for the United States in

Africa. One of the factors is economic, and the others are historical and ideological. Economic in a sense that prior to and after World War II, the U.S. invested heavily in Liberia. These investments included The Firestone, Goodrich, and Uniroyal rubber plantations; an iron ore mine in which Bethlehem Steel has a 25 percent interest; and local branches of affiliates of Chase Manhattan, Citibank and Chemical Bank. Liberia was a principal stopping point for Pan American (which also had a management contract for the airport); American bank loans outstanding aggregate about \$100 million; AID has outstanding loans of \$76 million. Located there also are the U.S. Military Mission to Liberia; Voice of America relay station; a telecommunications relay station that transmits the diplomatic traffic between Washington and almost all of the U.S. Embassies in Africa; an OMEGA Navigation Center; and about 3,500 American citizens who reside in Liberia.

Historically, Liberia was founded by freed Africans who emigrated to Africa in the 1800s under the auspices of the American Colonization Society. These freed Africans carried with them American culture and traditions. Ideologically, freed Africans patterned their lifestyle, form of government, and cultural individualism after that of the United States, and in this process denied the inclusion of indigenous Africans and their form of democracy in the governance of the country.

This pattern of exclusionary rule on the part of the freed Africans who ruled Liberia from 1847 to the military interregnum in 1980, and the post-military era, created an atmosphere of continued confrontation between the freed Africans and indigenous Liberians which resulted in the destruction of the First Republic and

subsequently led to the eruption, since 1989, of the atrocious civil war. The extrapolation here is linear: Liberian policymakers from the period of Liberia's independence on July 26, 1847, up to the contemporary time (especially between 1960-1990), relied on their "special" (historical, cultural and ideological) relationship with the U.S. policymakers, and they promoted American interests in Liberia, as well as in the West African sub-region and elsewhere in Africa. In this regard, Liberian policymakers also benefitted.

This author argues, aesthetically, that U.S. political communication has played an integral and paramount role in the stability of Liberia during the Cold War period even though from a domineering position. The interests of Liberia and other countries in West Africa would have been well served had the U.S. attached greater significance in dealing with "Black" African policymakers on issues of mutual concern. It was recognized, through this study, that due to institutionalized racism in the U.S. during the Cold War, its policymakers not only overlooked Africa but failed to integrate the power base there by offering opportunities to African American policymakers to participate in the construction of economic, social, political and military policies for Africa.

General Overview

General overview 1. Scrutinizing the study, we can only reject the hypothesis that Liberian policymakers reorient their domestic policy to be in consonance with prevailing American interests in the country because they were usually influenced by the powerful United States' communications propaganda. The communications media

helped to marginalize Liberian policymakers who were misinformed by its propagandistic designs, thus making them ineffectual and susceptible to American cultural influences, as well as political, military and economic exploitations. This was based on the perceptions of Liberian and American policymakers who were interviewed for this study. They stated that only a "non-confrontational, special relationship" has existed between Liberia and the U.S. from the period of its foundation to the present time.

General overview 2. The findings indicate that we accept the hypothesis that the effects of U.S. political communication and information have implicit impact on Liberian policymakers. On account of this, the U.S. achieved its interests in Liberia in the three decades (1960-1990) during the Cold War. This is predicated on the view that many Liberian and American policymakers agreed that Western culture slightly affected or influenced the lifestyles of Liberians and the contemporary social, economic and political activities of Liberian society. Furthermore, Liberian policymakers agreed that they "prefer American culture to their own" because most Liberian policymakers were descendants of the freed Africans who emigrated from America, and they were Christians. This study also indicate that U.S. military communications were not responsible for the destruction of Liberian institutions, rather they were contributory factors in Liberia's economic and security development. This study indicates that while the operations of military communications in Liberia were purely for American security interests, they prevented Liberian regimes from destabilization from the inception of the Cold War to its demise.

General overview 3. This study discovers that the prevailing assumption of the Liberian policymakers was that the United States policymakers dictate American policy to Liberian policymakers regardless of that policy's constructive use for Liberia. This study discovers also that American policymakers do not take into consideration the cultural motifs of the Liberian society when formulating policy for that country. In view of the diminishing Liberian economy and political paralysis, it is hardly feasible that democracy can be established there. This is based on the fact that many Liberian policymakers and intellectuals revealed, through this study, that the "U.S. policymakers should concern themselves, first, with analyzing and appreciating the dynamics of Liberia's diverse ethnic linkages and ethos; and second, assisting in building a democracy and the free enterprise system consistent with Liberia's cultural and social characteristics in mind. Otherwise problems of unimaginable proportions would surface which would impede the building of a contemporary democracy in Liberia," to benefit both countries.

Recommendations for Further Studies

This study focuses on the effects of U.S. political communication in Liberia from 1960-1990. The study succeeded in its objectives: (1) it determines the extent to which the U.S. policymakers vis-a-vis Liberian policymakers used political communication and information to achieve American strategic interests in Liberia. (2) It shows the significance of how political communication and information emanating from the United States helped Liberia's national development during the period under review. Thus, a further study is necessary which will focus essentially on similar

themes but of a broader historical context covering not only Liberia but the entire African continent either from the beginning of the Cold War to its demise, or from the beginning of the Cold War to the end of this century.

Conclusion

The effects of U.S. political communication in Liberia from 1960-1990 had a profound impact on the way Liberians and Liberian policymakers lived and conducted businesses during the Cold War. Axiologically, Liberian policymakers reoriented themselves to the process of American political communication and information in order to design a coherent policy for the governing of Liberia. In other words, they exercised Western traditions coupled with the preponderance of U.S. political communication and information which were paradoxically disseminated through the communications media. In the process Liberian policymakers dictated Liberian and American policies in Liberia. Because of this, they were dislocated in the orientations of policy.

At an epistemological level, Liberian and West African policymakers should concern themselves with maintaining the security of the region, given the disinterest of the United States since the end of the Cold War. Perhaps U.S. disinterest in the region is reasonably attributed to the view that African policymakers are not concerned with the political, economic and security improvement of the region, rather they are concerned with attaining wealth and power. It is apparent that African policymakers do not want to find means to eradicate lawlessness, poverty, disease, ignorance and drug trafficking which have become pervasive in the West African sub-

region. Robert D. Kaplan, a prolific writer with impeccable credentials has conceded in his illuminating essay, "The Coming Anarchy," that

West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real "strategic" danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism. (Kaplan, 1994, p. 47)

Given such phenomena, the United States has the moral authority to arrest these conditions before they become endemic to the security of African humanity. Problems affecting the West African countries are similar to problems in other developing countries in Latin America and Asia.

As a consequence, neither a genuine constitutional democracy nor a free enterprise system could be established in Liberia or elsewhere in Africa except if and/or when the U.S. withdrew unconditionally its support for non-democratic regimes (i.e. The Mobutu Sese Sesko Regime in Zaire, Gnassingbe Etienne Eyadema of Togo; Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso; Muammar Qaddafi of Libya; Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, among others). These and other non-democratic African regimes were valuable to U.S. geo-strategic interests during the Cold War irrespective of their misrule. However, since the termination of the Cold War, they have not only become embarrassing but inimical to the fundamental political reforms sweeping Africa. As follows, they are inimical also to the political and economic interests of the United States in particular and Africa in general.

U.S. foreign policy toward Africa beginning now and continuing in the 21st century must be reconstructed along the lines of human rights, democracy and the spirit of free enterprise, which would benefit both the U.S. and Africa. Political communication and information systems should be used by U.S. policymakers to foster democracy, promote trade and industrialization in Liberia and elsewhere in Africa. As part of this effort, African American policymakers and entrepreneurs should be encouraged by U.S. policymakers to contribute to this project. With the rise of so many dignified African American personalities in U.S. government, there exists "good relations between Black America and Africa so important and appreciated than in U.S. foreign policy towards Africa. In the Clinton Administration, African Americans hold key positions that impact on U.S. foreign policy towards Africa" (Butty, 1994, p. 300). The new dimension in the orchestration of the new U.S. African policy should not only concern itself with consolidating U.S. Embassies in West, East, North, Central, and South Africa; rather this policy should promote a dialogue for building democracy. This dialogue should be articulated by U.S. policymakers in the form of political communication to African policymakers: that the mini-nation-states in Africa be consolidated into one state geo-politically in West, East, North, Central, and South Africa, in order to build a strong economic and democratic political system. Africa's immediate future seems bleak because of ethnicism, disease, and ethnic warfare as demonstrated in Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, Angola, Chad, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, etc. Kaplan (1994) reiterated similar concerns in his essay, "The Coming Anarchy":

Precisely because much of Africa is set to go over the edge at a time when the Cold War has ended, when environmental and demographic stress in other parts of the globe is becoming critical, and when the post-First World War system of nation-states-not just the Balkans but perhaps also in the Middle East-is about to be toppled, Africa suggests what war, borders, and ethnic politics will be like a few decades hence. (p. 54)

If African leaders learn to work together for the sake of African humanity, profound industrial, economic, social, political and environmental developments will occur. Falling short of these changes, Africa shall remain subservient to and exploited by imperial powers. Liberia is no exception.

It can be stated in the final analysis that this study found that the United States recognized the power of the mass media and used it to propagate and influence policies in Liberia, with the aim of maximizing American economic, social, cultural, political and security interests. In an unprecedented form, this study crucially explored, examined and delineated the structural setting under which the U.S. maintains its domination and control of Liberia through the manipulation of the communication and information systems.

This study therefore assessed and enumerated the ways and essential means by which Liberian policymakers perceived, received and used the United States political communication and information systems to dominate and influence the foundations of public policy in Liberia from 1960-1990. In this study, the author hypothesizes that the effects of United States political communication and information systems in Liberia are tantamount to the imposition of American social and cultural ethos on

Liberians. In view of this hypothetical assessment, the Liberian policymakers reoriented their domestic policy to be consistent with American interests in the country since they were influenced by the powerful United States communications media. These communications media help to marginalize Liberian policymakers who were subtly aware of its propagandistic intentions, thus making them ineffectual and susceptible to American socio-political, economic and strategic maneuvers. Such acquiescence by Liberian policymakers in the wake of pronounced dissemination of American political communication and information in Liberia, cemented the U.S. attempts at presenting itself as a benevolent ally of Liberia during the Cold War. Hence, Liberia became a fertile source for the success of American political communication, and American strategic interests were fully achieved between 1960-1990.

REFERENCES

- Adelman, Kenneth L. (1980). African realities. New York, N.Y.: Crane, Russak, & Company, Inc.
- A Fund for Free Expression Report. (1986). Best friends, violations of human rights in liberia, america's closest ally in Africa. New York: A Fund for Free Expression.
- Akinla, Oladele O. (1987). Economic Reform in Subsaharan Africa: The Changing Business and Legal Environment. Boston College Third World Journal, 7, (19), 26.
- Alexandre, Laurien. (1988). The voice of America. From detente to the reagan doctrine. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation.
- Amin, Samir. (1989). Eurocentrism. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Andren, G. (1981). Reliability and content analysis. In K. E. Rosengren (ed.), Advances in content analysis (pp. 43-67). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Ani, Marimba. (1994). Yurugu. An africa-centered critique of european cultural thought and behavior. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press.
- American Assembly. (1958). The united states and africa. New York: Columbia University Press.
- American Colonization Society Annual Report, vols. 1-10, 1818-1827.
- Asante, Clemente. (1994). Media-government relations and national development in ghana, 1957-1990. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Howard University, Washington, D.C.
- Asante, Molefi Kete. (1987). The afrocentric idea. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Asante, Molefi Kete. (1990a). Kemet, afrocentricity and knowledge. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press.
- Asante, Molefi Kete. (1990b). Afrocentricity and the critique of drama. The Western Journal of Black Studies, 14, (2), 136.

- Asante, Molefi Kete. (1983). The ideological significance of afrocentricity in intercultural communication. Journal of Black Studies, 14, (1), 15.
- Asante, Molefi Kete & Ziegler, Dhyana. (1992). Thunder and silence: The mass media in Africa. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press.
- Asante, Molefi Kete, & Welsh-Asante, Kariamuu. (1981). MYTH: the communication dimension to the african american mind. Journal of Black Studies, 11, (4), 395.
- Balogun, Ola. (1975). Cultural perspectives in the african media. In Onuora E. Nwunelli (ed.), Mass communication in nigeria: a book of reading. Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd.
- Babbie, Earl. (1992). The practice of social research. six edition. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
- Banks, Arthur S., Overstreet, William, & Schecter, Michael G. (1979). Political handbook of the world. New York: The Research Foundation of the State University of New York.
- Bienen, Henry. (1985). Populist military regimes in west africa. Armed Forces and Society, 11, (3), 357-377.
- Bletz, Donald F. (1972). The role of the military professional in the u.s. foreign policy. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Boikali III, Jerome Zack. (1985). The media system of liberia. In Frank Okwu Ugboajah (ed.), Mass communication, culture and society in west africa. New York: Hanszell Publishers.
- Boley, G.E. Saigbe. (1983). Liberia: The rise and fall of the first republic. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Butty, James. (1994). U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. West Africa, 398, 300.
- Cesaire, Aime. (1972). Discourse on colonialism. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Chinweizu, Jemie, Onwuchekwa, & Madubuike, Ihechukwu. (1983). Toward the decolonization of african literature. Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press.

- Clough, Michael. (1992). U.S. policy toward africa and the end of the cold war. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
- Curtin, Philip D. (1969). The atlantic slave trade: A Census. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Deng, Francis M. (1992). An african response to a new u.s. policy. TransAfrica Forum, 9, (2), 47-51.
- Deutsch, Karl. (1963). Nationalism and social communication. New York: Free Press.
- Diop, Cheikh Anta. (1991). Civilization or barbarism. Brooklyn, N.Y.: Lawrence Hill Books.
- Diop, Cheikh Anta. (1974). African origin of civilization: myth or reality. Chicago, Illinois: Lawrence Hill Books.
- Doe, Samuel Kanyon, President of Liberia. (1986). Inaugural address. Special Newsletter (Liberian Information Center, Washington, D.C.), 1, 2.
- Dunn, D. Elwood & Tarr, Byron. (1988). Liberia: a national polity in transition. Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc.
- Duignan, Peter & Gann, L.H. (1984). The united states and africa. A history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Elder, Robert E. (1968). The information machine: The united states information agency and american foreign policy. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press.
- Emerson, Rupert. (1967). Africa and united states policy. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- Fanon, Frantz. (1968). The wretched of the earth. New York: Grove Weidenfeld.
- Guannu, Joseph Saye. (1982). An introduction to liberian government. Smithtown, New York: Exposition Press.
- Guannu, Joseph Saye. (1980). The inaugural addresses of the presidents of liberia: from joseph jenkins roberts to william r. tolbert, jr., 1848-1976. Kicksville, New Jersey: Exposition Press.


- Hansen, Allen C. (1989). Usia. Public diplomacy in the computer age. Second edition. New York: Praeger.
- Hamelink, Cees J. (1983). Cultural anatomy in global communication: planning national information policy. New York: Longman.
- Head, Sydney W. (1985). World broadcasting system: a comparative analysis. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Pub. Co.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. (1990). Structural adjustment of politics in africa. World Development, 18, (7), 949.
- Holloway, Joseph E. (1981). Liberian diplomacy in africa: a study of inter-african relations. Washington, D.C. University Press of America.
- Huberich, Charles Henry. (1947). Legislative history of liberia. New York: Central Book Company, Inc.
- Immigration and Naturalization Service's Federal Citizenship Text. (1987). United states history 1600-1987 (U.S. Department of Justice Publication No. M-288). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Jones, Hannah Abeodu Bowen. (1962). The Struggle for political and cultural unification in liberia, 1847-1930. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University.
- Kaplan, Robert D. (1994). The coming anarchy. The Atlantic Monthly, 273, (2), February, 44-76.
- Karmack, Andrew M. (1958). The African economy and international trade. In American Assembly (ed.), The United States and Africa. New York: Columbia University.
- Karnga, Abayomi. (1926). History of liberia. Liverpool: D. H. Tyte & Company.
- Katz, Mark N. (1988). Gorbachev's africa policy. In Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), Africa in the 1990s and beyond. U.s. policy opportunities and choices. Algonac, Michigan: Reference Publications, Inc.
- Katz, Elihu, & Lazarsfeld, Paul. (1955). Personal influence. The part played by people in the flow of mass communications. New York: The Free Press.

- Keto, C. Tsehloane. (1991). The africa-centered perspective of history: an introduction. Laurel Springs, New Jersey: K. A. Publications.
- Kieh, George Klay. (1992). Dependency and the foreign policy of a small power. The liberian case. San Francisco: Mellen Research University Press.
- Kitchen, Helen. (1988). The making of u.s. policy toward africa. In Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), Africa in the 1990s and beyond. U.S. policy opportunities and choices. Algonac, Michigan: Reference Publications.
- Knox, Clinton E. (1975). Comment. In Frederick S. Arkhurst (ed.), U.s. policy toward africa. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Korto, Joseph D. Zeakedoe. (1991). Analysis of a policy formulation process for external aid to education: the case of the world bank and liberia. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Catholic University.
- Lasswell, H.D. (1927). The theory of political propaganda. American Political Science Review, 21, 627-631.
- Liebenow, J. Gus. (1987). Liberia: the quest for democracy. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Legum, Colin. (1965). Pan africanisms: a short political guide. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, Inc.
- Lippmann, W. (1922). Public opinion. New York: Macmillan.
- Madhubuti, Haki R. (1992). Enemies: the clash of races. Chicago: Third World Press.
- Malone, Clifford D. (1988). Organizing the nation's public diplomacy. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Mann, Jim & Lauter, David. (1993). Clinton has a policy penchant for asia (News Analysis). The Philadelphia Inquirer, November, p. 2.
- Murphy, Jefferson. (1969). Understanding africa. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company.
- Naigow, Peter Lorkula. (1977). How the voice of america's african division perceives and programs for sub-saharan africa: a case study of criteria used in determining Programming (Doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1977). Dissertation Abstracts, 38, (03), 1086.

- Neuman, Russell W., McKnight, Lee, & Solomon, Richard Jay. (1993). The politics of a paradigm shift: telecommunications regulation and the communications revolution. Political Communication, 10, (1), 77-94.
- Nielsen, Waldemar. (1969). The great powers and africa. New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc.
- Nnaemeka, Tony Ike. (1990). Cultural influences, modern changes, and the sociology of modern political communication. Journal of Black Studies, 20, (9), 308.
- Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W.B. (1975). Conflicting interests of africa and the united states. In Frederick S. Arkhurst (ed.), U.s. policy toward africa. New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc.
- Price, Robert William. (1980). The black republic of liberia, 1822-1912: a ninety year struggle for international acceptance (Doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1980). Dissertation Abstracts International, 41, 106, 2724.
- Pye, Lucien W. (1963). Communications and political development. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Robertson, David B., & Judd, Dennis R. (1989). The development of american public policy. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company.
- Robinson, Randall. (1992). U.S. africa policy: building a democratic peace. TransAfrica Forum, 2, (2), 39-46.
- Rotberg, Robert I. (1988). Africa in the 1990s and beyond. U.s. policy opportunities and choices. Algonac, Michigan: Reference Publications, Inc.
- Sawyer, Amos. (1992). The emergence of autocracy in liberia: tragedy and challenge San Francisco, California: Institute for Contemporary Studies.
- Schiller, Herbert I. (1984). Information and the crisis economy. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation.
- Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M. (1965). A thousand days. John f. kennedy in the white house. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- Servaes, J. (1991). Toward a new perspective for communication and development. In F.L. Casmir (ed.), Communication in development (pp. 51-85). Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex.


- The African Repository and Colonial Journal, 1825.
- Underwood, John. (1988). The debt problem in sub-saharan africa: causes, consequences, and possible solutions. In Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), Africa in the 1990s and beyond. U.s. policy opportunities and choices. Algonac, Michigan: Reference Publications.
- Vincent, Donna M. (1992). Voice of america in the changing world of africa. Africa Communications, January/February, p. 28.
- VOA. (1992). Programming handbook, third edition. Washington, D.C.: Voice of America.
- VOA. (1994). English to africa profile. Newsletter of the English to Africa Branch of VOA. Washington, D.C.: Voice of America.
- VOA. (1993). Program review narrative. Newsletter of the English to Africa Branch of VOA. Washington, D.C.: Voice of America.
- Wa Thiong'o, Ngugi. (1986). Decolonising the mind. The politics of language in african literature. London: James Currey.
- Welsh-Asante, Kariamu. (1991). Foreword. In Molefi Kete Asante (ed.), Afrocentricity. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc.
- Whitaker, Jennifer Seymour. (1978). Africa and the united states vital interests. New York: New York University Press.
- Wright, Stephen. (1992). Africa in the post-cold war world. TransAfrica Forum, 9, (2), 25-35.
- Wonkeryor, Edward Lama. (1980). A historical development of the role and function of broadcasting in liberia. Unpublished master's degree thesis, University of South Carolina, Columbia, S.C.

POLITICAL MAP OF LIBERIA



Source: Ministry of Information, Cultural Affairs & Tourism; and Ministry of Lands & Mines, Monrovia, 1986.

DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR LIBERIAN ETHNIC AND LANGUAGE GROUPS



Source: Ministry of Information, Cultural Affairs & Tourism; and Ministry of Lands & Mines, Monrovia, 1986.

APPENDIX C
A SAMPLE OF LETTERS TO THE U.S.
AND LIBERIAN POLICYMAKERS

1300 Cecil B. Moore Ave.
Apt. 5
Temple University
Philadelphia, PA 19122
January 5, 1994

Mr. William Jackson
Country Desk Officer for Liberia
AFW, Room 4250
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Jackson:

I am writing to confirm February 18, 1994, 3:00 p.m. as the appropriate date and time for you to please help me by giving me interview about how American political communication and information have, from 1960-1990, contributed to at best, developing the political, economic, cultural and social institutions of Liberia; and at worst, helping to destroy Liberia's existence as a viable political, economic, cultural and social entity among the community of nations. At the interview, we shall examine the broader overview of the crucial roles played by the Department of State vis-a-vis Liberia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the containment of and awakening the consciousness of Liberians about the United States' strategies in achieving its interests in Liberia. Finally, our discourse will look at the current political communication and information policies of the United States government, regarding Liberia and the West African sub-region in terms of military, economic and political spheres.

I would appreciate if you could provide me with some valuable historical background information about the kinds of political communication and information which were provided by the Department of State to the Liberian government to help foster economic, social and political development, as well as military training in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and up to the present time. I am currently at Temple University for studies leading to the Ph.D. in African American Studies.

JACKSON

The focus of my research is to examine, explore and delineate the effects of United States' political communication in Liberia from 1960-1990. This research will provide me with some pertinent insight into how the American and Liberian policymakers use political communication and information systems to effect public policy and maintain their individual interests in Liberia.

Prior to our scheduled interview, I would like to request your help in completing the enclosed questionnaire for the purpose of gathering additional data for my dissertation research. This questionnaire is multiple-choiced. Some questions require narrative responses and may need some time. I would appreciate your kind understanding and patience in providing this help.

This questionnaire technique is deemed sufficient and necessary due to the explanatory nature of the study. I have enclosed a self-addressed envelop for returning the completed questionnaire. Please let me know soon in writing if the confirmed date and time meet your approval. Thanks for your time and help.

Sincerely,

Edward Lama Wonkeryor
Ph.D. Candidate

ENCLOSURE

APPENDIX D
A LETTER FROM THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

United States Department of State
Washington, D.C.
February 18, 1994

Mr. Edward Wonkeryor
1300 Cecil B. Moore Ave., Apt. 5
Temple University
Philadelphia, PA 19122

Dear Mr. Wonkeryor:

As a follow-up to our discussion today on your doctoral thesis on U.S.-Liberian diplomatic relations I would like confirm that my observations were personal and should not be attributed as the views of the U.S. Government. That having been said, I have no objection to your citing me by name as a source.

I wish you success in completing your research and would welcome a copy (or an abstract even) of the finished product.

Sincerely,

William D. Jackson
Country Desk Officer for Liberia

APPENDIX E
QUESTIONNAIRE COMPLETED BY AMERICAN
AND LIBERIAN POLICYMAKERS

Instructions

The following statements reflect some beliefs, opinions, feelings and studies of the transmissions of political communication and information to Liberia to galvanize American interests. Please indicate your agreement/disagreement with each of the following statements by circling the appropriate response.

A. Entertainment

1. The depiction of violence on television programs imported from the United States is influencing Liberian teenagers to resort to violence.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

2. Traditional African values among the Liberians makes it difficult to accept the content of many American movies/American radio programs.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't know 4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

3. Liberian listeners and viewers of radio and television programs which emanate from the U.S., are influenced by the advertisement of consumer products.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't know 4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

4. Liberian programs shown on television do not address well nor reflect the social realities of the country.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree.

5. Liberian programs shown on television do not address well nor reflect the political realities of the country.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree

5. Strongly Disagree

6. Liberian programs shown on television do not address well nor reflect the economic realities of the country.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree

5. Strongly Disagree

7. Liberian programs transmitted on radio do not address well nor reflect the social realities of the country.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree

5. Strongly Disagree

8. Liberian programs transmitted on radio do not address well nor reflect the political realities of the country.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree

5. Strongly Disagree

9. Liberian programs transmitted on radio do not address well nor reflect the economic realities of the country.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree

5. Strongly Disagree

10. Most of the programs shown on Liberian television network are Western oriented with sexual overtones.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree

5. Strongly Disagree.

11. Most of the programs transmitted on Liberian radio network are Western oriented with sexual overtones.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

B. Culture

1. African culture is not sufficiently depicted on the Liberian television network nor on its radio medium.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree
5. Strongly Agree.

2. Liberian policymakers prefer American culture than their own.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

3. Christianity is regarded as the most acceptable form of religion in Liberia as compared to other African religions and Islam.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

4. Respect for parents and elders has become nonexistent in Liberia.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

If your response was (1) or (2) with the above, is this due to:

- (a) influx of American culture (b) other: _____
specify _____

5. To maintain the African culture and traditions in Liberia, any planned educational programs must reflect the merits and demerits of the African cultural characteristics.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly Disagree

6. Whose role is it to maintain culture and traditions in Liberia?

- (a) Policymakers 1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know
 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree

- (b) Parents 1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know
 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree

C. Corporate Communication

1. Information regarding the operations of U.S. companies are not made available to the Liberian public.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly Disagree

2. United States companies (i.e. Firestone, LAMCO, United States Trading Company, etc.) Liberian resources without offering any incentives to the country.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly Disagree

3. Leaders of U.S. corporations operating in Liberia provide accurate information about profit or loss gain from their operations.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly Disagree

Please explain your response _____

4. The taxes paid by U.S. corporations to Liberia are adequate.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

5. There is no two-way communications between Liberian policymakers and American corporate leaders.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

6. Corporate communication is essential for the building of Liberia's infrastructure.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree.

D. Diplomatic Communication

1. Diplomatic communication between American and Liberian policymakers is biased in favor of America.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 3. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

2. United States policymakers dictate American policy to Liberian policymakers regardless of that policy's constructive use for Liberia.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

3. American policymakers communicate with Liberian policymakers only when their interests are at stake in the country.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

4. Liberian policymakers communicate with American policymakers only when their interests are at stake in the country or in the U.S.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree

5. Strongly Disagree

5. Diplomatic communication between the United States and Liberia has been reduced substantially by the demise of the "cold war" between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree

5. Strongly Disagree

6. Since the death of some American missionaries during the violent Liberian civil war, diplomatic communication between American policymakers and heads of the various warring factions in Liberia has broken down.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree

5. Strongly Disagree

E. Military Communication

1. U.S. military communications are responsible for the destruction of Liberian institutions.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree

5. Strongly Disagree

2. The installation of U.S. military communications posts (i.e. the Omega Navigational Towers, Diplomatic Communications, etc.) help to sustain the Liberian economy.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree

5. Strongly Disagree

3. A fair military communication between the United States and Liberia will help American policymakers to embark on sound policy dealing with mutual security interests.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

4. The U.S. uses its operation of military communication posts in Liberia for the purpose of enhancing America's own security interests in Liberia and elsewhere in Africa.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Don't Know 4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

F. Biographical Sketch

To better understand your policymaking behavior I would like to get some information about you. Your answers will be kept confidential. Please answer each question by placing an X besides the appropriate response.

1. Age _____

2. Are you a United States citizen?

- ___ Yes
___ No

3. What is your highest level of education attained?

- ___ Secondary
___ College
___ Graduate/Professional

4. Where educated _____.

5. Gender of respondent

- ___ Male
___ Female

6. What is your occupation?

- Civil servant
- Manager
- Communications specialist
- Other (specify) _____

7. What is your race or ethnic origin?

- African
- African American
- White
- Asian
- Hispanic
- Other (Please specify) _____

Thank you for your help. Please use the enclosed envelop to mail survey to: E. Lama Wonkeryor, 1300 Cecil B. Moore Ave., Apt. 5, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122. If you would welcome a follow-up interview over the phone, please furnish information as to phone contact, time and date.